Representation of International Criticism of the Middle East Conflict in Arab Cartoons on Instagram

Review

Reflections on BDS

Guest Editors’ Introduction

God and State in Egypt

Review: <i>Environmental Politics of the Middle East</i>, edited by Harry Verhoeven

Photo: International Security Assistance Force MediaBerlin—At the Munich Security Conference earlier this year, the President of Germany, Joachim Gauck asked the following key questions:“Has Germany already adequately recognized the new threats and the changing structure of the international order?“Has Germany shown enough initiative to ensure the future viability of the networks of norms, friends, and alliances, which after all brought us peace in freedom and democracy in prosperity?”A moment later he took it upon himself to provide the answers: “Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.”His remarks prompted an intensive debate—immediately narrowed to the issue of Germany’s engagement in and contributions to current and future military operations. However, his remarks were meant as a wake-up call designed to start a much broader discussion of Germany’s role and responsibilities in a changing world, taking into account the broad spectrum of the nation’s power and influence.So far, the debate has failed to engage much of the German public. Still, some now understand that our country cannot play a leading role in economic and financial politics within the European Union and beyond, while at the same time remaining more or less an observer when foreign and security politics are at stake.The Ukrainian crisis has clearly brought about a substantial change. Germany has taken the initiative and risks within the so-called Weimar Triangle, a grouping of Poland, Germany, and France, and within the European Union. There, Germany has been trying to define and pursue common positions as prerequisites for any approach toward Russia.The second substantial change was made recently when Germany broke with its long-held policy not to supply lethal weapons to conflict zones. The German government decided to supply weapons to the Kurds in Iraq, in concert with the EU policy on the conflict in northern Iraq. Germany has not only backed the actions of its allies and others, but has taken on its own responsibilities in addressing the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, known as ISIS, which has occupied large parts of Iraq and slaughtered thousands of people.But there is more to be done. Germany, and in particular the German public, has to understand how dependent its own peace, freedom, and prosperity is on this dynamic and changing world. A broad analysis, like the Review 2014 initiated by the German Foreign Office, is needed to define “long lines” of Germany’s role and responsibilities, including goals, interests, instruments, and resources.Since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, foreign and security politics were largely determined by six major factors, which contributed to the re-unification of the country and the overcoming of the divide in Europe. Though times have changed dramatically since then, these factors must be preserved and further developed—taking into account current and future political challenges and concerns.The reconciliation between France and Germany, finalized with the Élysée Treaty of 1963, was an historical achievement. It turned out to be the precondition for the European amalgamation that eventually led to the establishment of the European Union. The Franco-German cooperation as part of this process has been called the “European engine.” When this “engine” was running, Europe made progress. Nothing has changed in this respect—yet. Europe’s political and economic power is located in its center, where France and Germany must develop and pursue the required initiatives for Europe’s future. At the same time, they must take into account the interests of the other EU members and need to cooperate with these countries closely. A core requirement for continuing this approach is that France and Germany perceive themselves as equal partners. Yet there are some doubts stemming largely from Germany’s dominance and France’s weakness in economic terms, as well as German reluctance particularly on matters of defense policy. Both states must strengthen their bilateral political dialogue on these issues, with the goal of continuing to strengthen the “European engine.”It might sound rather contradictory to argue for strengthening the EU while nationalistic movements are becoming stronger in Europe and one important member state, the United Kingdom, is threatening the Union with withdrawal. But it must be emphasized that the European Union actually is a success story, unprecedented in history. It can be an example to other regions on this globe. Moreover, a united Europe is the only answer by the old continent to the new challenges in a dramatically changing world.Only free and united can the EU be an acknowledged global actor, preserving its own interests while also contributing to stability and peace. The economic and financial crisis that debuted in 2007 has clearly demonstrated that Europe as a union is already a global actor. Thus, it’s about time that the EU becomes a global player in the field of what is called the Common Foreign and Security Politics of the Union.First steps have been taken, even in defense policy, but much remains to be done, not as a competitor of the United States, but in concert. Germany, as a leading state within Europe, carries a particular responsibility to move this forward. The Franco-German “engine” must be kept alive—and Europeans should hope that one day the UK will join the two countries in leading in this particular field with all its knowledge, experience, and resources.In the early years of the Federal Republic, the conservative former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer anchored and embedded West Germany into the Western alliance, one of the wisest decisions in modern German history. Today it has become more trying to argue for preserving or even enhancing the transatlantic relationship—with an instinctive American disengagement from Europe, the U.S. “pivot to Asia,” and the growing mistrust due to the NSA spying scandal and other espionage incidents which