‘Remember Iraq!’ Learning theory and the 2013 non-decision on air strikes against Syria

Abstract

Statesmen sometimes seek to legitimize contemporary foreign policy decisions by referring to a ‘historical lesson’, derived from an allegedly analogous situation in the past. According to foreign policy learning theory, such lessons may also be decisive for the actual decisions. Learning theory is here being tested against four national decision processes in August–September 2013 regarding air strikes against Syria. The four countries participated militarily in the March 2003 Iraq intervention. The latter being defined as reasonably ‘similar’ to the Syria project and also as a failure, learning theory expects the 10-year-old memory to decisively restrain their 2013 decisions. Was this really the case, or were the countries driven more by, for example, contemporary 2013 concerns focusing at the situation in and around Syria? The theoretical expectation turns out to be fulfilled in the USA, the UK, and Poland, but is disappointed regarding Denmark, where a rivalling lesson, i.a., proved stronger.