Representations of xenophobia: A quantitative image type analysis of AfD’s visual strategy

This contribution provides evidence for the sources of sympathies for radical right-wing populist (RRP) parties in a longitudinal perspective. We extend previous knowledge by evaluating the impact of media attention on individual changes of RRP party sympathies. To test our hypotheses, we use panel data from The Netherlands and combine it with information on the saliency of RRP parties and their issues in major Dutch newspapers. Drawing on multilevel structural equation models, our findings indicate that media attention positively affects changes in RRP party sympathies. Furthermore, we find that the effect of media attention on RRP party sympathies is enhanced by perceived ethnic threat and Euroscepticism, respectively. In sum, this study shows that media attention to RRP parties is pivotal for the fortune of such parties.

This paper investigates the consequences of immigration, crime and socio-economic depriviation for the performance of right-wing extremist and populist parties in the German city state of Hamburg between 1986 and 2005. The ecological determinants of voting for right-wing parties on the district level are compared to those for mainstream and other protest parties. Parallels and differences in spatial characteristics between right-wing extremist and populist parties' performance are identified. Our empirical results tend to confirm the general contextual sociological theory of right-wing radicalization by general social deprivation and immigration. Nevertheless they indicate that one has to be very cautious when interpreting the unemployment/crime - right-winger nexus. Moreover, crime does not seem to have a strong significant effect on right-wing populist parties' election successes despite its importance for their programmes and campaigns.

The dynamics of radical right-wing populist party preferences and perceived group threat: A comparative panel analysis of three competing hypotheses in the Netherlands and Germany

Understanding the electoral success of right-wing populist parties has sparked the interest of many scholars. One factor receiving less attention in these debates is the role of religious affiliation as a cultural marker of allegedly dangerous out-groups. Right-wing populists often portray themselves as defenders of a Christian Occident that is allegedly under threat by an invasion of Muslims. We argue, in accordance with the culturalbacklash thesis, that the mobilization of right-wing populists would not have been possible without the widespread perception of Islam and Muslims as a threat. To test this assumption, we analyzed data from the European Social Survey (2014). Our results show that support for a ban against Muslims increases the likelihood of voting for right-wing populist parties, and the percentage of Muslims in the total population has no moderating effect. The individual linkage between anti-Muslim prejudices and the support of right-wing populist parties is a pan-European phenomenon. Interestingly, right-wing populists profit from anti-Muslim prejudices in places where few Muslims live. Thus, the absence of Muslims seems to favor a social climate in which anti-Muslim sentiments prevail. “Islamophobia without Muslims” offers right-wing populists a political window of opportunity to join government coalitions or even to win elections.

The article reveals the relationship between the political crises that affected the European Union from 2015 to 2020, and the growing sympathy of voters for populist-Eurosceptic parties. Particular attention is paid to the political situation in Austria, where in 2017-2019. The government included right-wing populists, as well as the results of the European Parliament elections in May 2019, which testify to the strengthening of the position of a new populism, especially the right-wing one, represented by the Eurosceptics group Identity and Democracy. The purpose of the article is to analyze the current state of the right-wing populist parties and to describe the current patterns of their development in terms of political prospects and the impact on the internal politics of the EU member states. The following research questions are formulated: 1. Has the influence of right-wing populist parties intensified or waned during the migration crisis? 2. Do right-wing populists constitute a coherent pan-European political force? 3. What is the specificity of Italian, Austrian and German right-wing populists?. To answer these questions, a quantitative (first of all, thematic literature and publications in the media) and quantitative analysis (dynamics of relevant statistical information was evaluated). As a result of the study, the authors come to the following conclusions: 1. The entry of the Austrian right-wing populists (APS) into a coalition with S. Kurtz in 2017-2019. - This is part of the regular fluctuations in the balance of power between the three political camps inside Austria, and not a sharp turnaround in established political models (right turn). 2. The German right-wing populists, on the contrary, despite local and really sudden successes (AdG), are in systemic isolation. 3. In Italy, right-wing populists have made significant progress, but the prospects for their unity with other European new right-wingers remain controversial. 4. With some caution, it can be stated that the period 2017-2019, was successful for right-wing populists. The recognition of the right-wing populist parties, their media coverage and presence in government has increased markedly. The perception of the importance of migration themes and cultural identity has increased in comparison with the first half of the 2010s. Moreover, in 2020. this trend is beginning to decline, the themes of culture and migration are gradually giving way to topics of safety, health and the environment.

