Responsibility for AI Inventions

Artificially Intelligent Persons

The author of the article has conducted a comparative analysis of the legal doctrine in regard to granting legal personality to a legal entity as one of the elements of its legal characteristics. The main emphasis has been made on the latest research concerning the possibility of the existence of legal personality in artificial intelligence. It has been proved that the use of artificial intelligence construction in legal enforcement and doctrine is not the evidence of the expediency of immediate granting it with legal personality. It has been substantiated that this issue even currently is quite complex and problematic for solving compared to the construction of a legal entity. Thus, it is one of the main reasons for the non-recognition of the legality of acquiring legal personality by artificial intelligence, along with individuals and legal entities, as independent participants of corporate legal relations. It is cautioned that artificial intelligence is one of the most important advanced technologies of the present time, but it is a system that only emits human mental behavior. Particular attention has been paid to the fact that artificial intelligence technologies are actively used in the framework of corporate governance, but there are currently no generally recognized mechanisms for their respective application. In order to prevent the risks that may occur in the field of corporate governance while applying artificial intelligence technologies, the author has suggested to develop mechanisms for imposing corporations with the obligation to develop internal acts that would regulate the impact of artificial intelligence on decision-making by members of such legal entities’ bodies; to outline at the legislative level the limits of applying artificial intelligence technologies during decision-making by members of the corporation entitie’s bodies; to develop regulations that would consolidate the accountability of artificial intelligence systems (for example, to their developer, a legal entity that has the rights to such a system, etc.) and establish a mechanism of responsibility for causing damage by artificial intelligence systems. Key words: legal entity, individual, artificial intelligence, legal personality, corporate entity, corporate governance, member of the body, technology

Digital, led by ChatGPT, is triggering innovative changes in all areas, including politics, economy, society, and culture. It is the so-called era of digital deepening. Digital innovation brings infinite possibilities and benefits to mankind, but artificial intelligence (AI) technology or research field for realizing human cognitive, reasoning, and judgment on a computer. In this paper, we will use a mixture of artificial intelligence and AI. It is also raising various issues that did not exist in the past, such as legal personality and tort liability, product copyright, and job change. Along with the development of artificial intelligence, what is being raised is the issue of ethics of artificial intelligence. For example, if a biased algorithm such as gender discrimination or racial discrimination is inserted by an artificial intelligence robot developer, artificial intelligence robots will also have this biased idea. In this respect, it is necessary to properly establish not only the technical research of artificial intelligence but also the ethical aspect. Accordingly, major institutions around the world are making efforts to develop artificial intelligence in the right direction for mankind by establishing 23 principles called 'Asiloma AI Principles' in 2017. These issues have complex and diverse interests and are difficult to resolve due to the lack of a clear normative system, so it is necessary to improve social acceptance through the establishment of a new normative system (order). This article examines the prerequisites for establishing a practical new digital order and normative system (Artificial Intelligence's legal personality and tort responsibility, artificial intelligence's fairness and ethics principles and equality principles, artificial intelligence and judgment, artificial intelligence and jobs, artificial intelligence and copyrights), and examines the constitution and administrative law to respond to artificial intelligence. It is always important to keep in mind that “artificial intelligence cannot take precedence over the constitution and basic rights” when it comes to normative responses. Regarding the relationship between the state and science and technology, the Constitution stipulates that “the state shall endeavor to develop the national economy through innovation of science and technology and the development of information and manpower (Article 127), and the rights of authors, inventors, and science and technicians are protected by law (Article 22).” It is constitutionally declared that the state should actively plan, form, and lead in a certain direction for the promotion of science and technology directly. In relation to these constitutional provisions, the establishment and implementation of science and technology policies can be seen as an important duty given to the Republic of Korea as a democratic welfare state. Apart from private autonomy, it is urged to prepare a basic artificial intelligence law to protect the safety and basic rights of the people affected by artificial intelligence.

