Responsibility for the Cold War - A Case Study in Historical Responsibility

Abstract

Historians have long argued whether, as a matter of principle, it is appropriate for them to hold men responsible for consequences of their actions, to praise and to blame. Philosophers, for their part, have endeavored through the ages to deepen their insight into the nature of human responsibility. Occasionally they have applied their conclusions to history, specifying what judgments it is proper for historians to make. Now and then a philosopher's very notion of responsibility has been influenced by his thinking about the nature of the historical process or history as an aspect of human existence. But analytic surveys, by historians or philosophers, of historical practice in regard to praising, blaming, and ascribing responsibility are vitually non-existent.' To what extent do historians actually praise and blame? When they do, what is their purpose? What terms do they employ in ascribing responsibility? Is their terminology in itself significant? When they blame someone or hold him responsible are the judgments historians make generally of the same type? These questions have yet to be answered. Until they are answered historians cannot be sure what matter of principle is at issue in the debate over the appropriateness of praising and blaming. Until they are answered we cannot confidently assert the relevance to history of any philosophical thesis about praise and blame or presume to know how historical, legal, and moral responsibility are related. This paper is an excursion into a small sector of vast, unexplored territory. The principal material examined comprises sixteen historical works dealing with the Cold War.2 Whether Russia or the United States was principally to