This paper investigates the consequences of immigration, crime and socio-economic depriviation for the performance of right-wing extremist and populist parties in the German city state of Hamburg between 1986 and 2005. The ecological determinants of voting for right-wing parties on district level are compared to those for mainstream and other protest parties. Parallels and differences in spatial characteristics between right-wing extremist and populist parties’ performance are identified. Our empirical results tend to confirm the general contextual sociological theory of right-wing radicalization by general social deprivation and immigration. Nevertheless, they indicate that one has to be very cautious when interpreting the unemployment/crime – right-winger nexus. Moreover, crime does not seem to have a strong significant effect on right-wing populist parties’ election successes despite its importance for their programmes and campaigns.

Demand‐side research on the Radical right‐wing populist parties (RRPPs) has highlighted anti‐immigration attitudes, political dissatisfaction and their interaction as drivers of sympathy for them. Supply‐side research studies the isolation that RRPPs often face in their respective parliaments. Linking these perspectives, we theorize and test whether cross‐country differences in parliamentary isolation of an RRPP can predict differences in attitudinal associations. Conducting OLS regression analyses on 15 country samples, we find that that, beyond direct association with sympathy for RRPPs, the moderating term of anti‐immigration attitudes and political dissatisfaction varies considerably across our samples. This variation is consistent with the parliamentary status of the RRPP in each country at the time of data collection. In predicting sympathy for RRPPs, these factors reinforce each other when the RRPPs is isolated in parliament; attenuate each other when the RRPP is in government; and are independent from one another when the RRPP has a history of government.

This study aims to determine the significance differences by those who are taught using Quipper through a facebook account in assigning creative worksheets and those who are not taught using Quipper in the field of Islamic education studies. This research method is an experiment with Quasi Nonequivalent control group design. The population was 70 people and the sample was divided into experiment class and control class with a total of 35 people each. The research instrument was the Observation Sheet, Student Learning Outcomes Test in the form of worksheets, questionnaires, study documents, and triangulation. Quantitative data analysis with descriptive and inferential non-parametric statistical techniques Mann Whitney U-Test test. Data analysis was assisted by SPSS application version 24. The results of the study were the use of Quipper School through a Facebook account in assigning creative worksheets to improve the effectiveness of Islamic education learning in SMK Negeri 1 Sengkang meeting the KKM, and there were significant differences between use and not use Quipper School through facebook account in assigning creative worksheets, and in the mann-whitney test, it is known the value of Asymp. Sig. (2- tailed) of 0,000 is smaller than probability value of 0.05 then the hypothesis H0 is rejected H1 is accepted. The next important study is the development of Quipper School media through a Facebook account on strengthening psychomotor competence in the field of Islamic education studies.

With the emergence of the two newest party families, Green and right-wing populist (RWP) parties, the assumption rose that these parties can be considered the two poles of the new transnational cleavage. In this paper, I analyse the impact of voter attitudes toward liberal values, immigration, EU integration and climate change in nine Western and Northern European countries on voting for Green and RWP parties using data from the ESS10 (2020–2022). Using descriptive analyses and logistic regression models, I find some evidence of a transnational cleavage, in the form of an ideological as well as structural divide between Green and RWP parties and their voters. However, this divide does not extend across all four attitudes or all nine countries. I conclude that Green and RWP parties do not seem to be complete opposites in Northern and Western Europe, but only in country- and issue-specific contexts.

The visual social media platform Instagram is a popular tool for political image building. Drawing on image management theory as well as right-wing populist and visual communication, this study explores how eight European leading politicians of right-wing populist parties present themselves on Instagram. The aim is to provide a first insight into relevant characteristics and patterns of their Instagram communication. The approach is twofold: A comprehensive visual content analysis (N = 724) is followed by hierarchical clustering on principal components. Three types of messages were identified, the most important ones being the creation of a professional image and the demonstration of closeness to citizens. Surprisingly few of the categories considered as relevant for right-wing populist communication were detected. At the individual level, politicians differ in the messages they emphasize.

