Rethinking vulnerability and humanitarian assistance in the pastoral drylands: insights from northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia

Disaster is a serious of the functioning community or a society. In response to disaster, Humanitarian Aid Agencies operates under challenging environment. Historically, Borana zone is among the area from the southern part of Ethiopia which is highly vulnerable to both natural and manmade disaster. The researcher aim to identify problem Humanitarian aid agencies faced during their operation. The researcher employed descriptive research design and purposive sampling technique. And data was collected from 139 respondents through questionnaire, FGD [1] and interview. The finding revealed that; there are serious communication barriers, fund shortage and allocation problems, lack of physical infrastructure and facilities, lack of control and follow up among Humanitarian Aid Agencies and government bodies, lack of collaboration among humanitarian agencies, lack of coordination among government and None Governmental Organizations officials. And drought, disease and economic crises are the top three disasters that are being major cause for humanitarian aid. In general, based the findings the researcher recommended that HAAs [2] , Government bodies and Pastoral communities should set solution for the issue at hand. Keywords : Disaster, Humanitarian Aid Agency, Disaster Relief logistics, Humanitarian Aid and Relief Supply. DOI: 10.7176/IAGS/81-01 Publication date: March 31 st 2020 [1] FGD: Focus Group Discussion [2] HAA: Humanitarian Aid Agency

This paper shows that with the decline of overall poverty, the concern for rising or persisting inequalities and the need for a transformative social protection, the capacity of countering social exclusion and promoting social justice also becomes increasingly relevant to urbanizing sub-Saharan Africa. It is argued that several parts of sub-Saharan Africa are likely to move towards pro-poor urbanization and show emerging changes in rural and urban livelihoods. Then, the practice of social protection programmes along the rural–urban continuum in sub-Saharan Africa is examined extensively in order to determine whether these practices align with emerging changes in livelihoods and tackle social exclusion in a transformative way. It is found that the livelihoods of the poor are enhanced and that social inclusion has increased. However, social protection’s adaptation to emerging changes in rural and urban livelihoods is still poor, and so is social protection’s capacity to tackle social exclusion in a transformative way. It is concluded that transformative social protection would require more structural interventions through empowering pressure on the state and innovative decentralization from the top.

Reviewed by: Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa Terrence Lyons Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa. By John Prendergast. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1996. 164 pp. $12.95 paper. This volume by John Prendergast is part of a growing literature by activists in the humanitarian community who have been conducting a process of critical self-examination. Prendergast and others, including Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss, Ken Menkhaus, Alex de Waal, Mark Duffield, and the interagency review of the humanitarian response to the genocide in Rwanda have raised a series of important and difficult issues. Each is struggling with the set of issues presented by Prendergast in this volume as to how emergency aid can exacerbate conflict and how to both minimize these unintended consequences of humanitarianism and to use assistance to contribute to peace building. [End Page 234] These questions have come to prominence in the literature on humanitarianism as a result of the role famine assistance played in sustaining both the military government and insurgent forces in Ethiopia in the 1980s, the factional leaders in Somalia in the early 1990s, and most tragically the 1994 genocide and continuing conflict in Rwanda and its neighbors. These horrors have forced the humanitarian community to question the simple principle that a hungry child knows no politics. Instead, the relief community has come to recognize that it cannot ignore politics and that, in many cases, emergency assistance is the principal source of resources that may be used to either reinforce peace or strengthen the forces of destruction. Apolitical humanitarianism is impossible in the context of complex emergencies and state collapse, as the disasters in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan in Africa along with Afghanistan, Bosnia, and other cases around the world have made clear. Prendergast focuses his attention on a region he knows extraordinarily well, the so-called “Greater Horn of Africa” that includes not only Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia but also Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire). One of the most important contributions of this book is the insights Prendergast makes on the basis of his long involvement in the region. Much of the data for this study comes from personal observations and interviews with humanitarian officials in the field rather than at headquarters. Despite a subtitle that suggests a continental focus, Prendergast barely mentions other cases where similar dynamics took place, most notably Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and Angola. Prendergast justifies this focus by correctly pointing out that the Greater Horn has been a “laboratory for innovative crisis response,” although humanitarian agencies in Liberia also demonstrated a broad understanding of their relationships with political and military actors on the ground. The book is organized around a series of basic aphorisms, including the Seven Deadly Sins of humanitarianism in complex emergencies and the Ten Commandments for providing aid without sustaining conflict. Each seems thoroughly sensible, particularly when supported by Prendergast’s carefully selected examples from the field. What is lacking, however, is a set of specific judgments or criteria to guide decision makers within [End Page 235] humanitarian organizations and the donor community. The distinctiveness of each case and the author’s deep appreciation for context perhaps makes such generalizations difficult. In the end, Prendergast calls for a greater awareness of the political context humanitarian organizations work within when responding to complex emergencies and to experiment, consult widely and openly, and constantly evaluate one’s actions. The author’s most specific recommendations relate to the need to use humanitarian assistance to support local community structures and initiatives. Prendergast concludes by noting the centrality of humanitarian actors in complex emergencies: In most complex political emergencies, humanitarian aid is the most important avenue of contact among the international community, the conflicting parties, and civilians in the war zone. Ignoring the wider impacts and potential of humanitarian aid removes one of the most important policy instruments for preventing the escalation of conflict and promoting long-term peace building. Prendergast’s insights from the Horn of Africa should help humanitarian actors become more conscious of their roles and better able to use emergency relief to promote conflict management. Terrence Lyons Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program The...