have even higher visibility in Germany than in the United States. Germans are asking, “Why do they spy on us when they could and should talk to us?” Trust between states and people is of extraordinary political value. This should not be neglected by Americans. German irritations about the United States as a viable partner can have a deep and lasting impact on transatlantic relations.Political ideas or initiatives should normally never be pursued without alternatives. But with respect to good and trusting transatlantic relations, there is no alternative for either the United States or Europe. No conceivable alternative exists for either partner that would allow it to define and pursue common positions—most recently toward Russia in the Ukrainian crisis. We share so many values, and most of our interests are identical. We are partners within the North Atlantic Alliance. Looking at current and future risks and threats, NATO must be strengthened to ensure the security of the U.S. and Europe. In this context, time might be ripe to discuss openly and frankly how freedom and security is to be balanced in this new technological era. Additionally, a debate is essential on a more equal burden sharing between Europe and the United States regarding defense.There are also opportunities for improvement in the field of economic policy. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Program [TTIP] would combine the two strongest economic centers of the world, with advantages for both the United States and the European Union. TTIP would bring more economic growth, more job creation, and better social standards if both sides were willing to compromise. It would also send a clear signal to all other global partners by setting common standards. Furthermore, such a pact could be an impetus to search for additional common solutions in transatlantic relations.With the Ukraine crisis in mind, it might sound strange to argue for a partnership with Russia. But even during the coldest periods of the Cold War, the Western nations kept political contacts alive with Moscow. In the end, the Ostpolitik of Chancellor Willy Brandt contributed very much to the process which tore down the Berlin Wall and overcame the division of Europe. There is no doubt that any kind of partnership policy with President Putin will be difficult. So it is of utmost importance that the United States and the European Union remain united and firmly committed to a common policy toward Russia.Germany must take a leading role in developing this policy within the EU, given its wide-ranging relations with Russia. This includes bearing possible negative effects on its own economy and sharing the necessary burden in military terms. Such a policy may also require patience and endurance if Putin maintains his nationalistic and hegemonic politics. Russia is an essential part of Europe, and thus the Western nations have to deal with this country and maintain communication and consultation based on their own strength and unity.The 1975 Helsinki Charter—the core of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] process—laid the foundation for the beginning of the end of the Soviet regime and the Warsaw Pact. Citizens in Central and Eastern Europe demanded human rights and the rule of law, referring to this Charter, while succeeding in overcoming the unnatural division of Europe. In 1990, all European states, together with the United States and Canada, as well as the still existing Soviet Union, declared the objective of a “Europe whole and free.”A quarter century later the question must be asked if this really has been achieved. Sadly, the Ukrainian crisis provides us with a negative answer. Not all countries are sovereign and independent, and not all people are free and living under the rule of law in democracy and peace, particularly not those in Russia and its neighborhood. What went wrong, and what remains to be done?First, the EU member states, the United States, and Canada must care more in political, economic, and military terms about the states in Eastern Europe, which are neither members of NATO nor the EU. Second, a common Western policy toward and with Russia must be pursued. Finally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], successor to the CSCE, must be invigorated with a special focus on peace and security.Not until 1973 did both Germanys, the communist East and the free West, become members of the United Nations. After 1990, re-united Germany has always taken an active role within the United Nations and is one of its largest financial contributors. During the last UN reform process, Germany sought, in vain, a permanent seat in the Security Council. Unfortunately, UN structures, especially the Security Council itself, still reflect the world order of 1945. All reform endeavors in this respect have failed, limiting or even impeding efforts and initiatives in the important fields of peace, security, stability, and development. This leads to one of the most serious deficiencies in world politics.Since 2011, the disastrous civil war in Syria has been the prime example. The UN is the only global forum providing the framework for a rule-based international order, including the unique right to legitimize the use of force outside the universal right of self-defense. So strengthening the United Nations and its affiliate organizations, while taking on its national responsibilities within the UN remains an important goal of German foreign policy. At the same time, Germany is fully aware of the fact that improvements can only be achieved in close cooperation with its Western partners and in concert with such other major powers as China, Russia, India, and Brazil.Globalization has created new political, economic, and social networks, which now span the globe. This reality has caused an unprecedented degree of interdependencies, but also vulnerabilities, with profound consequences for Germany and its partners. Germany is more exposed to globalization than many other countries and must therefore consider these interdependencies and their concurrent vulnerabilities in developing its political approaches.This group of rapidly rising nations includes first and foremost China, but also developing countries such as India, Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia. Some