Abstract

AbstractWe lay groundwork for applying ethnographic methods in philosophy of science. We frame our analysis in terms of two tasks: (1) to identify the benefits of an ethnographic approach in philosophy of science and (2) to structure an ethnographic approach for philosophical investigation best adapted to provide information relevant to philosophical interests and epistemic values. To this end, we advocate for a purpose-guided form of cognitive ethnography that mediates between the explanatory and normative interests of philosophy of science, while maintaining openness and independence when framing such an investigation to achieve robust unbiased results.

Highlights

  • With the exception of historical case study methods, philosophy of science has not traditionally relied on empirical methods to gather data to support its claims

  • In this paper we explore what roles ethnography might play in an empirical philosophy of science and how it could be adapted to suite philosophical interests, goals, and values

  • We argue for the possibility of a more purpose-guided style of cognitive ethnography than is customary in social sciences and STS approaches, and provide guidance on how to approach a philosophical adaptation

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Summary

Introduction

With the exception of historical case study methods, philosophy of science has not traditionally relied on empirical methods to gather data to support its claims. A number of philosophy of science studies have been published that employ experimental methods and survey-based approaches, as well as bibliometric studies, to investigate for instance the meanings of certain concepts and the types and role of values in scientific practice Such approaches are called “quantitative” in the social science literature because the research uses numerical and formal methods of analysis. We stress the value of ethnography both as a means to study contextual relations, and as a means to collect and analyze data systematically on real-world epistemic practices, and, improving the reliability of philosophical claims about scientific practice In these sections, we argue for the possibility of a more purpose-guided style of cognitive ethnography than is customary in social sciences and STS approaches, and provide guidance on how to approach a philosophical adaptation. Since transfer of methods across domains is never straightforward, we intend our analysis not as definitive, but as a means to provoke more extensive methodological discussion, and provide an initial guide for those who seek to engage with ethnographic approaches

Positioning Ethnographic Research
Distinguishing ethnographic approaches
Benefits of an ethnographic approach for philosophy of science
Adapting Ethnographic Methods
Distinguishing a philosophical approach to ethnography
Putting ethnography into practice
Sample fruits of an ethnographic approach
Assessing “mechanistic explanation” in integrative systems biology
Conclusion
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