The article deals with the influence of the artificial intelligence phenomenon on the legal paradigm in terms of widening the range of legal entities. The decisive properties of artificial intelligence are the awareness of their own construction and functioning, ability to self-study, self-improvement, self-development, autonomy from the person in decision-making and so on. The author concludes that the division into legal and non-legal entities is artificial and depends solely on the human. The humanity creates its own legal space and determines the circle of legal and non-legal entities in it. This division has been developed by many generations of lawyers. But this division is not a dogma. With only one human willpower, another artificial creation was created. It was a legal entity. For a legal entity, the opportunity to be the person of a legal relationship is recognized without reservation. Since a collective agreement for the recognition of any person of legal relations is only in the collective imagination (intersubjective reality), its terms can always be changed in one direction or the other. Therefore, in the case of the emergence of a new actor who is a super-developed artificial intelligence, there is every reason to recognize it as a person of legal relations. Artificial intelligence can be empowered and may be recognized as being able to fulfill certain responsibilities. It has also been argued that the digital human being (Homo numeralis, Homo digitalis, Homo horologium) creates a new social and legal phenomenon. A human being is asked to name a person who is advanced with bioengineering, combining organics with inorganics, or building an inorganic life form. The digital human being will relate to the common human being as the next stage of evolution. This can lead to an even greater or fundamental stratification of society. Similarly, a digital human being can be the target of a cyber-attack.

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui serta memahami urgensi pengaturan AI dalam UU Hak Cipta di Indonesia serta potensi AI sebagai subjek hukum dalam sistem hukum di Indonesia, Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian normative serta menggunakan pendekatan perundang-undangan atau statue approach serta pendekatan perbandingan atau comparative approach. Adapun rumusan masalah dalam penelitian ini adalah Apa urgensi pengaturan artificial intelligence dalam rezim hukum hak cipta di Indonesia? Dan Bagaimanakah potensi artificial intelligence sebagai subjek hukum dalam sistem hukum di Indonesia ? Dalam penelitian ini menemukan bahwa dalam UUHC Indonesia tidak mengenal AI sebagai subjek hukum, sehingga AI berdasarkan pada UUHC Indonesia tidak dapat digolongkan sebagai pencipta serta potensi AI untuk diakui sebagai entitas baru berkaitan dengan subjek hukum selain manusia dan badan hukum yang sebelumnya telah diakui sebagai subjek hukum di Indonesia sangat terbuka, mengingat AI dapat dipersamakan dengan badan hukum sesuai dengan teori-teori badan hukum serta adanya konsep Work Made For Hire yang terdapat dalam UUHC Amerika Serikat yang dapat diadopsi oleh Indonesia untuk mengakomodir AI sebagai suatu entitas baru berkaitan dengan subjek hukum yang diakui di Indonesia. Kata Kunci: Kecerdasan Buatan, Hak Cipta, Subjek Hukum This study aims to determine and understand the urgency of AI regulation in the Copyright Law in Indonesia as well as the potential of AI as a legal subject in the legal system in Indonesia, This study uses normative research methods and uses a statutory approach or statue approach and a comparative approach. 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Since artificial intelligence has completed the process from the auxiliary tool of human creation to the independent creation completion of works with formal appearance, it has brought many legal issues that have caused widespread controversy. Among them, whether artificial intelligence has the qualification of legal subject and whether the products of artificial intelligence should be protected by law is the focus of the problem. In the legal circle, the involvement of the theme of “non-anthropocentrism” can be traced back to the debate between animal legal personality and non-human ecological rights. The Naruto v. Slater Monkey selfie case and the Pigcasso light people’s debating about animal copyright, and artificial intelligence provides a new research perspective and reinvigorates the research on animal copyright. By means of the analogy research of animals, humans and artificial intelligence, this paper explores the rationality, necessity and feasibility of investing non-human beings with quasi-legal subject qualification in the special subdivision field of law—copyright. Quasi-legal subject qualification means that artificial narrow intelligence and animals are endowed with judicial capacity for copyrights and limited capacity to act. At the same time, the designers of artificial intelligence, animal breeders and the government and so on serve as the quasi-guardian of artificial intelligence and animals. In addition, artificial general intelligence and artificial super general intelligence are endowed with completely independent legal capacity to act, and the quasi-guardian system is terminated. The quasi-guardian system is perfectly compatible with the existing legal framework from the perspective of development. It protects the ownerless intellectual property from the free lift, thereby helping avoid the tragedy of the commons. Furthermore, it solves the problem that animals and artificial narrow intelligence cannot independently safeguard their rights and provides a forward-looking theoretical model for the system construction of non-human copyright.

