Rethinking Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations: Condemned to Nuclear Confrontation?

Abstract

On August 23, 1994, speaking at rally in the Pakistaniheld part of Kashmir, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said: I can confirm Pakistan possesses the atomic bomb, adding that an Indian attack on Pakistan could trigger a nuclear holocaust as both countries possess atomic bombs.' Although Sharif's statement was quickly denied by himself and the Pakistani government, the incident highlighted the dangers of the present Indo-Pakistani nuclear impasse. Can India and Pakistan remain undeclared nuclear powers indefinitely? Does the new international strategic environment make Indian and Pakistani proliferation decisions inevitable, or on the contrary, does it create the possibility of peaceful and enduring resolution of their dispute? Can an Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms control regime be decoupled from the issue of Kashmir? Answering these questions is important to design sound nonproliferation strategy toward South Asia. Both India and Pakistan are believed to have the capability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on short notice.2 According to recent report, they are in the process of miniaturizing their nuclear warheads to make them fit