Abstract

Following the influential thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and others, philosophers of language have for the most part adopted semantic externalism concerning natural kind terms. In this article, we present results from three experiments on the reference of natural kind terms. Our results confirm some standard externalist assumptions, but are in conflict with others: Ordinary speakers take both appearance and underlying nature to be central in their categorization judgments. Moreover, our results indicate that speakers’ categorization judgments are gradual, and proportional to the degree of similarity between new samples and familiar, “standard” samples. These findings pose problems for traditional theories, both externalist and internalist.

Highlights

  • Mainstream externalist theories of reference for natural kind terms hold that their reference is at least partly determined by the deep structure of the samples the term is or has been applied to, and not solely by the relevant speakers’ mental states

  • We had three main goals: (a) to investigate the relative weight of deep structure and appearance in semantic judgments; (b) to examine how consistent speakers are in their semantic judgments; and (c) to examine whether there is gradualness in semantic judgments depending on how similar a novel sample is to standard samples of a familiar natural kind

  • The results are in line with previous studies, where judgments have not been clear-cut between internalism and externalism (Braisby et al, 1996; Genone & Lombrozo, 2012; Jylkkä et al, 2009; Malt, 1994; Nichols et al, 2015; Tobia et al, 2019), or between superficial properties and deep structure (e.g., Gelman, 2003, 2004; Keil, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rips, 2001)

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Summary

Introduction

Mainstream externalist theories of reference for natural kind terms hold that their reference is at least partly determined by the deep structure of the samples the term is or has been applied to, and not solely by the relevant speakers’ mental states. Hold that being H2O is necessary and sufficient for anything to belong in the extension of the term “water,” even when the term is used by someone ignorant of the molecular structure of water. This is one upshot of Hilary Putnam's influential Twin Earth thought experiment (Putnam, 1975). In Experiment 3, we examined whether underlying structure and appearance have to be completely shared with standard samples in order for a new sample to belong to the same kind, or whether similarity to standard samples in one or both respects would be enough. As an additional research question, we examined whether speakers’ categorization judgments are associated with their thinking style (rational or experiental; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996)

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