Religious Space-Sharing. Encounters and Negotiations Between the St. Georgis Eritrean Orthodox Church and the St. Paul’s Congregation in Berlin, Germany

This article presents a validation study of the short forms of the Centrality of Religiosity Scale (CRS) in Romania, followed by an examination of religious individualism among Orthodox and Pentecostal Christians. In a first step, the validity and reliability of the short forms of the CRS, namely the Abrahamitic CRS-5 and the interreligious CRSi-7, are tested in Romania. In a second step, the differences in attitudes regarding calling—a Weberian concept—are examined between Orthodox and Pentecostal Christians in Romania. For these examinations, we used data from a survey conducted in Romania in 2018 (N=547). The results show that the CRS performs well in the Orthodox (n=273) and Pentecostal subsamples (n=274). Moreover, based on the applied confirmatory factor and path analyses, on the one hand, we propose that calling attitudes stand out among Pentecostal Christians compared to Orthodox Christians. On the other hand, the Orthodox Christians make more use of religious advisers (priests), hereby expressing a different individual religious attitude of preferring to be advised rather than called. Furthermore, path analyses suggest that calling has neither a direct nor an indirect effect on religiosity among the Orthodox Christians while Pentecostal Christians’ religiosity is not directly linked to an adviser but to calling. The gender of the respondents is identified as a factor that is, directly and indirectly, related to religiosity. The results are discussed in the frame of religious individualism.

Orthodox Christians in Poland have faced numerous attempts to be forced into union with the Roman Catholic Church, ranging from the thirteenth to the twentieth century. The first attempt at a union between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church took place as early as the mid-thirteenth century. Another attempt at forcing the Orthodox Church into union with Rome took place during the reign of Ladislaŭ II Yagiello. The problem of church union returned in the reign of Alexander the Yagiellonian. When Ivan III rejected all projects for bringing the Florence such a union into practice, discussion on church union disappeared until the end of the sixteenth century. The mission of the papal legate, Father Antonio Possevino, to Ivan IV, had been intended to draw Moscow into the union, and its failure caused the papacy to concentrate its efforts on the Orthodox Church in Poland. The Ruthenian bishops’ obedience to the Pope was officially announced on the 8 October 1596. The decisions of the Uniate-Catholic synod were met with numerous protests from the Orthodox clergy and nobility. The larger part of the clergy and the faithful, together with bishops remained in the Orthodox camp. Despite the failure of the Brest Synod in fully uniting Orthodox and Roman churches, new union projects concerning the Orthodox Church in Poland continued to arise prior to the end of 18th century. The Vatican’s interest in the Orthodox Church in Central Europe was renewed at the end of the First World War. On April 1st, 1917, the Pope created the Congregation for the Oriental Churches which was responsibile for all issues relating to the activities of all the Eastern denominations. Despite aims at unification, attempts at church union have had a negative influence on the relations between the Roman Catholic and Polish Orthodox Church in contemporary Poland. The result of centuries of attempts at unification under the Pope has been fragmentation and division.

Orthodox Christians in Poland have faced numerous attempts to be forced into union with the Roman Catholic Church, ranging from the thirteenth to the twentieth century. The first attempt at a union between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church took place as early as the mid-thirteenth century. Another attempt at forcing the Orthodox Church into union with Rome took place during the reign of Ladislaŭ II Yagiello. The problem of church union returned in the reign of Alexander the Yagiellonian. When Ivan III rejected all projects for bringing the Florence such a union into practice, discussion on church union disappeared until the end of the sixteenth century. The mission of the papal legate, Father Antonio Possevino, to Ivan IV, had been intended to draw Moscow into the union, and its failure caused the papacy to concentrate its efforts on the Orthodox Church in Poland. The Ruthenian bishops’ obedience to the Pope was officially announced on the 8 October 1596. The decisions of the Uniate-Catholic synod were met with numerous protests from the Orthodox clergy and nobility. The larger part of the clergy and the faithful, together with bishops remained in the Orthodox camp. Despite the failure of the Brest Synod in fully uniting Orthodox and Roman churches, new union projects concerning the Orthodox Church in Poland continued to arise prior to the end of 18th century. The Vatican’s interest in the Orthodox Church in Central Europe was renewed at the end of the First World War. On April 1st, 1917, the Pope created the Congregation for the Oriental Churches which was responsibile for all issues relating to the activities of all the Eastern denominations. Despite aims at unification, attempts at church union have had a negative influence on the relations between the Roman Catholic and Polish Orthodox Church in contemporary Poland. The result of centuries of attempts at unification under the Pope has been fragmentation and division.