share such values as the rule of law and good governance. But many do not see the West as a role model and are reluctant to grant political and social rights and freedoms. The current and probable future focus of these states is on their economic growth, which may generate economic cooperation, but also competition with Western countries, including Germany. The willingness of these rising states to take on responsibilities for peace, security, and stability within the international order is rather limited to their respective regions and mainly aimed at preserving their own interests.In the case of China, an aggressive policy toward its neighbors leads to a continuing state of high tension in East Asia, where a balancing policy of the United States in support of these neighboring countries is of utmost importance. However, even this cannot guarantee peace in that region. Any conflict there would have serious global implications. Inevitably, these polycentric developments will lead to competition, even to conflicts by the new economic and political powers with the West. A concerted Western policy, which combines engagement where possible, and containment where necessary, must be further developed. The EU and Germany need to play an active role. The best case scenario should lead to a new architecture of the international order with these new powers appropriately represented, while preventing the formation of new blocks.At the same time, the international community is faced with too many fragile or failed states. In all too many such nations, what begins as an internal conflict quickly spills over to neighbors, quite often engulfing an entire region. In a globalized world, a local problem can quickly develop into a regional, even international crisis. However, it becomes a problem when the regional, even international community is not engaged early enough and proactively. During the last two decades’ crises, conflicts, even wars in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia offer clear evidence that the international community acted or reacted too late, or worse yet, not at all.Conflict prevention is the catchphrase. It requires the willingness of political leaders and their voters to act in a timely fashion by using all instruments required, if necessary also military means, to end and resolve a conflict. With the experience of less successful military engagements in the last decade and conscious of their reduced resources, the United States and Europe do feel exhausted regarding any further international involvement. However, when analyzing political, economic, and social fragility in many countries, largely within the European neighborhood, it seems high time to develop a renewed common and comprehensive policy on conflict prevention. In concert with a global American policy, the EU, and therefore Germany as one of its leading states, has a particular responsibility for preserving peace and security in and for Europe by using its wide range of instruments.Globalization has accelerated the privatization and individualization of violence in its major forms of terrorism and organized crime. Fragile or failed states combined with political and religious extremism nurture both. However, the negative effects of terrorism and organized crime spill over to other nations and regions with profound implications for internal security. The situation is worsening due to the fact that terror organizations are occupying and controlling entire geographical areas, sometimes across state borders, such as Hamas in Gaza, ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Military operations alone cannot resolve these problems. In many cases they may even generate more hatred, especially if Western states get involved.There is no simple answer on how to deal with such threats. What is required is an internationally agreed upon, comprehensive political approach employing all instruments of diplomacy, economic, and development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and decisive military action, if necessary, with the main effort directed toward the suffering local population. Furthermore, close cooperation with reliable local and regional authorities and organizations is imperative. At least, good governance and economic and social welfare at an appropriate level have the effect of eradicating the influence of extremists. Only the United States and the EU are able and also obliged to pursue such a policy due to their political, economic, and military capabilities, but more due to their to universal like human freedom, and for organized with its in and weapons and the are mainly to be in fragile and failed states. But the of of our own is and many with the opportunities of and their and by so or even the and of the West as a role model for the rule of law and can only be with and and with an and better international cooperation of and to the known states, at other countries have the to join the in a rather Such a would make this world a much more to The permanent members of the UN Security Council Germany, in Europe the with the should be in this broader a weapons state, it would not only the Middle East but a new with implications for security on a global the of the this reality is also by and The United States, the EU, and the European France, and Germany, have to Russia and on and toward an with during the with is an essential a for a successful of the Treaty in This is still a and fragile of international and additional by states may be during this and may even be But its is of utmost importance to global security and and the are still with on the consequences of the change. and is too many have turned a to this some out of to their economic We all the effects on the and our but there is still a reluctance in too many parts of the world, including the West, to consider the and consequences and take the necessary steps the required are not in a years will all be exposed to much more serious risks stemming from living will be by and and in some countries, or at some parts of will have from this as a of rising This all will have political, economic, and humanitarian with an important security and many other states have to act in a timely and appropriate addressing their challenges with national