Retraction notice: Analysis of the activities of law enforcement authorities in the field of combating crime and corruption offences

(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)1.IntroductionWhat is the link between shadow economy size and public official corruption? This question lacks a clear answer in the current literature. The existing evidence points to corruption and the shadow economy sometimes acting as complements and at other times substitutes. The shadow economy and corruption literatures are explored here to address previous findings and to highlight the absence of clarity in the corruption-shadow economy relationship. The designations complement and substitute often mask the underlying relationship between corrupt officials and shadow economy participants. The empirical analysis in this study focuses on corruption and shadow economy size across the U.S. states, but the theory presented might be applied more broadly. For example, in the U.S., like other high-income nations, a collusive relationship between corrupt public officials and firms is likely to result in more formal sector privileges for those firms party to the exchange (Dreher and Schneider, 2010). In this paper, such relationships are defined as cronyism. It is argued here that cronyism exists between public officials and firms primarily at two levels: highly visible officials with large firms and less visible officials with small firms. Additionally, cronyism creates barriers that drive otherwise legitimate firms, their workers, and entrepreneurs underground.This is different than conventional arguments in the literature. Dreher and Schneider (2010), for example, suggest that collusion between firms and corrupt officials in high-income countries result in a negative - substitutive - relationship between corruption and shadow economy size. That is, according to Dreher and Schneider, firms leave the underground in order to collude with corrupt officials for formal sector work. (The substitution is not between corruption and shadow economy size in this case, but the formal and informal sectors). However, a cursory glance at the data (Figure 1 below) shows a positive corruption-shadow economy relationship in the United States. In what follows, a new theory is presented for the corruption-shadow economy relationship in high-income countries. In brief, the theory posits that large (more visible) firms will operate primarily in the formal sector to begin with; only brief crony transactions will take place off-the-books, contributing positively, if at all, to shadow economy size. Public officials who face a high degree of public scrutiny - e.g., politicians - will not likely engage in corrupt acts with small firms and entrepreneurs. As utility maximizers along political lines, corrupt political actors will want to engage in low-risk, high-reward cronyism. Therefore, corrupt officials who are more visible to the public will likely focus their solicitations on a small number of large firms. However, public officials who are less visible to the public eye - e.g., law enforcement - will probably have more luck shaking down smaller firms and sole proprietors. Again, however, the relationship between less visible corrupt officials and small firms should reveal a positive corruption-shadow economy relationship.Moreover, some entrepreneurs and firms will flee all corruption and take their business underground. This, too, will be captured in a positive corruptionshadow economy relationship. Thus, the association between corrupt officials and shadow market participants addressed here is sometimes collusive, sometimes non-collusive. The importance of this realization is discussed further in the next section.With this expectation in mind, both in-state and spatial aspects of the corruption and shadow economy relationship are investigated. First, the analysis looks at the association between corruption and shadow economy size within states' borders. Second, spatial contagion of both shadow economies and corruption are examined, followed by cross-contagion - the relationship between neighboring shadow economies (corruption) and home corruption (shadow economies). …

Purpose The purpose of this study is to analyse the activities of law enforcement bodies in the field of combating crime and corruption offences. Design/methodology/approach In modern conditions in Ukraine, effective cooperation between law enforcement bodies and authorities at all levels, as well as with partner organisations and agencies at the national, regional and international levels to effectively combat crimes related to organised crime and corruption is of particular importance. Improving the investigative and detective capacity of the criminal justice system, combined with efforts to intensify cooperation, contributes to a deeper understanding of the role of joint struggle in this area, thus helping to deter, detect, punish and prevent crime and corruption offences. They must be directly part of a sustainable, long-term and comprehensive strategy to reduce the scope for corruption and open the political and economic system to greater competition. Findings The results of this study allow substantiating that the Ukrainian leadership understands the seriousness of corruption and organised crime: the state takes decisive legislative measures based on international experience. Originality/value The obvious mechanisms for reducing the level of corruption and organised crime in Ukraine can be: implementation of measures to ensure business freedom; the formation of anti-corruption business strategies; introduction of special methods of anti-corruption education; approbation in Ukraine of positive normative legal acts and practices of law enforcement of preventive nature of the European Union for joint activity of law enforcement bodies and civil society in the field of combating crime and corruption offences.

