Renegociação de contratos de concessão: o caso da concessão da BR-163/MT (Rota do Oeste)

Two intrinsic conflicts are present in the regulation of privatized water utilities under concession agreements, the leading form of private sector participation (PSP) in urban water utilities in developing countries. First, although concession agreements constrain the discretionary power of regulatory agencies, contract incompleteness, widespread and unavoidable in water sector, calls for more extensive uses of discretionary power. Second, although contract renegotiations may undermine the efficiency gains achieved through competitive bidding processes, the economic costs and political risks of terminating concession contracts can be prohibitively high. This chapter assesses the impacts that these conflicts exert upon regulatory effectiveness by examining major regulatory decisions that were made after the water supply and sanitation services in Metro Manila were privatized in 1997. Our analysis suggests that concession contracts indeed were relatively effective in curbing opportunistic behaviors by the government and by concessionaires in the earlier years following

Aggressive bidding and the renegotiation of concession contracts: Empirical evidence from Peru*

Concession contracts provide a mechanism for transferring the traditional public sector client roles of market research, project appraisal, project financing, operation and maintenance, and revenue generation associated with power station projects to the private sector organizations, formerly only responsible for turnkey design and construction. The recent research work undertaken in the Project Management Group, UMIST, has developed and validated a mechanism for the rapid appraisal of concession contracts. A case study example is presented to illustrate the significant features of the procurement of power projects using concession contracts.

Uma das utilizações dos contratos de concessão de serviço público no Brasil é no setor de infraestrutura rodoviária, existindo no âmbito federal 21 contratos de concessão de exploração de rodovias delegadas à iniciativa privada, totalizando aproximadamente 10 mil quilômetros, o que representa 12,6% da malha rodoviária federal. Considerando que nesse tipo de contrato o Governo não transfere a propriedade do ativo, mas apenas seu acesso ao concessionário para exploração de serviços públicos, o presente estudo tem como objetivo verificar em que entidade (pública ou privada) estão registradas as rodovias federais objeto de contratos de concessão. Para tratar a questão da pesquisa foram analisados os demonstrativos contábeis das 21 empresas concessionárias, ou do grupo controlador, e o Balanço Patrimonial da Agência Nacional de Transportes Terrestres (ANTT), todos referentes ao exercício de 2014. Os achados do estudo mostram que as rodovias federais brasileiras não estão registradas nem nos balanços públicos e nem nas demonstrações contábeis das empresas concessionárias, apresentando evidências de que esses ativos de infraestrutura de responsabilidade do Governo Federal brasileiro se enquadram na definição de ativos órfãos.

This research aims to question how the Covid-19 Pandemic affected the economic-financial activity of in the public and private sectors, highlighting how public transport companies were directly affected by the forced change in standards for attention to demands for preserving public health in the country, and with this, objectively achieving urban mobility. Together, we seek to analyze the context of economic and financial balance, correlating it with the problem presented, exposing, to this end, the characteristics of concession contracts and Public-Private Partnerships, pointing to the need to resume the economic and financial balance and finally, establishing the Dispute Board (DP) as necessary to resolve the problem presented. Finally, highlighting the social and economic benefits and profits of restructuring the economic and financial balance in Brazil in a Post-Pandemic context. The methodology to be used is based on the bibliographic analysis of renowned authors in the area, such as the renowned author Maria Sylvia Di Pietro and jointly using national data on concession contracts.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the theoretical foundations for determining the legal nature of the commercial concession contract (franchising) and its features. An analysis of the current legislation regarding the determination of the legal nature of the commercial concession contract was carried out. It is argued that the issues of the legal nature of the commercial concession (franchising) contract remain debatable today. In addition, the institution of franchising in Ukraine needs a thorough rethinking and significant reformation, both theoretically and practically. It is substantiated that according to the analysis of the current legislation of Ukraine, the international law enforcement practice, a commercial concession is mediated by a franchise agreement. For this purpose, it is argued that the commercial concession agreement is equivalent to franchising agreements abroad. The author states in the article that according to the analysis of the current legislation of Ukraine, international law enforcement practice, a commercial concession is mediated by a franchise agreement. Considering the fact that the term "franchising" is unknown to the legislation of Ukraine, its equivalent is the concept of "commercial concession", and in order to avoid additional inconveniences at the stage of adapting franchising to the conditions of Ukrainian legislation, it is suggested that it is appropriate to use concepts commonly used in international practice. The statement on the adoption of the Law "On Franchising" with the aim of preventing confusion of concepts and strengthening the legislative framework was supported. Scientific positions on the interpretation of the concept of franchising and the features of the commercial concession contract are considered. Proposals for improving the theoretical foundations of the specified problem have been formulated.