initiatives and But solutions are essential on a global It is important that a new UN be for in The United States and the EU should play an active and decisive part in this process, and both should do possible to and the developing influence internal politics in countries and while foreign and security policy on a global that is only to in importance. Looking only to years on should to be taken into The United States will maintain its current while Europe’s may to might change this to a will but will be with social stemming from an caused by the In the of and the world will within the with under the of question is the and nations will be in a to provide their people with a future. the question of how much the West is able and willing to support these might is to in the and therefore neighborhood. The current crisis in the with humanitarian may provide us with a first of what may be at if our focus to all of North and Africa, as well as the Middle East, many states with economic, and social structures, which social and of which can only be within the to their close the EU, with Germany as a leading but also must define and to and support in close cooperation with these states. Such an approach also requires the engagement of the United States, the rising nations, and the more such initiatives are a for preserving our own freedom, and internal and must be recognized as a and is all of our Looking it seems to be that have not the effects of this new to the necessary, and will need more time to get a on the provides us with a of never known and with opportunities of never Furthermore, has strengthened and the by providing to and and more to So networks new risks and threats to our security are security is the for states, their and including the for and as well as the other an of and opportunities for never This can be with negative impact by and but also for impact like in political and social and the global community are with important such as how to our and human how to ensure the security of our and how to both in this Germany and all other states are only in a to national with rather limited impact as networks So global solutions are necessary and a first a framework with is essential within the The United States carries particular responsibilities on by of its dominance in this Still, and between and Europeans are necessary to on important between freedom and security of our leading to a common transatlantic which could the to a global and their are by values and conflicts in this polycentric world. states with political on the are by where a group the many countries, particularly some rising nations, are this In this is clearly an while Russia seems in this these states or these political to others, in the case of due to their economic What about the of our own Western values and of comprehensive of the Western model and its impact on the of our might some important and Europeans are fully committed to human civil rule of law, and political However, globalization and the economic crisis have negative effects on our states and their have become more social more All of us within the EU should be about the reality that as many as the in EU states are or do not have a to there are the of a of and in our Western We should not the that modern are to or to to the the Europeans and must strengthen our common values and our of by even more and to our with all and economic and provide our particularly our with future this is at it provides us with the instruments and the to for these values and our of in our foreign policy. in and will the competition on and to a better and a of foreign and security challenges that most other states, and especially its Western in this globalized world. therefore to define for Germany, which might be also to the foreign and security of other first could be called the of No state, neither Germany nor other European states nor the United States as the only remaining global can act on its All nations have largely their The and the of in international and the role of the national state in must be We are to an end of the of when the first were created in the European under a of of In the of solutions require In this the European Union might the political example for other states and for Germany, has been and will remain a second for the end of any are to be with for the others, or as the world the of This should to the whole spectrum of political There may be some leaders to this But they will be the future President Putin may to be the first Western states, Germany must not standards in their Any approach and should be fully with the values for which they this a call for a foreign and security policy, the It is that conflicts may between values and interests, especially with states, or even Unfortunately, there are too many particularly to security interests, where Western states, including their military failed to their own values and with international This must be changed if are to and our and that the West is to its own values and is reliable in foreign and security policy requires a comprehensive approach from the economic, and especially military will to resolve any in terms of conflict crisis or peace This requires us to on clear and political by an intensive and cooperation aimed at between the on national and international to Germany. Germany was a of a security by NATO and especially the United States. The re-united Germany, due to its and especially its economic must more Germany to to the of international policy and to become a security In this the narrowed internal German which on Germany’s military is more is Germany must play a aimed at common with others, and for within the EU, and the has never been as and free as it is Germans take this reality for and these times will last Yet our freedom, security, and prosperity are dependent on Europe and the world as a and our responsibilities, and as a member of the international community must be by our policy and and military Joachim this process at the Munich Security Conference last However, much more must be if our are to understand and what it to to the stability of the international With the at which international are a by leading countries like Germany to and more decisively is essential if are to peace and security for and for

