Abstract
We summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers. We do this using studies of traditional and business‐format‐franchise relationships, as well as studies of sales‐force‐integration decisions. Some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive‐cum‐insurance theory of organization, while others are not. We briefly review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming conflicts between theory and practice.
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