Political corruption is an ethical and juridical deviation committed by people with positions of political power. Political corruption has a more structured system than general corruption cases, because political corruption is committed to satisfy the interests of political parties. Political corruption cases are commonplace in a country where political corruption is rampant. This is a normative legal research, using a case approach, conceptual approach, and statutory approach, as well as qualitative analysis. Based on this analysis, it is conclusive that political corruption is an action carried out by political elites or state government officials that has an impact on the country's political and economic situation. People and or parties who have political positions usually commit these acts. Political corruption can be in the form of abuse of authority, granting influence, lobbying, self-enrichment, vote-buying, and election fraud. In terms of effectiveness of the law, the pervasive political corruption in Indonesia is attributed to ineffective law enforcement related to political corruption. In fact, some former corruption convicts may become a corruption recidivist simply because the law enforcement of political corruption fails to have any deterrent effect due to the disharmony between laws and regulations related to political corruption. The rampant political corruption practices result in violations against the principles of good governance.

Reclaiming Proportionality (Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2016)

Political corruption is one of the legal phenomena in the form of corruption carried out by involving political actors or power actors. Political corruption is a phenomenon that occurs in almost all parts of the world and is a global problem. This study aims to explore the value and substance of progressive law as a solution in dealing with political corruption in Indonesia. This research is a normative legal research. This research specifically prioritizes socio-legal aspects, namely non-legal aspects that can enlighten and clarify the description of problems in political corruption. The legal materials used are primary legal materials which include: the Corruption Law, the Amendment to the Corruption Crime Act, and the UNCAC ratification law. Secondary legal materials include the results of studies and research on political corruption in Indonesia, and non-legal materials include various non-legal studies and analyzes related to political corruption that support this research. The approach used is a statutory approach as well as a conceptual approach. The results of the study confirm that the urgency of progressive law in breaking down political corruption needs to be carried out because the orientation of progressive law does not only focus on rules, but also emphasizes behavioral aspects. The orientation and formulation of progressive law in breaking down political corruption is to emphasize the behavioral dimension in the form of leadership and professionalism in terms of substance, structure, and legal culture.

The nexus between crude oil theft, corruption, and national security in Nigeria is complex and multifaceted. Oil theft directly impacts the nation's economy by reducing government revenue, which in turn limits the resources available for critical public services, including security and law enforcement. Corruption, by weakening governance and fostering impunity, compounds these security threats, allowing criminal networks to thrive This study investigates the intricate relationship between crude oil theft, corruption, and national security in Nigeria. The study utilised a longitudinal research design, examining secondary data from 2013 to 2023, including metrics such as oil theft, political corruption, violent events, and fatalities. Data from sources like the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), and the World Bank's political corruption index were analysed using Poisson regression to assess the effects of oil theft and corruption on national security. Findings revealed that crude oil theft has a statistically significant positive relationship with violent events, while political corruption, represented by the political corruption index, shows a strong negative relationship with security, with an estimate of - 26.475. This could imply that corruption may sometimes act as a stabilising force whereby, in corrupt systems, those in power might suppress violence to maintain order and avoid public attention that could threaten their positions. However, political corruption has a substantial positive effect on fatalities, with an estimate of 19.589. This highlights that as corruption increases, fatalities rise significantly, pointing to the detrimental impact of corruption on state institutions and the rule of law. These findings also suggest that while crude oil theft directly contributes to insecurity, political corruption may reduce overt violence by maintaining fragile stability. Therefore, addressing these issues requires a nuanced approach. Policymakers must recognise that combating corruption and oil theft alone will not be sufficient to ensure national security; instead, strategies should tackle both issues simultaneously, understanding that reducing visible violence does not always eliminate the underlying causes of insecurity.

