Abstract
This paper studies a transportation model where commuters repeatedly travel from a common source to a common destination. This situation is framed as a repeated routing game with single source-destination pair. We show that a form of the well known folk theorem applies in this setting, namely that a Pareto-optimal outcome may result from selfish behavior, provided that agents are far-sighted and minimize their average transportation cost over time. Our main contribution is to prove this result under the realistic assumption of imperfect monitoring: agents do not observe one another's actions, rather, they get an aggregated signal. We examine two versions: a public monitoring setting where agents observe the flow in the network, and a private monitoring version where agents observe the cost that they pay on each edge of the network. Finally we compute the strategic complexity of the equilibrium strategies.
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