Revisiting Crisis and State: Authoritarianism and Exception in Turkey

In contrast to the well-known twin currency and banking crises the literature has so far neglected a second type of twin crises, the simultaneous occurrence of currency and debt crises. The decision of a government to devalue and/or to default is closely interlinked through the government's intertemporal budget constraint. In our empirical analysis we find some evidence that one-year lagged debt crisis strongly Granger causes currency crisis and two-year lagged currency crisis weakly Granger causes debt crisis. We find strong evidence that debt and currency crises have common fundamental causes. Low reserve over imports ratio, low domestic GDP growth rate, and low FDI over external debt ratio all increase the likelihood of debt and currency crises.

When do autocrats replace their ministers? Research suggests that failed coup attempts lead autocrats to remove disloyal ruling elites. While this is an important and intuitive finding, failed coup attempts are very rare events and hence leave large amounts of variation in minister removal unexplained. Autocrats are reactionary when a rare window of opportunity, such as a failed coup attempt, occurs. However, previous work also suggests that they are anticipatory and survival-seeking. We argue that autocratic leaders are strategic actors who take preemptive action against potentially disloyal elites, rather than risking a coup attempt being realized. Using structural coup risk as a lower estimate of a leader's own perception of coup risk, we find that it significantly contributes to the prediction of minister removals. Compared to failed coup attempts, we find that it substantially improves predictive performance across a number of metrics. Our findings contribute to nascent research on government stability and the survival of autocratic leaders.

We construct and explore a new quarterly dataset covering crisis episodes in 40 developed countries over 1970–2010. First, we examine stylized facts of banking, debt, and currency crises. Using panel vector autoregression, we confirm that currency and debt crises are typically preceded by banking crises, but not vice versa. Banking crises are also the most costly in terms of the overall output loss, and output takes about six years to recover. Second, we try to identify early warning indicators of crises specific to developed economies, accounting for model uncertainty by means of Bayesian model averaging. Our results suggest that onsets of banking and currency crises tend to be preceded by booms in economic activity. In particular, we find that growth of domestic private credit, increasing FDI inflows, rising money market rates as well as increasing world GDP and inflation were common leading indicators of banking crises. Currency crisis onsets were typically preceded by rising money market rates, but also by worsening government balances and falling central bank reserves. Early warning indicators of debt crises are difficult to uncover due to the low occurrence of such episodes in our dataset. Finally, employing a signaling approach we show that using a composite early warning index significantly increases the usefulness of the model when compared to using the best single indicator (domestic private credit).

Are twin currency and debt crises special?

This paper introduces a new database of financial crises, providing an important insight into the causes, duration, and consequences of different types of financial crises. Besides extending the systemic banking crises database by Laeven and Valencia (2020) to the period 1970–2019, we develop new approaches for the identification of currency and sovereign debt crises, which we regard preferable in some respects to those in the literature. Covering 206 countries, our crises database draws on 151 systemic banking crises (1970-2019), 414 currency crises (1950-2019), 200 sovereign debt crises (1960-2019), 75 twin crises (1970-2019), and 21 triple crises (1970-2019). We provide evidence that banking and debt crises tend to coincide or precede currency crises, while debt crises and banking crises are less likely to coincide or precede each other. We also find that advanced countries experienced longer banking crises but shorter currency, debt, twin, and triple crises.

A new comprehensive database of financial crises: Identification, frequency, and duration

This study examines the formation of capital accumulation in a fishing community driven by women (fishermen's wives) and is able to produce socio-economic changes in the community. The research, located in Pattingalloang Sub-District, aims to find out the pattern of capital accumulation and the role of state in the Fishermen Women's Community (KWN) Fatimah Az-Zahrah. The research was analyzed with capital accumulation theory, structuration, social networks and the state and social democracy. The research method was carried out qualitatively with a phenomenological approach, which primary data was obtained through observation and in-depth interviews, while secondary data obtining from various literature, supporting documentation and archives that strengthen primary data. Data analysis techniques derived from words and spoken words from the observed actors. The results, illustrate the pattern of capital accumulation in terms of actors, place the women as empowerment agencies, initiation of empowerment, named Nuraeni and several women so that the Woman Fishermen Community was born, with government and non-government parties. The role of government in the formation of capital accumulation in KWN can be divided into three important roles, namely; division of power, the provider of legal certainty and social security service providers.