Exploring potential political corruption in large-scale infrastructure projects in Nigeria

Ukraine belongs to a group of countries in which political, grand, and petty corruption deeply rooted in various spheres of life and became an organic element of social relations. During 2014-2018, the fight against corruption in Ukraine was identified as one of the key priorities of the state policy. This was also noted by international organizations. The implemented reforms contributed to moving Ukraine from 144th place in 2013 to 130th place according to the Corruption Perception Index. The purpose of the article is determined as to study reforming of the institutional system of the fight against corruption in the context of European integration transformation directed to increasing transparency and openness of the state as an institute and improving the governance. Traditionally, three functional types of corruption are distinguished: political corruption, grand corruption, and petty corruption. The author presented a generalized group of indicators of measuring the efficiency of the fight against corruption, including: Group 1. Economic indicators: reduction of economic losses as a result of the elimination of specific corruption schemes and the elimination of conditions that give rise to corruption; Group 2. Indicators of the activity of the law-enforcement system: the number of persons brought to administrative and criminal responsibility for corruption violations and crimes; amounts of damages recovered; Group 3. Indicators of public acceptance of the effectiveness of counteraction to corruption: assessment of the dynamics of corruption in various dimensions by different social and professional groups. For successful application of the experience of EU countries when developing effective anti-corruption policy in Ukraine, it is necessary: firstly, determine and implement in Ukrainian legislation relevant international legal rules of state, regional, and local nature; secondly, given the successful experience of certain countries, identify a complex of most important for Ukraine factors aimed at providing effectiveness of state policy of preventing corruption, structure them based on principles of priority and the most functionality in order to create a model optimal for Ukrainian conditions; thirdly, develop and form for this model proper institutional support of regulatory character that would harmoniously combine state, regional, and local levels of public administration. The paper determines “direct” anti-corruption effects of corresponding changes in economic governance. It is obvious that direct effects can be levelled by corruption risks in related spheres. So, the delegation of certain powers and financial resources to the local level in the process of decentralization objectively restricts corruption in the relations of “centre-regions” in terms of the distribution and use of financial resources, however, without effective anti-corruption system at the local level, the anti-corruption effect of decentralization will be less than expected. In order to overcome mass violations of anti-corruption norms and rules, it is needed to implement a whole range of measures to criminalize corruption, that is, to establish criminal responsibility for corruption offenses and corruption-related offenses and create a law enforcement system capable of effectively counteracting the corruption actions that we have identified in the study.

