Abstract
ABSTRACT In the contemporary phenomenological debate, Henry's and Barbaras's phenomenologies of life differ in the respective meanings given to life as affectivity: immanent affectivity for Henry, desire for Barbaras. However, Henry's and Barbaras's joint critique of the Merleau-Pontian concept of “flesh of the world” suggests that their phenomenologies of life might be more compatible with each other than it seems at first. This thesis is further supported by the shared idea of a unity of affectivity and intentionality. Thus, the wider perspective should be to think of analyses of “drive” and desire as being complementary, not mutually exclusive.
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