Abstract
Resource allocation is a fundamental and challenging component of common pool resource governance, particularly transboundary fisheries. We highlight the growing importance of allocation in fisheries governance, comparing approaches of the five tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (tRFMOs). We find all tRFMOs except one have defined resources for allocation and outlined principles to guide allocation based on equity, citizenship, and legitimacy. However, all fall short of applying these principles in assigning fish resources. Most tRFMOs rely on historical catch or effort, while equity principles rarely determine dedicated rights. Further, the current system of annual negotiations reduces certainty, trust, and transparency, counteracting many benefits asserted by rights-based management proponents. We suggest one means of gaining traction may be to shift conversations from allocative rights toward weighting of principles already identified by most tRFMOs. Incorporating principles into resource allocation remains a major opportunity, with important implications for current and future access to fish.
Highlights
Resource allocation is a fundamental and challenging component of common pool resource (CPR) governance (Ostrom 1990, 2003)
We provide a brief history of developments within the five tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (tRFMOs), considering where each is situated within this allocation process
We provide a brief history of developments within the five tRFMOs (Fig. 4), considering where each is situated within this allocation process
Summary
Resource allocation is a fundamental and challenging component of common pool resource (CPR) governance (Ostrom 1990, 2003). Substantially less research has explored the ways in which those resources are allocated among users, and the implications for fairness, equity, and justice (Agrawal 2003; Albin 2003; Ostrom 2003). In her seminal work, Ostrom emphasizes both these components of good CPR governance, stating that successful CPRs are able to ‘‘allocate resource units and at the same time avoid the conflict, uncertainty, and perceived unfairness of a poorly solved assignment problem...’’ (Ostrom 1990). As spatially expansive and remote systems with multinational users exploiting mobile, concealed, multi-species resources, transboundary fisheries meet few if any of these conditions, and are especially difficult to govern
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