Abstract
By constructing a quadrilateral evolutionary game model involving the central government, local governments, polluting enterprises, and the public, this paper attempts to comprehensively analyze the development and implementation of China’s air pollution control policies. Through the quadrilateral evolutionary game model, this paper systematically studies the evolutionary stable strategies of the four parties involved and obtains 27 equilibrium points, strategy sets, and their corresponding policy performance with the help of the four-dimensional dynamic system. The research results show that there are five equilibrium points that represent the least ideal scenarios, 14 equilibrium points that represent the less than ideal scenarios, four equilibrium points that represent the ideal scenarios, three equilibrium points that represent the more than ideal scenarios, and one equilibrium point that represents the most ideal scenarios. By analyzing the eight equilibrium points that represent the ideal, more than ideal and most ideal scenarios, especially the four stable points, this paper has obtained the conditions as well as policy implications of the four stable points in China’s air pollution control campaign.
Highlights
Severe air pollution will lead to a high incidence of diseases and low level of social welfare and impose immeasurable negative impacts on sustainable development in the long run [1,2,3]
The Dynamic Trend and Evolutionary Stable Points of the Central Government. It can be seen from Equation (6) that the main factors that determine the central government’s tendency to choose the monitoring strategy include the following: 1. The probability of the other parties’ strategy decisions, such as the probability of the local government choosing to regulate y, the probability of the enterprise choosing to comply with regulations on emissions z, and the probability of the public choosing to blow the whistle θ; 2
The Dynamic Trend and Evolutionary Stable Points of the Local Government. It can be seen from Equation (10) that the main factors that determine the local government’s tendency to choose the regulating strategy include: 1. The probability of the other parties’ strategy decisions, such as the probability of the central government choosing to monitor x, the probability of the enterprise choosing to comply with regulations on emissions z, and the probability of the public choosing to blow the whistle θ; 2
Summary
Severe air pollution will lead to a high incidence of diseases and low level of social welfare and impose immeasurable negative impacts on sustainable development in the long run [1,2,3]. As a large developing country that is at a critical stage of economic transformation, China has realized the significance of air pollution problems. Assessing the results of these policies is of paramount importance, to check if these are delivering results. This can be done usingSuasitrainqaubialitlyit2y02m0, 1o2d, xeFlsOR[9P]E,EsRaRteElVliItEeWdata [10], or measurements [11]
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