Response to Moss: Correspondence concerning the Psychoanalytic Controversies section on the Israel–Palestine conflict (issue 1, 2025)

The formation of the State of Israel in 1948 has led to bloody course of events, which continues to this day, as to who has the right to claim the land home; the Palestinian-Arabs (mostly Muslim) or the Jewish (mostly non-Arab residents). The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most violent and bloodiest protracted conflict in the post World War II era, which has resulted in massive human casualties and human rights abuses for decades. The numerous wars in conjunction with the rise of militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas have led to the development of a human security dilemma in Palestine and Israel. Decades of violence and destruction have resulted in massive human casualties, political chaos and disruption to the way of life of the people in the region. The concept of human security began to enter mainstream human rights, security and international politics debate, more prominently, after the release of the 1994 report United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on Human Development. The report is essentially explicit manifestations of the human rights principles enshrined in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Humans Rights (UNDHR). Human security pushes for intense promotion and greater respect for human life in all spheres of human endeavors. This article inspects the human security dimension present in the Israel-Palestine conflict. This article encompasses two major parts. The first part provides an external understanding of how human security principles can be applied to Israel- Palestine conflict and how it affects the possibility of peace. Secondly, the article addresses the question on how people ‘inside’ the conflict view human security and the possibility of peace.

This article proposes a reading of films and literary works of Jewish–Israeli directors and writers that represent a link between the Holocaust and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Based on LaCapra’s ‘acting out’ and Hirsch’s ‘postmemory’ it examines the way artists reflect the complex political blend of the Holocaust and the Israeli– Palestinian conflict. The article shows that, alongside a right-wing narrative that represents the Arabs as the Nazis’ successors, Hebrew literature and cinema, especially in the last decade, reflect mainly the opinions of the left and extreme left wing in Israel, who do not accept this equation, but create what can be called a ‘counteracting-out’ – a reversed equation in which the resemblance between the Holocaust and the Nakbah and/or Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and Nazis is represented. The fact that the politicization of the Holocaust is tossed from one political side to the other reflects the confusion and ambivalence in Israel’s postmemory of the Holocaust, and indicates the struggle between different memory agents on the collective memory of the Holocaust.

The aim of the current article is to analyse the challenges for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to pursue a meaningful and effective policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on four dimensions: the history of European foreign policies toward the Middle East conflict, opportunities and constraints of realizing Palestinian self-determination, institutional opportunities and constraints for the ENP of walking the talk of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, and policy options of the EU toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and their success conditions. The EU’s chances and constraints in addressing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are discussed as structural challenges: the challenge created through the historical normative engagement of the EU, the problematic local conditions for constructively dealing with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and the European institutional capabilities and their limits to project its policy concepts on the Middle East. The critical discussion of the three-faceted system of challenges that the EU is exposed to when dealing with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is followed by the presentation and assessment of different policy options in the light of success conditions to (not) walk the talk of dealing with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in a productive way. The article comes to the conclusion that the EU is hardly capable of contributing to the realization of Palestinian self-determination.

Using the Europeanization concept as framework of analysis, this article examines the interaction of Germany's national policy with Europe's collective foreign policy in a central policy area – the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It argues that Germany's conflict resolution policy evolved in close interaction with Europe's common foreign policy. Germany has relied on EPC/CFSP as a framework to pursue national objectives and foreign policy priorities more effectively. What is more, four decades of European foreign policy co-operation toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict also impacted on the substance and practices of Germany's national foreign policy, providing a cover for a more ‘even-handed’ and active policy.