Artificial intelligence, or better known as AI, is experiencing very rapid development in today's technological era. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is an innovation that has changed many aspects of life in the world. The presence of machines with AI capabilities certainly has a disruptive impact on various social structures of society. One of the significant changes with the presence of AI is the legal science course, especially criminal law. The existence of a legal vacuum in the regulation of criminal law enforcement regarding AI or artificial intelligence initiated the author to conduct research related to law enforcement efforts against AI as a criminal law subject. This research aims to find out law enforcement against AI which can be the subject of criminal law. This study uses a type of juridical-normative research with a conceptual approach, a statute approach, and a comparative approach. Legal studies on artificial intelligence as perpetrators of criminal acts are quite minimal because they are not accompanied by regulations that regulate them. Artificial intelligence such as AI cannot perform illegal acts independently, because in its operation, AI requires help from humans. In Indonesia's positive law, artificial intelligence (AI) is not recognized as a legal subject as is a human or legal entity that is juridically recognized as a legal subject. Only legal subjects, both individuals and legal entities, can be held criminally liable. The right conclusion in this article is that the government should prepare regulations on AI as a subject of criminal acts and law enforcement against artificial intelligence. This arrangement is along with the identification of legal subjects, both individuals and legal entities, as well as appropriate laws to carry out law enforcement efforts against AI.

Information technology is taking the world by storm. The technological world is changing rapidly and drastically. Human activities are taken over by robots and computers. The usage of computers and robots has increased productivity in various sectors. The emergence of artificial intelligence has stirred up many debates on both its importance and limitations. Artificial intelligence is directed to the usage of Information Technology in conducting tasks that normally require human intelligence. The expectation of artificial intelligence is high, nevertheless, artificial intelligence has its shortcomings namely the impact of artificial intelligence on the concept of a legal personality. The problem with artificial Intelligence is the debate on whether does it have a legal personality? And another problem is under what situation does the law treat artificial intelligence as an entity with its own rights and obligations. The objective of this article is to examine the various definitions of legal personality and whether artificial intelligence can become a legal person. The article will also examine the criminal liability of artificial intelligence when a crime has been committed. The methodology adopted is qualitative namely Doctrinal Legal Research by analyzing the relevant legal views from various journals on artificial intelligence. The study found out that artificial intelligence has its limitations in defining its legal personality and also in examining the criminal liability when a crime has been committed by robots.

Real-World Surveillance of FDA-Cleared Artificial Intelligence Models: Rationale and Logistics.

The Bundle Theory, or Electronic Personhood Theory, in the context of artificial intelligence (AI), is a theory adopted by the European legislature under the Artificial Intelligence Act 2024. It represents a legal and philosophical approach aimed at treating intelligent entities (such as robots and advanced AI systems) as independent legal persons, bearing certain responsibilities or possessing certain rights. The theory suggests that legal personality is not a fixed entity, but rather a bundle of legal attributes (such as financial liability, the right to sue, and liability) that can be granted to entities as needed. This theory has been used to grant legal status to companies and legal entities. Consequently, a future-oriented perspective has emerged, recognizing the legal personality of robots equipped with artificial intelligence, in order to hold them liable for damages that may be caused by their application to advanced AI systems. In our research, we adopted a descriptive approach by reviewing and analyzing conflicting jurisprudential opinions regarding the attribution of legal personality. We also defined the concept of the bundle theory and demonstrated its acceptability, with the aim of assessing the final position of the legal personality of artificial intelligence. Among the results of this study, as an approach to the problem of attributing legal personality, is the possibility of attributing legal personality to artificial intelligence under the bundle theory, considering it an electronic third party, subject to two restrictions: the first is its nature, which prevents it from acquiring certain special family rights; and the second is the restriction of specialization, which limits legal activities to the purpose for which it was created.

