Abstract
This paper is presenting the time (real estate agent (broker)’s service hours) - allocation of two types firms product (national (leader)-firm and private (follower)-firm) repeatedly. In which national (leader) firm’s strategy to decide the product price and private developer play a role of the follower with respect to maximizes its payoff. We characterize the resulting Stackelberg equilibrium in terms of time allocation to these developers as well as price. Agent’s controls the service hours considering it’s a normalizing form is unity. In this game theoretic model, quality of the product is measured by baseline sales, brand substitution degree and price positioning.
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