NAIS 1:2 FALL 2014 The Force of Exceptionalist Narratives 107 ERIC CHEYFITZ The Force of Exceptionalist Narratives in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict There has been a turn, for many people, in recognizing that Manifest Destiny was a horror, and the supposed “exceptionalism” or “idealism” of American “foreign” policy—these first inhabitants from whom the land was stolen were long not treated as having American “rights,” as foreigners—will not survive this evidence. We have come to a turning point in our society, where we might recognize the truth of what was done and resolve to go forward, as best we can, as a serious, multiracial society in which the stories of each person are acknowledged and the dark history which still afflicts us rejected. —ALAN GILBERT, JOHN EVANS PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, 2014 But it’s hard sometimes, letting go of the stories you think you know. —PAMELA J. OLSON, FAST TIMES IN PALESTINE: A LOVE AFFAIR WITH A HOMELESS HOMELAND (2013) My initial interest in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict comes from the fact that I am a Jew and one of my daughters and three of my grandchildren are citizens of Israel. But this personal connection is deeply embedded with my intellectual , scholarly, and political interest in the conflict. In this last connection, I am a member of both the American Studies Association (ASA) and the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association (NAISA) and a supporter of the resolutions published by both groups, following that of the Asian American Studies Association (AAAS), in solidarity with the 2005 call by Palestinian civil society for an academic boycott of Israeli institutions of higher education .1 These nonbinding resolutions, it should be stressed, are focused not on individual scholars, but on Israeli academic institutions because of the complicity of these institutions with Israel state policies in Gaza; the West Bank, including East Jerusalem; and the Golan Heights. These policies, which impose martial law on the Palestinian territories and are in violation of international law, interdict the academic freedom and human rights of the Palestinians. As the title suggests, this essay focuses neither on American nor Israeli exceptionalism per se but on how the intersection of the two narratives results in the historical denial by both nation-states of the actual history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict—the way in which American exceptionalism reinforces that of Israel is a particular focus. As I argue, this denial, which Eric Cheyfitz NAIS 1:2 FALL 2014 108 erases the Palestinian narrative of the conflict, makes a just resolution of the conflict impossible. We should remember in what follows that nations are narratives that rationalize, or idealize, the material force of the state. That is what is implied in the formation of the nation-state, a synthesis of rhetorical and material power. The state, then, requires the narrative of the nation to cover its tracks. The nation is the state’s alibi. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been continual, at least in the formal sense, since 1917. In that year the Balfour Declaration was proclaimed in a letter from British Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour to Lord Rothschild: His Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.2 The Declaration is manifestly a colonial document. Edward Said notes, That is the declaration was made (a) by a European power, (b) about a non-­ European territory, (c) in flat disregard of both the presence and the wishes of the native majority resident in that territory, and (d) it took the form of a promise about this same territory to another foreign group, so that this foreign group might, quite literally, make this territory a national home for the Jewish ­people.3 The British transferred their colonial project in Palestine to the UN in 1947, which, without the agreement of the over 700,000...

The conventional wisdom in the literature on EU–Israel/Palestine relations is that the EU has only displayed very limited, if any, normative power in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Previous studies have focused on the ability, or rather inability, of the EU to diffuse any of the core norms behind Ian Manners' concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE) into the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, while tending to ignore the ability of the EU to shape what is considered normal in many aspects of the conflict – either by making others adopt its policies, or by contributing to creating consensus around an issue. By using Tuomas Forsberg's framework of four different mechanisms of normative power: persuasion, invoking norms, shaping the discourse and the power of example on three important case studies from the conflict (EC/EU's declaratory diplomacy on the need for a just peace in the conflict, the Palestinians' bid for statehood at the UN in 2011 and the emerging ‘differentiation strategy’), this article concludes that the EU has much more normative power in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict than the literature has previously acknowledged.