The article shows that the problem of immigration occupies one of the central places in the program documents of European right-wing populist parties. Right-wing populists proceed from the fact that many Muslim immigrants in European countries form the so-called “parallel communities” with their own social and legal norms and a low degree of cultural integration into the host society - the nation. “Outsiders” not only do not seek to integrate into local communities, but also do not want to maintain any relations with non-Muslims of the host countries. With immigrants, right-wing populists associate the deterioration in the quality of life of indigenous people, the growth of crime and unemployment, and an additional burden on the social support systems of the population. At the same time, fearing to alienate moderate voters, right-wing populists do not oppose immigrants whose civil status has been settled and who have integrated into the host societies, becoming their organic part. The author of the article shows that the nutrient medium of populist propaganda is fear - an important tool for social mobilization. Right-wing populists give concrete form to public fears by pointing out to “frightened voters” the real or perceived dangers posed by immigrants. Such, for example, as the loss of national identity by the peoples of Europe, the destruction of the stability and well-being of indigenous Europeans. The result was the emergence and growth of a group of “frightened voters” ready to give up democratic convictions and oriented towards a homogeneous national community as the highest value. Right-wing populist parties offer two ways to solve the “immigration issue” in European countries. First, by tightening the national immigration policy (up to bullet immigration). Populists believe that the bureaucratic structures of the European Union have unlawfully secured extremely broad powers in the sphere of regulating immigration. Therefore, demands are being made to return to national states the right to determine the principles of immigration policy on their territory. The range of approaches to the content of national immigration policy among populists is quite wide: from the complete closure of borders for all immigrants to the establishment of strict border controls and the issuance of entry permits to individuals on a limited range of grounds. These grounds primarily include the need for skilled labor from non-European countries. European right-wing populists demand that all immigrants who have legal status in host countries integrate into the local society, adapt to its culture and way of life. Populists see another way to solve the “immigration issue” as "getting rid of" illegal immigrants, both by encouraging voluntary return migration and by forcibly deporting illegal immigrants. The article concludes that the political program of the right-wing populist parties was a response to the request of a large and socially heterogeneous group of European voters, covered by protest moods.

The Democratic Limits of Populist Politics

This work focuses on the consequences of Covid-19 for the public images of political leaders as they emerge from Twitter discourses in Italy. To that end, the research investigates the tweets of Italian citizens about the pandemic in 2020 to understand whether the messages related to the virus can provide helpful information to track support for politicians. These goals are relevant because we know little about how the images of political leaders change in times of crisis, and Italy has been one of the countries most affected by the pandemic. The threat of the virus and the search for protection should increase confidence in the Prime Minister and foster the ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect. However, as the debate on the virus dominated posts on Twitter, populist leaders opposing the Government could have taken advantage of the emergency to criticize the Government and thus gain support. Further, there are various political parties in the country, including right-wing mainstream and populist parties. Moreover, populists are both in the opposition and in government. We find that the images of politicians are shaped according to their stances relating to the pandemic and the ideas they promote. As expected, right-wing populists tried to use Twitter to criticize the Government but were often criticized for being ‘political looters’. Fear of the pandemic boosted confidence in the Prime Minister and his coalition. To understand these results, both context and the actor’s position are critical elements when studying public opinion through social media communication.

The literature on authoritarianism and exclusive forms of nationalism often implies that authoritarian and exclusive-nationalist individuals will prefer radical right-wing populist parties such as Austria's FPÖ. The theoretical case for such implications appears sound as party programmes for radical right-wing populist parties invoke rhetoric that should appeal to individuals with either of these characteristics. To date, these implications have not been examined. This article examines quantitative survey data from five Western European countries with electorally viable radical right-wing populist parties to determine whether radical right-wing populist parties are preferred by authoritarians and/or exclusive-nationalists. Analyses indicate that the radical right-wing populist parties studied here are consistently preferred by exclusive-nationalist individuals, though not necessarily to all other parties, but only inconsistently preferred by authoritarian individuals. While more nuanced investigation is still needed, it is clear that, contrary to the assumptions in the authoritarianism literature, radical right-wing populist parties cannot always rely on authoritarian individuals for support.

This article investigates the recent government participation of a number of radical right-wing populist parties in West European democracies. With the help of coalition formation theories the government coalitions in which these parties have participated are characterised and inferences are made about the reasons for the cooperation between mainstream right and radical right-wing populist parties. The accuracy of these inferences is then examined in more detail by analysing the changing electoral fortunes and party positions of both mainstream and radical right-wing populist parties. These analyses demonstrate that office, policy and votes made mainstream right parties turn to radical right-wing populist parties as new coalition partners and that two important changes in West European party systems have enabled the formation of the new alliances, the first being an electoral shift to the right and the second the convergence of party positions of mainstream right and radical right-wing populist parties.