Assessing the Value of Climate Forecast Information for Pastoralists: Evidence from Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya

Pastoralism is an important form of livelihood in Kenya, particularly in northern Kenya. While pastoralists have always faced risks such as political marginalization, harsh climate conditions and violent conflict, pastoral communities are increasingly exposed to new risks such as wildlife conservancies as well as large-scale wind and oil projects. The growing climate security literature has provided some insights into how changing rainfall patterns are affecting pastoralist conflicts, but we know little about the compound nature of multiple risks. This paper seeks to narrow this knowledge gap. It aims to better understand new and old risks and their combined impact on pastoral communities in the counties of Turkana, Samburu and Marsabit. The study is based on a comprehensive and structured review of the scientific literature. The findings show that all pastoral communities in northern Kenya face the old risks while the newer ones are county-specific. In Turkana, potential oil spills threaten land and water resources upon which pastoralist communities depend. In Samburu, wildlife conservancies have changed the land-use system, and in Marsabit a pastoral community is exposed to noise and visible emissions from a wind park. Common to these risks are that they: (1) are caused by top-down governance processes with little to no community involvement; (2) reduce the mobility and access to water and pasture of (some) pastoral communities; (3) change the security situation. A rethinking of wildlife conservancies and energy projects is needed that involves pastoral communities from the outset and makes them the primary beneficiaries of any measure implemented in northern Kenya.

Climate change has many humanitarian impacts such as drought, floods, landslides, extreme weather conditions requiring urgent response that cost billions of dollars. On the other hand, humanitarian aid responds to these crises with little consideration to dangers posed by materials used during response and poor waste management. These exacerbate the risks associated with climate change in the poor developing Countries including Kenya. This study argues that there is need for humanitarian aid agencies in Kenya to use green technology and innovations in humanitarian response and also improve waste management strategies by collaborating with private sector. There is need for government and Non-Governmental organizations to finance and implement climate change friendly policies. Climate financing could reduce climate change related emergencies and significantly reduce humanitarian operations in the affected areas in Kenya particularly in Counties located in Northern Kenya such as West Pokot and Turkana. According to Sustainable Development Goals report 2018 the rate of global progress has not been keeping pace with the ambition of vision 2030, necessitating immediate action by stakeholders as guided by Paris agreement, SDG 13 on Climate Change and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. Also, UN Disaster Risk Reduction report stated that over the last two decades economic losses from extreme weather amounted to trillions of dollars. Financing implementation of Kenya climate ambition requires significant public and private finance. According to UNDP in 2020 an estimate of USD 40B was needed for the next ten years (2020-2030) to implement climate mitigation and adaptation action, so far little has been done. The research was conducted using integrated literature review with the aim to assess, critique, and synthesize existing literature on a humanitarian aid green technology innovation, climate financing and climate change in a way that enables new theoretical frameworks and perspectives to emerge. Findings indicate that there is need for humanitarian aid organizations to integrate green technology innovation in the humanitarian response in order to reduce negative impact on climate change in Kenya. In the absence of clear policies on climate financing the challenge of climate change still exists and is likely to challenge the Africa Union Agenda 2063. There is need for collaboration and partnerships among the government, counties, NGOS as well as private sector in order to reverse the climate change trend.