Israeli–Palestinian peace is promoted through political and diplomatic channels, as well as indirect channels such as conferences, lectures, meetings, workshops and political journalism. However, there is less awareness of the extensive artistic activity in Israel surrounding peace and its implications for society, or of the uniqueness of the theatrical medium as a public medium that allows its viewers and participants to clarify their conflicts and positions related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As part of a large and comprehensive study of plays about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (which included mapping out and analyzing the themes of 37 plays about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict between 2005–2007, and checking the impact of some of the plays on teenage audiences), this study focused on Israeli theater creators who deal with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The goal was to specify the models, issues and strategies the creators used in plays about the conflict in order to influence viewers’ positions. This article represents the findings of the analysis of 26 in‐depth interviews with various creators (playwrights, directors and actors), who intended their plays to be seen by adult and high school audiences. The findings discuss the ideological, ethical and pedagogical dilemmas as well as the strategies they used to build texts meant to influence their viewers, and which distinguish dramatic works that educate for peace.

Learning the Narrative of the Other

Sense of National Coherence and Willingness to Reconcile

Social media has a big role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a forum for conveying information both in the form of facts and doctrine to the general public. The alignment of an individual or a country can be reflected through what they present on social media. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Edward W Said's theory of orientalism can be seen from the Balfour Declaration in 1917 which was interpreted as a manifestation of orientalism. The aim of this research is to analyze orientalist patterns in social media representations of Israel and Palestine. The method used by researchers in this research is the content analysis method. The research subjects used are ordinary people who have the power to convey their defense on social media. This research focuses on Israeli and Palestinian society by using social media as a tool in obtaining data. The result of this research is that orientalism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be identified through history, political actions and societal views which often reflect Western dominance and views of superiority towards the East. It can be concluded that in the context of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, the role of social media is becoming increasingly significant, and algorithms on these platforms can play an important role in shaping people's views and attitudes.

There have been numerous attempts to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, particularly since 1967. This chapter attempts to determine why they have all failed, examining the underlying factors in Israel's approach and the changes that occurred with regard to the major obstacles or challenges as viewed by Israel. As in the case of most conflicts, there are varied characterizations of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: Ethno-national, religious, territorial, postcolonial, and more. While this may be important for theoreticians or even students of conflict resolution, such characterizations may change over time, particularly in a long-standing conflict such as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Most Israelis see themselves as the victims in this conflict. They consciously or unconsciously see the present as a continuation— and also response— to centuries of persecution, exclusion, and attempted annihilation of the Jewish people.

NAIS 1:2 FALL 2014 Response to Eric Cheyfitz 147 STEVEN SALAITA Response to Eric Cheyfitz’s “The Force of Exceptionalist Narratives in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict” I WAS DELIGHTED to read Eric Cheyfitz’s “The Force of Exceptionalist Narratives in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict” and am excited to offer this brief response. This conversation is one that must necessarily continue. It is appropriate for a variety of reasons that it happens in a space of Indigenous reflection and theorization. I found it of particular value that Cheyfitz begins with analysis of the Balfour Declaration, which, beyond its obvious historical importance, is profoundly interesting as a rhetorical document. It promises a classically humanistic version of coexistence but is simultaneously a promissory certificate of colonial intent, attempting to assuage the anxieties of those its drafters were secretly planning to displace. In these contradictions we find ample opportunity to imaginatively assess the modern history of Palestine. In many ways, the state of Israel has indeed failed to live up to Balfour’s discourse. In that most important way, however, the behind-the-scenes conflation of “homeland” with “nation-state,” Israel managed to fulfill the declaration’s unspoken logic. It did so in large part through the exceptionalism Cheyfitz so ably explores . Here the colonial discourses of the United States and Israel exist in close proximity, if not in juxtaposition. I am interested in the ways that the Nazi Holocaust helped enact the performance of Israeli exceptionalism, because of the fruitful narratives of religious persecution as a precursor to settler colonization. One comment that Cheyfitz offers requires, I think, further conversation: “While the field of American studies, within which I include Ethnic and Native American studies.” Drawing from my readings of Robert Warrior, Jodi Byrd, Dale Turner, and others, I would argue that it’s useful to complicate the positionality of these fields in relation to one another. The move toward disciplinary independence—which is not to preclude interdependence—draws from (and contributes to) a particular narrative of decolonization that deeply informs the material politics of North America and Palestine. While Norman Finklestein, from whom Cheyfitz draws significant supporting material, has produced important work, I’m fond of the recent Steven Salaita NAIS 1:2 FALL 2014 148­ writings of Waziyatawin, J. Kehaulani Kauanui, and Steven Newcomb. There is a body of scholarship emerging that more robustly situates itself in decolonial paradigms that Finkelstein either ignores or refuses to engage. Those paradigms are crucial because Natives and Palestinians seek forms of self-­ determination that move beyond the conventional frameworks of Western human rights or international laws. Cheyfitz writes movingly in his conclusion of a Jewish presence in the Middle East that is integrative rather than isolated. This vision is one that advocates of decolonization should pursue vigorously, for it provides a model not only for a democratic Palestine but also for the engagement of Indigenous communities in North and South America with the institutions from which they have been excluded and from which they have endured considerable violence . In order for these forms of democratic engagement to become reality, they must, as Cheyfitz notes, disengage themselves from the ethnonationalism of the settler state. This is not an easy or especially realistic task. But I find any scholarly or material aspiration that stops short of this desired result to be unworthy of our time. And I’m quite unmoved by the hegemony of realism. I hope that our pieces can move beyond conversation with one another and into a broader discussion of what it means to dismantle and recreate the histories of our dispossession. I stand firm in my belief that it won’t happen in Palestine unless it happens in North America. STEVEN SALAITA is an independent scholar. ...