Introduction

Iran–US relations – strained at the best of times since the 1979 Iranian revolution – have never been worse than during the past six years, due to the much more intense interaction between the two ...

Introduction Daffodil Day, usually held in spring, raises funds for cancer awareness and research using this symbol of hope. On that day, people who donate money to this good cause are usually given a yellow daffodil pin to wear. When I lived in Auckland, New Zealand, on the last Friday in August most people walking around the city centre proudly wore a cheerful yellow flower. So many people generously participated in this initiative that one almost felt obliged to join the cause in order to wear the ‘uniform’ – the daffodil pin – as everyone else did on that day. To donate and to wear a daffodil is the social expectation, and operating in social environment people often endeavour to meet the expectation by doing the ‘appropriate things’ defined by societies or communities. After all, who does not like to receive a beam of acceptance and appreciation from a fellow daffodil bearer in Auckland’s Queen Street? States in international society are no different. In some ways, states wear ‘uniforms’ while executing domestic and foreign affairs just as human beings do within their social groups. States develop the understandings of desirable behaviour from the international community with which they interact and identify. They are ‘socialised’ to act in line with the expectations of international community. These expectations are expressed in the form of international norms, a prescriptive set of ideas about the ‘appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 891). Motivated by this logic of appropriateness, states that comply with certain international norms in world politics justify and undertake actions that are considered appropriate for their identities. This essay starts with examining how international norms can be spread to different countries through the process of ‘state socialisation’ (how the countries are ‘talked into’ wearing the ‘uniform’). Second, the essay investigates the idea of ‘cultural match’: how domestic actors comply with an international norm by interpreting and manipulating it according to their local political and legal practices (how the countries wear the ‘uniform’ differently). Lastly, the essay probes the current international normative community and the liberal values embedded in major international norms (whether states would continue wearing the ‘uniform’). International Norms and State Socialisation: Why Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’? Norm diffusion is related to the efforts of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ using various platforms to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 895-896). Early studies of norm diffusion tend to emphasise nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as norm entrepreneurs and advocates, such as Oxfam and its goal of reducing poverty and hunger worldwide (Capie 638). In other empirical research, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) were shown to serve as ‘norm teachers,’ such as UNESCO educating developing countries the value of science policy organisations (Finnemore 581-586). Additionally, states and other international actors can also play important roles in norm diffusion. Powerful states with more communication resources sometimes enjoy advantages in creating and promoting new norms (Florini 375). For example, the United States and Western European countries have often been considered as the major proponents of free trade. Norm emergence and state socialisation in a normative community often occurs during critical historical periods, such as wars and major economic downturns, when international changes and domestic crises often coincide with each other (Ikenberry and Kupchan 292). For instance, the norm entrepreneurs of ‘responsible power/state’ can be traced back to the great powers (mainly the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) and their management of international order at the end of WWII (see Bull). With their negotiations and series of international agreements at the Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conference in the 1940s, these great powers established a post-World War international society based on the key liberal values of international peace and security, free trade, human rights, and democracy. Human beings are not born to know what appropriate behaviour is; we learn social norms from parents, schools, peers, and other community members. International norms are collective expectations and understanding of how state governments should approach their domestic and foreign affairs. States ‘learn’ international norms while socialising with a normative community. From a sociological perspective, socialisation summarises ‘how and to what extent diverse individuals are meshed with the requirement of collective life’ at the societal level (Long and Hadden 39). It mainly consists of the process of training and shaping newcomers by the group members and the social adjustment