This research aims to analyze the process of law enforcement and prevention of money laundering crimes originating from corruption based on Law Number 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering Crimes and the efforts made by third parties acting in good faith to recover their assets if the money laundering crime is not proven in the corruption offense. The research method used in this study is a normative legal research method. From the analysis conducted, the legal enforcement mechanism for money laundering crimes originating from corruption as the underlying offense is essentially bound by the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP), the Money Laundering Act, and the Corruption Criminal Act. In the law enforcement process for money laundering crimes, there are still obstacles, both in terms of substantive law (substantive law) and procedural law (formal law). Additionally, the efforts that can be made by third parties to recover their assets are not sufficiently regulated in Law Number 8 of 2010, which means that it may not fully satisfy the principles of justice and legal certainty. To combat and prevent money laundering crimes, especially those derived from corruption, it is not only necessary to have law enforcement agencies with competent human resources for investigation and prosecution, but it is also essential to build synergy among stakeholders to prevent and combat money laundering crimes. Given that combating money laundering crimes involves multiple institutions such as financial institutions, law enforcement agencies, the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK), and other relevant agencies as subsystems, including Bank Indonesia, financial service providers, goods and services providers, the Capital Market Supervisory Agency (BAPEPAM-LK), the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (DJBC), and law enforcement authorities.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that 24.9 million people are victims of forced labor globally. In addition to being a tragic human rights and security issue, trafficking in persons (TIP) is a high-profit, low-risk type of organized crime that generates an estimated $150 billion in illicit profits per year. Trafficking in persons is prevalent throughout all countries in the world and transcends both regime types and levels of development. Considering the size of the problem - both in terms of the number of victims as well as the monetary size of this particular type of illicit trade - it is puzzling why progress in enforcement of the laws in place remains limited. Conviction rates remain low, the number of victims identified compared to the total victim estimate of 24.9 million is negligible, the estimated total illicit profits produced annually by trafficked forced laborers is on the rise, and the estimated number of victims of trafficking is increasing. Why are governments failing to effectively address the issue of trafficking in persons? What role does agency of the street-level bureaucrats and low state capacity play in limiting enforcement of applicable TIP laws? The first article in this series of three finds that one potential explanation as to why TIP persists is because of the intentional non-enforcement by those public officials in charge of enforcing the laws in place. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that non-enforcement is a result of a lack of resources, it could also be an active strategy based on corrupt officials' pursuit of private benefits. While there is a centrally-made policy to combat trafficking, the street-level bureaucrats appear to be acting in accordance with their own private interests. By applying a principal-agent lens to the issue, a piece of the larger puzzle of understanding the lack of enforcement of trafficking laws seems to be that there is a divergence between street level action and central policy, where the agency appears to be located at the individual or street level. The second article examines whether a state's capacity to address trafficking in persons varies depending on the bureaucratic functions public officials have been tasked to perform, or across the governance issues the state intends to address - meaning in the specific case of trafficking the purpose of exploitation or industry in which the trafficking victims are exploited. Contrary to current research on state capacity, the findings indicate that state capacity may indeed vary depending on the type of crime that needs to be prevented and enforced against, and the type of bureaucratic function that intersects with the trafficking crime. This means that we cannot treat human trafficking as a single phenomenon or apply a one-size-fits-all policy response to address it. Instead, the response will have to vary (i) depending on the sub-category of trafficking (i.e. trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation, forced labor or domestic servitude) that is being addressed, and (ii) where in the trafficking process or on which bureaucratic function governments focus their anti-trafficking efforts. The third and final article focuses in on the United States in general, and New York City in particular. Through semi-structured interviews with a wide range of representatives from NGOs, government agencies, journalists and politicians active in the anti-corruption and anti-trafficking space in NYC, a first-ever in-depth investigation of the trafficking in persons and corruption landscape in a large metropolitan city, located in a highly developed, democratic country, is conducted to provide an empirically based starting point for future research on this topic. While numerous reasons have been raised as to why trafficking is as prevalent as it is in NYC, the corrupt involvement by law enforcement was a recurring theme in the interviews. When the drivers of greed and a pursuit of power are present in an environment with a strong blue shield, insufficient whistleblower protection, and a lack of efficient oversight, we observe non-enforcement of TIP laws by those public officials who have been tasked with preventing this crime.--Author's abstract

Objective: This research aims to analyze changes in criminal law, particularly in the context of corruption, within the new Criminal Code in Indonesia. It explores the reasons behind the rejection of certain provisions in the new Criminal Code, especially those related to the punishment for corruption offenses. Theoretical Framework: The theoretical framework of this research is rooted in the field of criminal law and legal reform. It considers the evolution of criminal law in response to societal needs and expectations. The study also examines the principle of proportionality in criminal sentencing, particularly concerning corruption offenses. Method: This research adopts a normative legal research approach, relying on an analysis of existing legal texts and previous studies related to criminal law in Indonesia. The primary data sources include statutory laws in Indonesia, while secondary data sources consist of scholarly works and legal analyses. Result and Conclusion: The findings of this research reveal that the rejection of the new Criminal Code is primarily due to the removal of specific articles related to corruption. In the new Code, corruption offenses are no longer categorized as extraordinary crimes but are treated as ordinary offenses, akin to theft. This shift has implications for law enforcement authorities, such as the police, the prosecutor's office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission, as it blurs the lines of their jurisdiction and responsibilities in addressing corruption. Originality/Value: This research contributes to the understanding of the legal changes brought about by the new Criminal Code in Indonesia, with a specific focus on corruption offenses. It highlights the concerns and implications of categorizing corruption as an ordinary offense, potentially impacting the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. The study's value lies in its ability to inform policymakers, legal practitioners, and scholars about the complexities surrounding criminal law reform and its consequences in the context of corruption.