Electronic personhood for artificial intelligence in the workplace

Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning have prompted discussion about whether conventional liability laws can be applicable to AI systems which manifest a high degree of autonomy. Users and developers of such AI systems may meet neither the epistemic (sufficient degree of awareness of what is happening) nor control (control over the actions performed) conditions of personal responsibility for the actions of the system at hand, and therefore, conventional liability schemes may seem to be inapplicable[1].
 The recently adopted AI Liability Directive [2022] has sought to adapt EU law to the challenges to conventional liability schemes posed by AI systems by imposing a system of strict, rather than fault-based liability, for AI systems. The goal of this is to be able to more easily hold developers, producers, and users of AI technologies accountable, requiring them to explain how AI systems were built and trained. The Directive aims to make it easier for people and companies harmed by AI systems to sue those responsible for the AI systems for damages. However, the Directive seems to ignore the potential injustice that could result from producers and developers being held accountable for actions caused by AI systems which they are neither aware of nor have sufficient control over.
 In this essay, I will critically assess the Directive’s system of fault-based liability for AI systems and argue that, whilst such a system may confer some instrumental advantages on behalf of those suing for damages caused by AI systems, it risks causing injustice on the part of developers and producers by making them liable for events they could neither control nor predict. This is likely to risk both producing unjust outcomes and hindering progress in AI development. Instead, following Visa Kurki’s analysis of legal personhood as a cluster concept divided into passive and active incidents, I will argue that some AI systems ought to be granted a limited form of legal personhood, because they meet some of the relevant criteria for active legal personhood, such as the capacity to perform acts-in-the-law. The legal personhood I propose for AI systems is a kind of dependent legal personhood analogous to that granted to corporations. Such a form of legal personhood would not absolve developers and producers from liability for damages (where such liability is applicable), but at the same time, it would not risk unjustly holding producers and developers liable for actions of an AI system.
 [1] Mark Coeckelbergh, "Artificial Intelligence, Responsibility Attribution, and a Relational Justification of Explainability." Science and Engineering Ethics, (2020): 2054

Abstract: The idea of the legal personhood of artificial intelligence (AI) — the idea that intelligent agents can have rights and incur obligations under the law— is controversial, and in fact is often dismissed out of hand: in this paper I will argue that, on the contrary, such legal personhood may be the next big challenge for our legal systems, and we need it to deal with the new kinds ofcomplexity introduced by AI. Furthermore, I argue that we already have experiences we can look: to this end we can draw on the reasoning applied to the legal personhood recognized for corporations and other nonhuman entities. In order to do this, I address some of the criticisms against ascribing legal personhood to AI. I also look at the Canadian and EU ethical guidelines so as to keep the development of AI within the framework of human values, and I show that an ascription of legal personhood to AI is consistent with them. I also address a few of the big issues involved in making the legal personhood of AI a reality.

Artificial intelligence (AI) is often compared to corporations in legal studies when discussing AI legal personhood. This article also uses this analogy between AI and companies to study AI legal personhood but contributes to the discussion by utilizing the hybrid model of corporate legal personhood. The hybrid model simultaneously applies the real entity, aggregate entity, and artificial entity models. This article adopts a legalistic position, in which anything can be a legal person. However, there might be strong pragmatic reasons not to confer legal personhood on non-human entities. The article recognizes that artificial intelligence is autonomous by definition and has greater de facto autonomy than corporations and, consequently, greater potential for de jure autonomy. Therefore, AI has a strong attribute to be a real entity. Nevertheless, the article argues that AI has key characteristics from the aggregate entity and artificial entity models. Therefore, the hybrid entity model is more applicable to AI legal personhood than any single model alone. The discussion recognises that AI might be too autonomous for legal personhood. Still, it concludes that the hybrid model is a useful analytical framework as it incorporates legal persons with different levels of de jure and de facto autonomy.

