Returning Veterans’ Attitudes Toward Democracy: Evidence From a Survey of Ukraine’s ATO Veterans

It has long been understood that pro-government militia activity and pro-government militia violence increase during civil war. Recent literature contends that pro-government militia activity also rises when a state is involved in an interstate rivalry. We maintain that the combination of these two threats may, somewhat counterintuitively, result in reduced pro-government militia activity in some autocracies. This unexpected outcome can be explained by differences in state capacity and legitimacy. Using Geddes’ categorization of authoritarian regimes, we expect a decline in the number of operational pro-government militias when personalist and military regimes are challenged by both an insurgency and a rivalry. Pro-government militia liabilities are magnified in this context and add to these governments’ already considerable cumulative hazards. Pro-government militia numbers will, in contrast, remain consistent in single party regimes in this same circumstance. Since party governments have ample capacity, well-known disadvantages of pro-government militias rarely pose a threat to these capable regimes. In a sample of 142 autocracies from 1981 to 2010, we find considerable empirical support for our contention.

How do ethnic links between governments and pro-government militias (PGMs) affect the abusive behaviour of PGMs? PGMs may recruit irrespective of ethnic group (Non-Ethnic PGMs), from the ethnic group that controls the government (Dominant PGMs), from quiescent groups not in control of the government (Peripheral PGMs), and from ethnic groups actively rebelling against the government (Defector PGMs). PGMs recruited on ethnic lines tend to have informal relationships with the government, so they often help the government avoid accountability for civilian targeting. Examining ethnic relationships rather than whether the relationship is informal or semi-official, however, reveals important nuances. Defector PGMs are both able to target selectively and are deterred from being too abusive. Peripheral PGMs can target civilians more frequently, but they tend to lack the capacity to carry out large-scale massacres. Dominant PGMs can and do carry out large-scale massacres, but they target civilians less frequently because they only act when government accountability is not a concern. Regression analysis of a global group-year dataset of PGM abuses (1989–2007) supports these expectations. Our analysis demonstrates the value of considering PGM ethnic relationships with the government.

With an increased focus on the role of pro-government militias in understanding intra-state conflict, scholars have primarily argued that states use militias as a proxy of the government because of low capacity or as a means of avoiding responsibility for violence against civilians. However, states with both high capacity and a willingness to commit violence against civilians have also relied upon pro-government militias in counterinsurgency operations. This paper argues that states involved in enduring interstate rivalries are more likely to use pro-government militias in order to reserve conventional military forces for potential conflict with their rival. Based on a case study of India’s Kashmir insurgency and logit analysis of pro-government militia data from 1981 to 2001, the findings provide empirical support for this theory and are robust to alternative measures and model specifications.

ABSTRACTIt is puzzling why leaders delegate authority to pro-government militias (PGMs) at the expense of professional armed forces. Several state-level explanations, ranging from low state capacity to blame evasion for human rights violations have been proposed for the establishment of PGM linkages. These explanations lack focus on the individuals making decisions to form PGMs: national leaders. It is argued that leaders create linkages with PGMs to facilitate leaders’ political survival in the event of their deposition. Threats to leaders’ survival come from the military, foreign powers, or domestic actors outside the ruling coalition. As costs of leader deposition are low for the state, leaders facing threats from one or all of these sources must invest in protection from outside of the security apparatus. The argument is tested through data on PGM linkage formation and threats to political survival. Results show that leaders under coup threat are more likely to form PGM linkages, while threats from foreign actors make leaders particularly more likely to form linkages with ethnic or religious PGMs. The findings strongly suggest that PGM linkage formation is driven by leader-level desire for political survival, rather than a host of state-level explanations.

ABSTRACTThis paper introduces the African Relational Pro-Government Militia Dataset (RPGMD). Recent research has improved our understandings of how pro-government forces form, under what conditions they are most likely to act, and how they affect the risk of internal conflict, repression, and state fragility. In this paper, we give an overview of our dataset that identifies African pro-government militias (PGMs) from 1997 to 2014. The data set shows the wide proliferation and diffusion of these groups on the African continent. We identify 149 active PGMs, 104 of which are unique to our dataset. In addition to descriptive information about these PGMs, we contribute measures of PGM alliance relationships, ethnic relationships, and context. We use these variables to examine the determinants of the presence and level of abusive behavior perpetrated by individual PGMs. Results highlight the need to consider nuances in PGM–government relationships in addition to PGM characteristics.