Though currency and debt crises quite often occur simultaneously, the links between these two types of crises are not well understood. We review how currency and debt crises could be related due to common causes, contagion effects from one crisis to the other, and complementary budget financing aspects. In an empirical analysis based on a panel of 80 countries over the period 1975–2000, we first investigate the determinants of each crisis separately. Then we estimate links between both crises employing instrumental variables techniques. We find that, while there is a negative lagged influence of currency crises on debt crises, currency crises significantly increase the risk of contemporaneous debt crises and vice versa. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

What factors explain variation in the tenure of political leaders who survive a coup d’état? Our main hypothesis is that leaders who survive a coup attempt take the opportunity to purge known and potential rivals while also deterring future coup conspirators. The severity of the purge is also hypothesized to be positively associated with longer post-coup tenures, as potential rivals are eliminated or deterred from future coup attempts. After introducing the topic of the failed coup, and presenting the dataset we developed to measure the level of punishment associated with a failed coup attempt, we offer an analysis of the effect of purges on the survival time of leaders who survive a coup attempt. We find that, conditional on regime type, purging has an effect on lengthening leader tenure, with more severe purges being associated with longer authoritarian tenures. Democratic leaders gain no advantage. Changes in military expenditures do not increase subsequent tenure. We conclude with a discussion of the results as well as what a broader dataset might reveal.

Though currency and debt crises quite often occur simultaneously, the links between these two types of crises are not well understood. We review how currency and debt crises could be related due to (1) common causes, (2) internal contagion effects from one crisis to the other, and (3) complementary budget financing aspects. The relationship between currency and debt crises is illustrated with a small theoretical model. Using panel data for 80 countries over the period 1975-2000, we analyze the relationship between currency and debt crises empirically in two steps. First, we investigate the determinants of each crisis separately. Second, we estimate links between both crises employing instrumental variables techniques. We find that, while there is a negative lagged influence of currency crises on debt crises, the occurrence of a currency crisis significantly increases the risk of a contemporaneous debt crisis and vice versa. Both types of crises are significantly more likely if the debt burden is higher.

Banking, debt, and currency crises in developed countries: Stylized facts and early warning indicators

Debt and currency crises are closely interlinked through the government's intertemporal budget constraint. The default tax and the inflation/devaluation tax can be considered as alternative means of financing. Our empirical analysis finds that high‐debt countries choose default rather than inflation/devaluation for financing, while a high money stock reduces the probability of debt crises. Further, we find strong evidence that debt and currency crises share common fundamental causes. Finally, there is a Granger causality running from debt crises to currency crises, but only weakly in the other direction.

Unity in Rupture

Stability periods between financial crises: The role of macroeconomic fundamentals and crises management policies

How do failed coups influence power personalization in dictatorships? While scholars have studied the mechanisms of personalism in dictatorships in detail, little attention has been paid to the timing and determinants of surges in personalism levels. In this article, we propose that personalism can evolve non-linearly, and show that large, quite rapid increases in personalization by dictators occur after a failed coup attempt. The logic is that failed coups are information-revealing events that provide the dictator with strong motives and ample opportunities to accumulate power. The leader uses this window of opportunity to rapidly consolidate his power at the expense of the ruling coalition. We test the theory using time-series, cross-sectional data on dictatorships in 114 countries in the period between 1946 and 2010. Two placebo tests indicate that disruptive events by regime outsiders – failed assassination attempts and civil war onsets – do not promote the rush to personalize.