The study is devoted to the definition of artificial intelligence as a legal category. At the same time, the peculiarity of the term and its general social significance determine the fact that in order to find an answer to the question of the legal nature of artificial intelligence, it is relevant to analyze not only purely legal scientific ideas, but also philosophical, psychological, social, religious and other aspects of understanding artificial intelligence and the impact of this phenomenon on various spheres of public life. In order to define the concept of artificial intelligence, the author examined the attempts to define it that have already been used in legislation. In particular, the author analyzed the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act), which entered into force in the EU on August 1, 2024, and concluded that this law does not answer the question of the subjectivity or lack thereof of artificial intelligence. Considerable attention is paid to the legal framework of Ukraine, in particular, the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1556-p of December 2, 2020, which approved the Concept of Artificial Intelligence Development in Ukraine. This policy document uses the basic principles of the Guidelines of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on Artificial Intelligence (Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence), which Ukraine joined in 2019. The definition of artificial intelligence as a legal category in legal doctrine encounters a number of fundamental problems, but they all have a common denominator in identifying the legal nature of the bearers of such intelligence. The analysis of modern legal doctrine has revealed general approaches to understanding the relationship between the use of artificial intelligence and its liability for actions, namely: 1) positioning of robots with artificial intelligence as an object of social relations (under this approach, robots with artificial intelligence are perceived only as possible assistance in social relations where the subjects are individuals and legal entities) 2) positioning of artificial intelligence robots as separate subjects of legal relations (under this approach, artificial intelligence robots are perceived as separate independent subjects of social relations with the ability to realize and assess the significance of their actions and actions of other persons relatively independently and to a sufficient extent). Based on the study, the author offers her own solution to the problem of determining the legal status of artificial intelligence (robot, intellectual agent). First of all, the author proves the need to gradually prepare the legal system for the emergence of a new subject - an electronic person. It is timely to discuss the practical possibility of granting in the future the status of a quasi-legal entity to the most advanced artificial intelligence systems with a high degree of autonomy, since it does not fall under the category of a legal entity (which is also a fiction). It is substantiated that electronic persons should be understood as powerful artificial intelligence systems endowed with the status of a "quasi-legal" person having an appropriate scope of special legal capacity depending on their functional purpose and capabilities. The study draws historical and legal parallels with the experience of Ancient Rome in terms of using (involving) phenomena which were not originally subjects of law and then acquired such a possibility (municipalities, institutions, slaves, etc.) to participate in civil circulation. Recognition of artificial intelligence robots ("electronic persons", "intellectual agents") as a quasi-legal entity will entail a number of additional legal consequences. In particular, there is a need to include "cyber capacity" in the list of types of legal personality of a legal entity, i.e. the ability to be an active participant in relations in the IT sphere (to enter into contracts as a user, to be a member of social networks, to participate in interactive campaigns, etc.) Cyber capacity can be realized through both transactions and legal acts. As with legal entities, electronic entities should be subject to mandatory state registration in the relevant electronic registers. At the same time, a system of licensing the types of activities of such entities and establishing standards and norms to which such entities must comply, depending on the type of activity, is also possible. In addition to the development of the necessary regulations and standards, it is very important to use soft law. In this case, ethical standards of artificial intelligence are its value basis - they must be observed by all participants in legal relations: both private companies and executive authorities. The author argues that an electronic person can be defined as a set of technologies which are recognized by law as a participant in property and non-property relations. Such a person has the legal status of a quasi-legal entity, is registered in accordance with the procedure established by law, and has a special legal personality depending on the functional purpose (field of activity).