of novices to the normative framework and the logic of appropriateness (Long and Hadden 39). Similarly, social psychology defines socialisation as the process in which ‘social organisations influence the action and experience of individuals’ (Gold and Douvan 145). Inspired by sociology and psychology, political scientists consider socialisation to be the mechanism through which norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors (usually a norm novice) to adhere to a particular prescriptive standard (Johnston, “Social State” 16). Norm entrepreneurs can change novices’ behaviour by the methods of persuasion and social influence (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 496-506). Socialisation sometimes demands that individual actors should comply with organisational norms by changing their interests or preferences (persuasion). Norm entrepreneurs often attempt to construct an appealing cognitive frame in order to persuade the novices (either individuals or states) to change their normative preferences or adopt new norms. They tend to use language that can ‘name, interpret and dramatise’ the issues related to the emerging norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 987). As a main persuasive device, ‘framing’ can provide a singular interpretation and appropriate behavioural response for a particular situation (Payne 39). Cognitive consistency theory found in psychology has suggested the mechanism of ‘analogy’, which indicates that actors are more likely to accept new ideas that share some similarities to the extant belief or ideas that they have already accepted (see Hybel, ch. 2). Based on this understanding, norm entrepreneurs usually frame issues in a way that can associate and resonate with the shared value of the targeted novices (Payne 43). For example, Finnemore’s research shows that when it promoted the creation of state science bureaucracies in the 1960s, UNESCO associated professional science policy-making with the appropriate role of a modern state, which was well received by the post-war developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (Finnemore 565-597). Socialisation can also emanate actors’ pro-norm behaviour through a cost-benefit calculation made with social rewards and punishments (social influence). A normative community can use the mechanism of back-patting and opprobrium to distribute social reward and punishment. Back-patting – ‘recognition, praise and normative support’ – is offered for a novice’s or member’s cooperative and pro-norm behaviour (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503). In contrast, opprobrium associated with status denial and identity rejection can create social and psychological costs (Johnston 504). Both the reward and punishment grow in intensity with the number of co-operators (Johnston 504). A larger community can often create more criticism towards rule-breakers, and thus greatly increase the cost of disobedience. For instance, the lack of full commitment from major powers, such as China, the United States, and some other OECD countries, has arguably made global collective action towards mitigating climate change more difficult, as the cost of non-compliance is relatively low. While being in a normative environment, novice or emerging states that have not yet been socialised into the international community can respond to persuasion and social influence through the processes of identification and mimicking. Social psychology indicates that when one actor accepts persuasion or social influence based on its desire to build or maintain a ‘satisfying self-defining relationship’ to another actor, the mechanism of identification starts to work (Kelman 53). Identification among a social group can generate ‘obligatory’ behaviour, where individual states make decisions by attempting to match their perceptions of ‘who they are’ (national identity) with the expectation of the normative community (Glodgeier and Tetlock 82). After identifying with the normative community, a novice state would then mimic peer states’ pro-norm behaviour in order to be considered as a qualified member of the social group. For example, when the Chinese government was deliberating over its ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2003, a Ministry of Environmental Protection brief noted that China should ratify the Protocol as soon as possible because China had always been a country ‘keeping its word’ in international society, and non-ratification would largely ‘undermine China’s international image and reputation’ (Ministry of Environmental Protection of PRC). Despite the domestic industry’s disagreement with entering into the Protocol, the Chinese government’s self-identification as a ‘responsible state’ that performs its international promises and duties played an important role in China’s adoption of the international norm of biosafety. Domestic Salience of International Norms: How Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’ Differently? Individual states do not accept international norms passively; instead, state governments often negotiate and interact with domestic a