Examining militia relationships with the government and civilian populations can help scholars and policymakers better assess differences in militia form, function, and behavior. In this article, we examine the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU), a pro-government militia in the Philippines, to better understand how militia participants view insurgents, politicians, state security forces, and civilians based on their experiences serving in the group. We argue that analyzing these beliefs is critical to understanding how militias influence civilian security and the risk of political violence in conflict-contested areas, as well as the trajectory of civil conflict in states like the Philippines that rely on militias to perform core security functions. We base the analysis on surveys and interviews with CAFGU members and civilians living in the Eastern Visayas, a region of active and ongoing conflict, where insurgents and other armed militants advance their aims through acts of violence and terrorism. In doing so, we contribute to a growing literature on the role that militias play in civil war, as well as the implications that follow when states choose to arm “civilians” to aid in counterinsurgency and conflict suppression.

This study analyzes whether climate disasters and climate-induced food scarcities influence individuals’ willingness to fight for the state in a pro-government militia in the Philippines. We find that experiencing a disaster or subsistence loss corresponds to an increased willingness to join, even when accounting for other prominent explanations in the literature. This outcome, we argue, reflects the impact of climate change on the opportunity costs of conflict participation, especially in regions dependent on agriculture for income and food production, as diminished livelihood opportunities and subsistence resource access increase the viability of conflict participation as a strategy for livelihood diversification.

Why do some countries harbor pro-government militias (PGMs), while others do not? We assert that the deployment of PGMs depends on topographic, social, and political structures within which governments and rebels operate. Drawing on the concept of opportunity structures, we postulate that structural conditions within which governments are embedded in constitute a contributing factor to the existence and multiplicity of PGMs. Data from the Pro-Government Militia Dataset along with a two-stage hurdle model reveal that personalist regime type and civil wars increase the likelihood of PGM emergence. In contrast, ethnic fractionalization, onshore oil fields, drug production, number of rebel groups, and military prowess influence the number of PGMs.

The stigma attached to mental illnesses like schizophrenia is now well recognized in the developed world. There is, however, only limited information available on this topic from the developing countries. Measuring the stigma among psychiatrists, nonpsychiatric doctors, and general population will help assess the knowledge and attitude gap and facilitate targeted work in educating doctors and the general population. This study was carried out to evaluate the stigmatizing attitudes toward people with schizophrenia among psychiatrists, nonpsychiatric doctors, and the general population in New Delhi. A questionnaire with relevant questions to assess selected domains was designed in a google form and was circulated among psychiatrists, nonpsychiatric doctors, and people from the general community. For this study, data were taken from a group of nonpsychiatric doctors with over 10 years of experience in their field, a group of the general population having a minimum qualification of a Bachelors’ degree, from psychiatrists having a minimum qualification of an MD in Psychiatry. A total of 28 responses from nonpsychiatric doctors, 27 responses from the educated general population, and 20 responses from psychiatrists were obtained. There were significant differences (with 95% level of confidence) in the means of stigmatizing attitudes toward people with schizophrenia among psychiatrists, nonpsychiatric doctors, and the general population. Noticeable stigmatizing attitudes were also seen in mental health professionals. Stigmatizing attitudes were predominantly high in the domains of overall stigmatization, anger, dangerousness, and fear within the group of the general educated population followed by nonpsychiatric doctors. Nonpsychiatric doctors scored significantly higher in the domains of coercion to take medication and avoidance, followed by the general population. Lower levels of stigmatizing attitudes were seen in psychiatrists as well, in spite of being trained in mental health. These results need to be validated in larger randomized controlled trials.KeywordsStigmaSchizophreniaMental healthAQ-27PsychiatristsNonpsychiatric doctorsGeneral populationMental illness

Americans' Attitudes Toward Mental Health Treatment Seeking: 1990-2003

ABSTRACTThe research to date on pro-governm`ent militias demonstrates that numerous pro-regime militia groups were actively deployed in civil wars over the last half a century. As hundreds of militia groups emerged amid civil warfare, hundreds more were disbanded, integrated into regular military, or transformed into political forces. This study seeks to improve our understanding of global patterns of militia demobilization. In contrast to the growing body of literature that explores the emergence of militias or examines their relationship with the state, studies on the demise of pro-government militias are notable by their absence. Statistical analysis of 220 pro-government militias involved in seventy-five civil wars from 1981 to 2011, based on a recent database of pro-government militias, demonstrates that the disappearance of militias has little to do with the termination of armed conflict. This study is the first to investigate when and under which conditions militias created to assist governments in fighting civil wars disband.

In nearly two-thirds of civil wars since 1989, governments have received support in their counterinsurgency operations from militias. Many scholars predict higher levels of violence in conflicts involving pro-government militias because governments are either unable or unwilling to control militias. This article challenges this view, arguing that governments can and do often control militia behavior in civil war. Governments make strategic decisions about whether to use violence against civilians, encouraging both regular military forces and militia forces to target civilians or restraining regular military forces and militia forces from attacking civilians. In some cases, however, government and militia behavior differs. When a militia recruits its members from the same constituency as the insurgents, the militia is less likely to target civilians, as doing so would mean attacking their own community. Statistical analyses, using new data on pro-government militia violence in civil wars from 1989 to 2010, support these arguments.