The consequences of Sudan’s armed conflict on public health: a closer look at the devastating impact

When Nomads Settle: The Effects of Commoditization, Nutritional Change, and Formal Education on Ariaal and Rendille Pastoralists

Emerging agricultural expansion in northern regions: Insights from land-use research

Humanitarian response inadequate in Horn of Africa crisis

This short note discusses some of the realities faced by the 20 million pastoralists and the international agencies that deliver emergency and development assistance in the pastoral arc of the Horn of Africa (HOA). Isolation, poor roads, spotty telecommunications, and insecurity make it difficult for donor agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to implement projects. In the donor countries, short-term and shifting funding priorities for emergency and development assistance make long-term planning by donor agencies and NGOs difficult. This all conspires to create a system that delivers ‘things’ but does not deliver economic security to pastoral communities. Water development, provided through the programs that also deliver emergency food rations, tends to promote the growth of villages in previously uninhabited pastoral grazing areas. The village's resident population of livestock causes environmental degradation and constrains the mobility required for successful and sustainable pastoralism to function. The pastoral areas of Kenya are beginning to be economically and politically integrated with the rest of Kenya. However, the pastoral communities of Ethiopia continue to be estranged from the central government of Ethiopia. In northern Somalia, investments by Somali businessmen, remittances from the diaspora, and international assistance have resulted in a relatively stable economic and political system. In southern Somalia, because of continued conflict, about three million people are dependent upon food and emergency assistance. When peace is finally negotiated in the HOA and true development assistance becomes possible, there will be a population that is too large for the deteriorated environmental base, and too few economic opportunities for too many people who are underprepared to meet that future.

Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities are amongst the most vulnerable groups in the world to increased drought risk caused by climate change. Risk preferences play a key role in drought adaptation decisions, but little research has been done on risk preferences in (agro-)pastoral communities. This study therefore examines risk attitudes amongst Kenyan (agro-)pastoralists, which can inform the development of effective adaptation policies. A hypothetical multiple price list experiment, framed as farming decisions under drought-risk scenarios, is employed to measure utility curvature and probability weighting. Varying rainfall scenarios are presented to assess changes in risk-taking behaviour if climate change increases the probability of drought. We included three psychological factors and several socioeconomic variables in the analysis to understand variations in risk attitudes between individuals. The respondents are, on average, risk-averse and overweight high probabilities. An increased drought risk due to climate change is expected to amplify risk-averse behaviour. An internal locus of control and high drought-risk perceptions are associated with risk-averse behaviour, whereas receiving emergency drought support is associated with less risk-averse behaviour. Policies promoting anticipatory risk-reducing behaviour could emphasise the effectiveness of individual actions, increase awareness of the problem, and minimise reliance on emergency assistance.

There is an increasing amount of literature discussing the integration of humanitarian assistance into social protection systems or the linkage of disaster risk responses with specific social safety net programmes. The nexus maybe seen through synergies via common frameworks, platforms and systems utilized. The Philippines continues to tackle the problems of poverty and vulnerability among its 100 million population. It lies in the “Pacific Ring of Fire” and is visited regularly by typhoons, ravaged by flooding, and occasionally hit by destructive earthquakes. It also has two long running conflicts with rebel groups that have displaced thousands of its citizens in hot areas. Despite being a middle income country and owing to the recurrent nature of crises, the country has a permanent presence of humanitarian actors (UN agencies, international, and national NGOs) ready to complement government efforts during emergencies. This specific case study showcases the linking of humanitarian assistance and social protection in two instances where cash transfer for relief and recovery by humanitarian agencies, the World Food Programme (WFP) and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), successfully “piggybacked” on the Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program (4Ps), a lead social protection programme of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), during the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan (2013).

