Rent-seeking over time: The continuity of capture

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Recently in this journal Skaggs and Wasserkrug (1983) presented a model of bureau monitoring and related it to Federal Reserve behavior. Central to their argument was that bureau constituencies may pressure congressmen in maintaining the monitoring status quo. If competition is to be expected between self-interested parties for the property rights associated with regulation and regulatory commissions, then bureau monitoring, or lack of it, should have value. The capture of a commission by others is made more costly when information on a bureau's activities is restricted. In general, the issues surrounding bureau monitoring bring out the dynamic nature of the capture theory of regulation. Once captured, commissions must remain captured if benefits are to accrue to rent-seekers over time. Empirical support for the capture perspective, however, only relates personal characteristics of the appointed regulators (commissioners) to characteristics preferred by the regulated.' To reveal the dynamic nature of capture one must also account for the continuity of commission membership. A captured regulatory body can only remain captured if there is a continuity of 'desirable' characteristics. By compiling characteristics of appointed members previous studies have examined the output of the appointment process that resulted from competition for positions on regulatory boards. However, the lack of synchronization between appointments to federal regulatory commissions and presidential elections suggests that the distribution of influence among self-interested groups in the selection process may vary over time. Thus, continuous successful capture is more easily achieved if appointees remain on boards for full terms and, if possible, land reappointments. But the process is complicated further because regulators