Global Standards for Postgraduate Training in General Pediatrics: The International Pediatric Community Considers a Vision

Notes From the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958, by Irene L. Gendzier. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. xxii + 378 pages. Notes to p. 422. Bibl. to p. 444. Index to p. 470. $39.95. This is a comprehensive study of the first 15 years of post-World War II American diplomacy in the Middle East and its impact on developments in Lebanon. Irene L. Gendzier has amassed valuable information to research the factors that led to the landing of the US Marines in Beirut in 1958, and has given the reader a clear picture of Washington's relations with the Arab world at an important phase in the Cold War. Notes From the Minefield is divided into five chapters. The first, Setting of U.S. Policy, defines the historical and political fundamentals of US global interests and describes the formation of Lebanon as a modern state. The second focuses on the role of Lebanon's political elite in structuring that country's external alliances, as well as on the United States' economic and political stakes in the Middle East during the Truman administration (1945-53). The third chapter provides a detailed account of the relationship between the Eisenhower administration (1953-61) and the regime of Lebanese president Camille Sham`un (1952-58). The fourth chapter looks at the events that preceded the decision to dispatch American military troops to Lebanon. Finally, the dynamics of US military intervention in Lebanon and the implications of that intervention-internationally and regionally-are the topics of the last chapter of the book. The author raises the question, What is the meaning of 1958 in the context of U.S. Middle East policy? (p. 365). She disagrees with the official National Security Council memorandum (NSC 5820/1), which criticized America's identification with conservative and pro-Western regimes as detrimental to US influence in the Middle East. According to Gendzier, Washington adopted a very flexible response to the different elements pertinent to the brief 1958 civil crisis. While the United States feared Egyptian president Jamal `Abd al-Nasir's popularity in the Arab world and the radicalism of his brand of Arab nationalism, it appreciated his anti-communist stance. Although America supported President Sham`un, this did not preclude it from demanding reforms of the confessional system in Lebanon. British-American differences over the merit of US intervention in Lebanon subsided in favor of a wider Western strategic scheme to strengthen Britain's ties with Jordan and the Persian Gulf states. Notes From the Minefield contains important de-classified material in the form of National Security Council memos and a number of State Department documents. In addition, it depicts well the interplay among the different departments and agencies of the national security apparatus in the US government. This approach is commendable, since most accounts of US diplomacy in the Middle East depict it as a reflection of the values and disposition of a small cluster of 'Arabists' who worked to balance US relations with the Arab world in the face of the efforts of Israel's sympathizers. …

Teaching and Learning Guide for: Hijab and the Abrahamic Traditions

Africa’s Last Colony

In the post-9/11 climate, the role of Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states in Europe’s regional security environment and international politics has become more than ever a focus for attention, but remains ill-understood. This book provides a framework for the analysis of Middle Eastern foreign policies in general, and for understanding these states’ relations with Europe in particular. The book fills a gap in the literature on Euro-Middle Eastern relations by adopting a south-to-north perspective, using the tools of Foreign Policy Analysis to examine the determinants of the foreign policies of the MENA states themselves: only thus can one hope to arrive at a genuine understanding of what underlies these states’ evolving policy orientations and behaviour towards Europe. The volume starts by laying out a conceptual framework for analysis, and examining the domestic, regional, and international environments that condition MENA foreign policies. Actual policy output is then systematically investigated through a wide range of country case studies ranging from the Maghreb and the Mashreq to the Gulf and Turkey. Europe is treated throughout both as a target of those foreign policies, and as part of the environment that shapes them. The result of a two-year project sponsored by the European University Institute’s Mediterranean Programme, the book helps bridge the divide between Middle East expertise and the discipline of International Relations. The systematic comparative analysis of MENA states’ foreign policy with special reference to Europe throws new light on questions about ‘Third World’ foreign policy.

Regional Organizations and the Responsibility to Protect in the Context of the Arab Spring