This article examines how civilian defense militias shape violence during civil war. We define civilian defense forces as a sedentary and defensive form of pro-government militia that incumbents often use to harness the participation of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign. We argue that civilian defense forces reduce the problem of insurgent identification. This leads to a reduction in state violence against civilians. However, we also claim that these actors undermine civilian support for insurgents, which leads to an increase in rebel violence against civilians and overall intensification of conflict. A statistical analysis of government and rebel violence against civilians from 1981 to 2005 and a qualitative assessment of a civilian defense force operating in Iraq from 2005 to 2009 offer strong support for our theoretical claims. These findings provide further insight into pro-government militias and their effects on violence. They also have wider ethical implications for the use of civilian collaborators during civil war.

Background: End-stage renal disease, as one of the most serious and major health problems, does not have many treatment options available. One of the best treatment modalities used to cure this debilitating disease is kidney transplantation. However, with the continuous increase in number of patients diagnosed with it, there is not enough supply of the organ. The aim of our study is to assess knowledge about, attitude toward, and willingness to donate kidney among health science students at King Saud bin Abdulaziz University in comparison to the general population in Jeddah and to investigate the factors that play a role on their willingness.Methods: This is an observational, analytical, cross-sectional study design conducted in 2019. Two target populations were included: King Saud bin Abdulaziz University for Health Sciences students and the general population in Jeddah. Data were collected via a self-administered, close-ended, structured, and previously validated questionnaire that contained 39 items divided into four sections. SPSS program version 22 was used in data analysis.Results: Out of 685 surveyed participants, 179 (26.1%) were willing to donate their kidney, with students showing a higher rate of willingness (N = 101; 32.3%) than the general population (N = 78; 21%). However, only 46 (6.7%) out of the total population hold an organ donor card. In bivariate analysis, it was found that knowledge significantly associated with a higher rate of willingness among the student population than the general population, while positive beliefs were associated with increased willingness in the general population than students. Positive attitude appeared to play a role in higher willingness among the general population and student population.Conclusion: There is a low perception of awareness regarding kidney donation in both populations of this study. The willingness rate of health science students at King Saud bin Abdulaziz University and the general population was low when compared with other studies conducted internationally.

BackgroundDespite the advanced development of evidence-based psychological treatment services, help-seeking persons with mental health problems often fail to receive appropriate professional help. Internet-delivered psychotherapy has thus been suggested as an efficient strategy to overcome barriers to access mental health care on a large scale. However, previous research indicated poor public acceptability as an issue for the dissemination of Internet-delivered therapies. Currently, little is known about the expectations and attitudes toward Internet-delivered therapies in the general population. This is especially the case for countries such as Germany where electronic mental health (e-mental health) treatment services are planned to be implemented in routine care.ObjectiveThis pilot study aimed to determine the expectations and attitudes toward Internet-based psychotherapy in the general population in Germany. Furthermore, it aimed to explore the associations between attitudes toward Internet-based therapies and perceived stress.MethodsTo assess public attitudes toward Internet-based psychotherapy, we conducted both Web-based and paper-and-pencil surveys using a self-developed 14-item questionnaire (Cronbach alpha=.89). Psychological distress was measured by employing a visual analogue scale (VAS) and the 20-item German version of the Perceived Stress Questionnaire (PSQ). In addition, we conducted explorative factor analysis (principal axis factor analysis with promax rotation). Spearman’s rank correlations were used to determine the associations between attitudes toward Internet-based therapies and perceived stress.ResultsDescriptive analyses revealed that most respondents (N=1558; female: 78.95%, 1230/1558) indicated being not aware of the existence of Internet-delivered therapies (83.46%, 1141/1367). The average age was 32 years (standard deviation, SD 10.9; range 16-76). Through exploratory factor analysis, we identified 3 dimensions of public attitudes toward Internet-based therapies, which we labeled “usefulness or helpfulness,” “relative advantage or comparability,” and “accessibility or access to health care.” Analyses revealed negative views about Internet-based therapies on most domains, such as perceived helpfulness. The study findings further indicated ambivalent attitudes: Although most respondents agreed to statements on expected improvements in health care (eg, expanded access), we observed low intentions to future use of Internet-delivered therapies in case of mental health problems.ConclusionsThis pilot study showed deficient “e-awareness” and rather negative or ambivalent attitudes toward Internet-delivered therapies in the German-speaking general population. However, research targeting determinants of the large-scale adoption of Internet-based psychotherapy is still in its infancy. Thus, further research is required to explore the “black box” of public attitudes toward Internet-delivered therapies with representative samples, validated measures, and longitudinal survey designs.