Research on the mechanism of perceived psychological power’s impact on employees’ creative ideas: a moderated chain mediation model

Due to the continued reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, SOE leaders face many challenges competing in a rapidly changing global marketplace. Not only are leaders tasked to manage change, but they must also deliver results and increase revenue through human capital. The need for stronger human capital and human resources (HR) must play a stronger role in SOEs by adopting new strategies for talent management.The purpose of this study explores the experiences and perceptions of leader-managers as it relates to talent management in SOEs in China. Upon conducting phenomenological interviews with 11 state-owned companies and 17 leader-manager participants, analysis was completed to determine themes related to leadership-management selection, development, and practices in SOEs in China. Themes emerged from the data analysis including organizational structure and its influence on leader-manager selection; an overview of the leadership pipeline present in SOEs including the recruitment and selection process and succession planning strategies; HR’s role within the recruitment and selection process; leadership-management development through experience and other development strategies; influence of Chinese and Western culture and on talent management and leader-manager practices.The findings were synthesized to introduce a proposed talent management model for SOEs in China. The proposed model provides HR practitioners a framework to manage talent within their organizations, in particular in the areas of recruiting, developing, and retaining successful leader-managers within SOEs in China.

The main purpose of this study is to explore and compare the relationships of justice and commitment among Chinese employees working in International Joint Ventures (IJVs) and reformed State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) today. In this study, distributive justice and procedural justice are considered as antecedents of affective commitment, and interactional justice is considered as antecedent of commitment to supervisor. Additionally, the model further suggests that affective commitment will affect employees' turnover intention and organisational citizenship behaviour; and commitment to supervisor will affect employees' organisational citizenship behaviour. A data set consisting of 247 employees in two international joint ventures and 253 employees in two state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Southern China are used to test the hypotheses empirically. The LISREL results support the hypotheses. The study shows the major differences of employees' attitudes and behaviour in international joint ventures and state-owned enterprises in China today. The effect of distributive justice on employees' affective commitment is stronger in SOE than in IJV. On the contrary, the effect of procedural justice on employees' affective commitment is stronger in IJV than in SOE. Additionally, the effect of interactional justice on commitment to supervisor is similar in both types of organisation. These results reveal that interactional justice is highly emphasized in both IJVs and SOEs in contemporary China, though the employees are working in different organisational contexts. Finally, theoretical and practical implications of the present study are discussed.

The aim of the paper is to identify the complexity of policy execution, investment and financial support between state-owned and private-owned enterprises in China. Based on the literature review of business model innovation, and current situation of private-owned and state-owned enterprises in China, there is a lack of evidence and case analysis in the power of policy execution and the version of future development between two kinds of industries. The authors conducted qualitative research in four typical industries. Two of them are private-owned and the others are state-owned. The research aims to make a specific comparison between two kinds of industries in China.

Top executives in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China can be promoted to government sectors. This is regarded as political promotion. Using hand-collected turnover data for top executives in SOEs and adopting a time-varying difference-in-differences design, we find that firm risk is significantly lower in the years immediately before the political promotion of top executives, when their incentives for political promotions are stronger. Moreover, strong industry tournament incentives counteract the impact of political promotion incentives on firm risk. This study supplements tournament theory and enhances our understanding of how different incentive mechanisms interact and affect firms’ choices vis-à-vis their risk-taking activities.

In the increasingly competitive market, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, which dominate the national economy, have to take actions to enhance their competitive advantages in response to the competition. On one hand, competitive advantage of a company has impacts on its performance. On the other hand, the enterprise needs to develop competitive strategies related to its goals. Therefore, the two elements interact with each other. However, most scholars only focus on one aspect to do research, which resulted in incomplete findings. This article summarizes the development process of performance measurement in China and Western countries, based on performance measurement theory, and points out the disadvantages of the performance measurement system of state-owned enterprises in China. In addition, competitive strategies of company are sorted out. On the basis of existing research results, the article built a performance measurement index system which is used as a theoretical tool for case study. Then, through theoretical analysis and case studies of the two state-owned enterprises in the civil airline industry (China Eastern Airlines Corporation and China Southern Airlines Corporation), this article comprehensively analyzes and compares performance measurement of the two companies and the industry environment, suggests relevant competitive strategies for both companies. Finally, this article sums up the research results and makes suggestions for performance improvement.