This article examines the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy making in Australia by turning to the findings of a national survey of Australian public opinion on the Israel–Palestine conflict. The survey findings suggest that the Australian government's policy on the Israel–Palestine conflict is inconsistent with public opinion, and such disparity is explained here in terms of the lack of public attachment to the conflict, the limited media and the absence of any notable public advocacy for policy change. This explanation is informed by in-depth interviews conducted with current and former members of parliament and senior public servants. The article also explores the implications of the survey's findings in relation to the significant political changes taking place across the Middle East region. It suggests that these events may be creating an impetus for policy change that endorses Palestinian self-determination, for which there is significant support among the Australian public.

How does the subjective conceptual framing of conflict impact the warring parties’ attitudes towards political compromise and negotiation? To assess strategies for conflict resolution, researchers frequently try to determine the defining dispute of a given conflict. However, involved parties often view the conflict through fundamentally distinct lenses. Currently, researchers do not possess a clear theoretical or methodological way to conceptualize the complexity of such competing frames and their effects on conflict resolution. This article addresses this gap. Using the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a case study, we run a series of focus groups and three surveys among Jewish citizens of Israel, Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCIs), and Palestinians in the West Bank. Results reveal that three conflict frames are prominent – material, nationalist, and religious. However, the parties to the conflict differ in their dominant interpretation of the conflict. Jewish Israelis mostly frame the conflict as nationalist, whereas Palestinians, in both the West Bank and Israel, frame it as religious. Moreover, these frames impact conflict attitudes: a religious frame was associated with significantly less willingness to compromise in potential diplomatic negotiations among both Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Interestingly, differing frames had no significant impact on the political attitudes of West Bank Palestinians, suggesting that the daily realities of conflict there may be creating more static, militant attitudes among that population. These results challenge the efficacy of material solutions to the conflict and demonstrate the micro-foundations underpinning civilians’ conflict attitudes and their implications for successful conflict resolution.

The Israel-Palestinian conflict has been characterized as intractable, inextricable, and the root cause of suffering and misery for many of the people who live in the Middle East. Whilst it would be unwise to believe that the solution to this problem can be provided by negotiation support systems, we believe such systems can provide useful advice and allow disputants to more understand their goals and perform the trade-offs necessary to arrive at acceptable solutions.Given our research on interest based negotiation support systems to provide family mediation advice, we pose the question about the ability of such systems to provide useful advice about the Israel -- Palestinian dispute. We examine the differences between family mediation and international conflict resolution and reflect upon whether results from the former can provide useful advice in the latter.