The toll-adjustment mechanism (TAM) is a hybrid of a price cap regulation mechanism and a revenue sharing mechanism. It is one solution to saving private investors from severe traffic demand risk and the government from heavy fiscal burden, while ensuring the private investor a reasonable but not excessive rate of return in a public-private partnership (PPP) concession contract. This research models TAM as a real option to assess the value of flexibility of the right (but not obligation) to toll adjustments. A hypothetical case study derived from a real-life project (the Western Harbour Crossing in Hong Kong) is illustrated in detail to demonstrate the application of the framework developed and to validate the effectiveness and robustness of the framework. Outcomes of the research can help the government to design reasonable concession contracts and help the private investors to make sound investment decisions through effective management of the traffic demand risk. Therefore, a win-win prospect can be achieved in PPP concession contracts for both parties

Historically, electricity and gas supply evolved at the local level. In the nineteenth century, customers in cities were the first to enjoy artificial lighting by gas lamps and, later, by electric incandescent lamps. At that time, electricity and gas distribution, using public streets for the installation of cable network infrastructures, was granted through franchises or concession contracts. Today, we still find franchises and concession contracts regulating local electricity and gas distribution—but now deeply embedded in a regulatory environment at the national level, including statutes, regulatory agencies, and courts. As a consequence, this framework determines the scope for local regulation. In the light of the above, the question remains to what extent franchises and concession contracts can be seen as a means for genuine local regulation of electricity and gas distribution networks. Starting from the analysis of franchise-bidding schemes with respect to network infrastructures, we know what structures might lead to reduced inefficiencies and what inabilities pose problems. These insights give a guideline for the design of regulatory frameworks as a contractual relationship that are of high practical relevance, especially at a local level. This paper intends to contribute a next step in this analysis. Instead of prioritising centralised economic regulation for efficient allocation, we can emphasise the coordination of actors through decision-making processes. By virtue of decentralised coordination and consent with all the relevant actors at a local level, there is the prospect of more detailed goals different from centralised goals at a national level.

Sharing Risk Through Concession Contracts

Sharing risk through concession contracts

Flexible-term contracts for road franchising

Flexible-Term Contracts for Road Franchising

This paper aims to evaluate the evolution of Brazilian oil market after the national petroleum sector openness. This has taken place with Petroleum Law number 9.478/97 approved by Brazilian government. The methodology was based descriptive statistics analysis of the oil sector regulation data. The new Law has altered the mechanism of income transference from oil production to the government sector. The government sector had increased its proportion of total income by contract of concession and the same time it generated Oil National Agency as well. The results pointed out which this fate brought positive effects to the Brazilian economy in term of investments, industrial diversification and new companies into the oil sector. In last two decades, the oil production has triple fold, from 700.0 thousand to more than 2.0 million of processed barrel by day and the consume jumped from an average 1.6 million of barrel per day among 1990 and 1996 to 2.3 million of barrel per day during 2004 to 2011. The investments were about US$ 1,6 billion in the beginning the 90’s and they had increase substantially to US$ 22,5 billion in 2009.

This paper discusses the relationship between regulation and contracts in infrastructure industries and the role of regulation, particularly the role of regulatory agencies in the review, revision, and renegotiation of contracts. The paper starts with a short survey of relevant economic and legal issues. Examples are presented of how and why infrastructure contracts, including concession contracts, have been combined with monitoring and enforcement by external regulatory agencies. The examples discussed include historical UK experience, recent French experience, and developing country experience. The paper concludes with a discussion of the role that regulatory entities can play to reinforce trust and sustain contracts by enabling simpler contracts, resolving contract misunderstandings, and providing processes for ordered renegotiations.

Megaports’ concessions: The Puerto de Gran Escala in Chile as a case study