Formal and informal influences of the state on OFDI of hybrid state-owned enterprises in China

Some challenges were faced in traditional performance management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, such as more involuted reports, esoteric performance measures, unrealistic plans and budgets, inefficient rewards system etc. It is necessary and important to integrate performance management. A business model of integrated business performance management is clarified in this paper, which included strategy plan, performance measures, business planning, management reports, organizational alignment and reward systems. A technical framework of integrated business performance management system is discussed, which shows the infrastructure of system design. This paper's results will be benefit to further study of how to improve performance through implementing business performance management system for SOEs

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China have been pivotal in economic stabilization, transitioning from primary executors of economic plans to facilitators of temporary economic mobilization, counter-cyclical investments, and strategic investments aligned with national interests. This stabilization role, shaped by major social relations (the state–SOEs relation, the SOE management–worker relation, and the SOEs–private enterprises relation) in different stages, is distinct from capitalist government interventions. SOEs are an institution that, under certain conditions, the state can leverage to stabilize the economy while simultaneously promoting progressive social and economic goals. This institution offers favorable, albeit insufficient, conditions for China to transition toward a more socialist economy.

Do CEO's political promotion incentives influence the value of cash holdings: Evidence from state-owned enterprises in China

Using the reputation model of Kreps (1982), Vickers (1986) and Barro(1986), we develop a dynamic game model with incomplete information to examine the relations between the managers of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) in China and the government as the enterprise’s owner. Employing the model, we show that even a noncoopertive manager will not intrude the owner’s interests until the last period of his term in order to maximize his long term utility. The paper also discusses some phenomenona in state-owned enterprises in China, such as “insiders’ control”, “59 phenomenon” and excess on-the-job consumption.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolutionary pattern of state-owned enterprises in China. The researchers focused on the three state-owned enterprises of the same industry in south China that experienced diverse property right reform roads in the late 1990s and showed differing outcomes. Combined with the method of business anthropology, this paper asserts that different models of property right can affect different human behavior paths, which would produce the final destiny of the enterprise. The researchers conclude that the property right reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises in the future should be a mixed model that can achieve the governance balance.

This study investigates whether subsidies to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China’s steel industry are distorting competitive neutrality. The Subsidy and Countervailing Measures Agreement of the World Trade Organization defines “specific” and “harmful” subsidies as being subject to discipline because they distort the allocation of resources. During a recession in the steel industry between 2008 to 2015, China produced excessively and exported aggressively at a lower price. This study hypothesizes that subsidies given by local governments to specific SOEs with undefined conditions softened the budget constraints of these SOEs and that the market equilibrium price would have been lower had no subsidy been provided. Using data from the financial statements of listed steel and iron firms and other relevant sources, I find that firms with operating deficits received subsidies that were large enough to compensate for their deficits. This preferential treatment of these specific SOEs induced them to engage in price cutting behavior, harming competitive neutrality in the market.

Understanding mechanisms of digital transformation in state-owned enterprises in China: An institutional perspective

This paper constructs a simple model to reveal the trade-off between decentralized and centralized governance structure of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Our model shows that the delegation of decision making authority to SOE managers would enhance their initiative in terms of local investment while in meanwhile might lead to the ex-post moral hazard problem. The business empire building effect causes the misalignment between SOE managers’ personal interests and organizational interests as a whole. We introduce a mechanism so called constrained-delegation approach to illustrate the issues that by eliminating some of SOE managers’ empire building investment choices, the trade-off between centralization and decentralization with respect to the loss of control vs local initiative could be resolved. In the end of this paper, we also discuss the policy implications of such constrained-delegation organizational structure with particular reference to the rationale of the party-committee control within large SOEs in China.

In order to explore the necessity of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and clarify the direction of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China, this paper uses dynamic panel data model and bootstrap-DEA method to study the impact of “depth” and “breadth” of equity reform of state-owned enterprises in China on the performance of state-owned enterprise. The results show that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between performance and the level of equitable reform of state-owned enterprises. When the depth of equity reform is 36.6%, the performance of mixed reform enterprises is the best. There is a positive U-shaped relationship between the breadth of equity reform and the performance of state-owned enterprises. When the breadth of equity reform is 12.47%, the performance of mixed reform enterprises is the worst. At the same time, it is found that the average performance of the sample enterprises shows an obvious downward trend, while the performance variance of the sample enterprises shows an obvious upward trend, and this trend has not changed significantly after China launched a new round of state-owned enterprise reform in 2015. According to the above research findings, this paper believes that the intervention of government forces is conducive to promoting the survival of the fittest of state-owned enterprises and the overall optimal allocation of social resources, but we should pay attention to the adoption of market-oriented means and should not directly interfere with the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises in China is either relatively thorough, giving up the dominance of the largest state-owned shareholder, giving other shareholders a greater say, or not to carry out mixed reform, or symbolic mixed reform, otherwise it may aggravate the internal friction of the mixed reform state-owned enterprises, resulting in worse performance.