This study explored the gender conflicts and climate change in pastoral communities in Northern Kenya. Cross-sectional survey research design was used. The target population was all the residents in Nothern Kenya (18 years and above) and had information regarding the topic under discourse. A total of 92 respondents participated. The respondents were drawn through purposive sampling. A structured interview guide was used to gather information from the respondents. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the qualitative data obtained through the interview. The results obtained from the study reveal that climate change is significantly altering traditional gender roles within pastoral communities in Northern Kenya, leading to heightened gender conflicts. Women are facing increased burdens due to the depletion of natural resources, while men struggle with the erosion of their traditional roles as providers. These shifts in responsibilities have led to tensions within households, especially as women gain more decision-making power. Additionally, the scarcity of resources has exacerbated inter-community conflicts, often resulting in gender-based violence. The findings underscore the urgent need for gendersensitive interventions that address both the environmental and social impacts of climate change.

Sanctions Hurt but Are Not the Main Impediment to Humanitarian Operations in North Korea Roberta Cohen (bio) For more than two decades, humanitarian agencies have tried to address the chronic hunger and malnutrition of more than 40% of North Korea's 25 million people. Since the great famine of the 1990s, when humanitarian organizations were first invited into the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), they have come up against a series of obstacles put in their way by the government, undermining the effectiveness of aid. Although the sanctions imposed in 2006 and strengthened in 2016 and 2017 unquestionably have added to the difficulty of delivering humanitarian aid, the main impediment remains the government of North Korea itself. This essay will examine how the DPRK, while allowing humanitarian aid agencies access to its territory, has often restricted their operations and effectively prevented them from reaching many of the most in need, as well as how international sanctions have added to those difficulties. As a result, without a change in North Korea's policies and practices, the lifting of sanctions would not alter the fundamental problems faced by humanitarian actors in the country. The Challenge of Bringing Aid to North Korea In 2014 the report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK concluded that "20 years after humanitarian agencies began their work in the DPRK, humanitarian workers still face unacceptable constraints impeding their access to populations in dire need." The report found that the DPRK has "imposed movement and contact restrictions on humanitarian actors that unduly impede their access"; "deliberately failed to provide aid organizations with access to reliable data, which, if provided, would have greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the humanitarian response and saved many lives"; and continually obstructed effective monitoring of [End Page 35] humanitarian assistance,1 presumably to hide the diversion of some of the aid to the military, elite, or other favored groups as well as to markets. In response, aid agencies have devised special measures to try to ensure that food reaches those for whom it is intended, including by weighing children's arms, omitting rice from donations because corn gruel and other mixed foods are not favored by the military and elite, and supplying medicines "that can only be used for their intended purpose."2 At times they have developed successful random monitoring systems.3 Despite notable progress, in 2017 UN secretary-general António Guterres continued to highlight the "significant constraints" imposed by North Korea on aid agencies' access to the beneficiaries.4 In 2016, then UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon called on North Korea to grant UN agencies "unconditional access" to reliable and accurate data to ensure that aid programs "can effectively target and reach the most vulnerable."5 Yet when the World Food Programme's executive director visited North Korea in 2018, he noted that "access has still been very limited."6 The UN resident coordinator in Pyongyang aptly put it: "National authorities are reluctant to share data beyond the bare minimum and agencies are normally only allowed access to limited information that is strictly related to their operations."7 In this tightly controlled political climate, international humanitarian staff often have to make compromises. Some point out privately that it is unrealistic to try to uphold humanitarian standards in an environment as difficult as North Korea's. They try hard to come up with ways to make their aid sustainable for the North Korean people, but their plans are not always accepted. They may propose extensive medical treatment for some diseases only to have officials curtail the aid and increase the number of people being treated. Where the aid ends up is also not always clear. Supplies brought to one hospital may end up being sent elsewhere without explanation. [End Page 36] According to the UN Commission of Inquiry report, humanitarian staff expressed "strong doubts that the people and children presented to them were those most in need."8 Gaining access is an ongoing issue. In 2016, during Typhoon Lionrock, for example, UN agencies were told they could visit only three of the flooded areas.9 And they were not offered entry—nor did they...