The subject of the research in the presented article is the criminal law norms that determine the penalization of corruption-related crimes. The issues of sufficiency and effectiveness of sanctions of criminal law norms, their preventive potential, the difference in law enforcement practice in terms of sentencing corrupt officials and ordinary criminals are actively discussed. The issue of compliance of the norms on criminal liability for corruption and the criminological realities of our time is raised. The author examines such aspects of the topic as the influence of the structure of corruption-related crimes on the law enforcement practice of courts, the specifics of criminal proceedings at the judicial and pre-trial stages that affect the sentencing of corrupt officials. The practice of applying additional punishment in the form of deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities, as well as such a measure of a criminal nature as confiscation, is statistically analyzed.The methodological basis of the research is the dialectical method of cognition. The private scientific methods are the summary and grouping of the actual data of criminal statistics, mathematical methods for calculating relative crime rates. The author's special contribution to the study of this problem is the following patterns revealed in the course of the study: three-year cycles of "recruiting the mass of defendants" in corruption-related cases; an indication of certain aspects of the expanded reproduction of corruption-related crimes based on bribery; differences in the types of punishments imposed on corrupt officials and ordinary criminals; deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities and confiscation as preventive measures (sanctions) of the criminal law, contributing to the private prevention of offending corrupt behavior; the result of an analysis of the effectiveness of the application of additional punishment in the form of deprivation of a special right (disqualification) in relation to corrupt officials; the result of an analysis of the effectiveness of the confiscation of corrupt officials; arguments are given regarding the appropriateness of applying a judicial fine to corrupt officials.

Often carried out by law enforcement authorities, military personnel, and other government institutions, torture and inhumane acts remain major human rights issues for Nigeria. Reports of violence, extrajudicial punishments, and coercive interrogation techniques continue notwithstanding constitutional protections and international human rights duties. The frequency of torture in Nigeria is investigated in this paper together with its underlying causes: political corruption, economic instability, and systematic mishandling of human rights. The study also examines the Nigerian government’s reaction to violations of human rights, the function of international organizations, and the effect of democratic government on the safeguarding of personal liberties. This paper emphasizes the pressing necessity of policy reforms, law enforcement training, and diplomatic interventions to eradicate torture and promote human dignity by means of legislative frameworks, historical settings, and case studies. Among the recommendations include tightening legal responsibility, using intelligence-based interrogation methods, and improving global cooperation to stop violations of human rights.


 Corruption is an act to against the law and moral because it is considered as an act abusing the power and authority for personal’s benefit, group or other parties to take advantage each other either economically or politically. Due to perpetrators of corruption is a public official, the type of corruption is considered as political corruption. One of many cases of political corruption in regional level is corruption on social assistance fund.
 The reality of social assistance fund corruption case disclosure in many regionals seems difficult. The sociology aspect takes a part in law enforcement such as stratification, morphology and intervention variables. Stratification which is a formal position of somebody, friendship between law enforcers and the suspect, and intervention of superior to the subordinate in legal institution confirm the legal discrimination in corruption act of social assistance fund.
 Therefore, to suppress the rate of corrupt behavior in regional level, it needs the legal enforcement reconstruction started from legal enforcer side to the encouragement of legal enforcer reformation in regional level. The legal enforcer reformation should emphasize on the importance of rolling job system at the top management in the legal enforcement institution. This system can enrich experience and perception, and to sharpen the skills. On the other hand, it can minimize the occurrence of morphology aspect between the legal enforcer and local elites. Besides, the involvement of justice collaborator in corruption eradication should be implemented in order to reveal the political corruption case which is complicated and neatly covered.

Political corruption is a form of violation of people’s human rights and is a worrying phenomenon because it is dominated by state officials who have superior positions. This article aims to find out how the reality of law enforcement against corruption is carried out by state officials and how the criminal responsibility of state officials who commit political corruption in Indonesia. This article uses a normative juridical method. The results shows that law enforcement against state officials who commit political corruption has not been carried out optimally. The low demands of prosecutors followed by judges’ verdicts against state officials who commit corruption are the cause of the difficulty of eradicating this crime. The imposition of a maximum criminal threat or life imprisonment for perpetrators of political corruption is something that should be done to create a deterrent effect for the perpetrators or the public who see it. In this case, law enforcement officers must have the courage, integrity, and high morale to be indiscriminate in eradicating political crimes in Indonesia.