Abstract
New energy vehicle subsidy is an important way for our government to support new energy vehicle industry. In recent years, our government has formulated a policy of vigorously supporting the new energy automobile industry. With the increase of support, the number of new energy vehicles in China has increased year by year. In view of the information asymmetry between the government and the enterprise in the implementation of the new energy vehicle subsidies policy, this paper studies the problem of the reverse selection of the enterprise and the government in the subsidy process by using the signal game model, and analyzes the related influencing factors and the game equilibrium. The results show that the probability of “subsidy defraud” is greatly improved due to the asymmetry of information between enterprises and governments. Realize the optimal separation and equilibrium solution of high sales enterprises applying for high subsidies and the government giving high subsidies; low sales enterprises apply for low subsidies, and the government gives the optimal separation equilibrium solution of low subsidies. It is necessary to increase the camouflage cost of the enterprise’s “subsidy defraud” and to increase the punishment of the “subsidy defraud”. At the same time, according to the results of the study, the relevant suggestions and countermeasures of the government’s preventive “subsidy defraud” behavior are put forward. The above research is of great theoretical significance and practical value in promoting the development of new energy vehicles in the post-subsidy era.
Highlights
In view of the information asymmetry between the government and the enterprise in the implementation of the new energy vehicle subsidies policy, this paper studies the problem of the reverse selection of the enterprise and the government in the subsidy process by using the signal game model, and analyzes the related influencing factors and the game equilibrium
Realize the optimal separation and equilibrium solution of high sales enterprises applying for high subsidies and the government giving high subsidies; low sales enterprises apply for low subsidies, and the government gives the optimal separation equilibrium solution of low subsidies
Consider the separation and equilibrium, that is, enterprises with high sales apply for high subsidy, enterprises with low sales apply for low subsidy, the government gives high subsidy or low subsidy according to the application of the enterprise
Summary
In order to promote the development of the new energy vehicle industry, the central and local governments have successively issued a series of incentive industrial development policies such as vehicle purchase subscriptions, tax preference, bus procurement, etc. Many enterprises fabricate false material procurement, vehicle production and sales and other original vouchers and records, fictitious sales business to defraud the government subsidy for their own benefit. This kind of behavior reduces the incentive benefit of the government subsidy to the new energy vehicle industry, and reduces the enthusiasm of the production and development of the formal manufacturers, which greatly hinders the development of the whole new energy vehicle industry. If the above-mentioned problems cannot be solved in a timely and reasonable manner, the development of the new energy vehicle industry in China will be in trouble
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