Nearer, My God, to Thee

This article presents selected results of the study on 22 major Orthodox (Eastern Christian) Churches in the United States. This research was sponsored by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies as a part of the nationwide “Religious Congregations Membership Study: 2000.” The data were obtained directly from the headquarters of different Orthodox Churches in North America through personal visits and by interviewing the church’s leaders—the bishops or the chancellors.

The liberation of the Muscovite lands from the Mongol oppression coincided with the fall of Constantinople. The inhabitants of Muscovy were convinced, in line with the Byzantine tradition, that the state was necessary for salvation just as the Orthodox Church, while the close ties between the state and the Church symbolised God’s covenant with people. After 1453, the Orthodox society of Muscovy were commonly of the opinion that the legitimacy of the Byzantine Empire vested into the new „Third Rome”, i.e. Moscow. That idea began assuming a more tangible shape during the reign of Ivan IV the Terrible. The ruler was officially crowned as Tsar and the abbot of the Volokolamsky monastery Josef declared that the Orthodox Church and the state should unite in making the Kingdom of God come true in the earth. Russian Orthodoxy was torn by a disagreement over the issue of monastic life and attitude to the earthly power. Nil Sorsky (1433–1508) and the Hesychasts from the forest hermitages beyond the Volga river claimed that the Orthodox Church should be independent of the state and it should not resort to state administration in religious matters. According to Nil Sorsky, monasteries should remain poor and denounce the ownership of land. That time witnessed a dynamic development of the monastic centre on the Solovetsky Islands in the White Sea. Solovetsky saints Savvatii, Zosima and Herman launched a magnificent spiritual centre of Russian Orthodoxy. During the reign of Ivan IV the conflict was unavoidable also between the ruler and the clergy. The Metropolitan of Moscow Philip demanded that the Orthodox Church gain autonomy – and fell victim to Tsar’s fury. After Ivan IV’s death, during the rule of Boris Godunov, in 1589 Moscow was granted the status of a patriarchate. Metropolitan of Moscow, Job was appointed the first patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. Muscovy was first named Russia in the late 15th century. The name was popularised during the 16th century and in 1721 it became the official designation of the state. Until 1694 the relations between the state and the Church were exemplarily harmonious. Religious life in Russia was overthrown during the reign of Peter I (1682–1725). The Russian Orthodox Church could not form an effective opposition to the political reforms of Peter I who, after the death of patriarch Adrian (1700), obstructed the election of his successor. Finally, Peter the Great abolished the patriarchate and replaced it with the institution of the Holy Synod, whose members were appointed by himself. The 18th century witnessed another revival of religious life in Russia, accompanied by the growing importance of the Orthodox Church in the public sphere. The Russian theological school was stimulated by the more and more popular teachings of bishop of Voronezh St. Tikhon Zadonsky. Inspired by the Gospel and the works of the Holy Fathers of Orthodoxy, his preaching promoted the idea of the common character of human salvation. Owing to his efforts new monastic centres, specialised in contemplation and prayer, were founded in the 19th century. The Russian monasticism was increasingly moved by the institution of Elderhood (starchestvo), the body of monks of eminent piety and wisdom. The revival of monastic life was instigated by the monk St. Paisius Velichkovsky, who lived in the 18th century. The views of the charismatic elderly who had the gift of prophecy (monks of the Optina hermitage), and especially those of St. Seraphim of Sarov, influenced the Russian elites, including Tsar himself. In the 19th century the Russian Empire Tsar promoted the ideology of an Orthodox state based on a symbiosis of „Orthodoxy, absolutism and nationality”. The circles of the higher clergy recultivated the ideas of the Church’s independence of the state. Metropolitan of Moscow Filaret was an ardent supporter of the Church’s autonomy. Other bishops, faced with the failure of any efforts to free the Orthodox Church from dependence on the state, chose to live monastic life, as for instance St. Ignatius Branchaninov, St. Ambrosius of the Optina hermitage or Theophan the Hermit. Another movement among the clergy was represented by St. Ioann of Kronstadt (1829–1909). The priest hailed the participation in everyday liturgy, support to the poor and the need for educating social masses. In the early 20th century the Orthodox Church raised the demands of independence and reactivation of patriarchate. The outbreak of World War I and the defeats suffered in the first years of the war made the revolutionary tendencies imminent. In the times of both revolutions, in 1917, the Orthodox Church remained faithful to Tsar. After the subversion of monarchy but before the Bolshevik prosecutions of the Orthodox Church began, the Kremlin Synod managed to restore the canonical elect ability of bishops and reactivate the patriarchate. Archbishop of Vilnius Tikhon was appointed patriarch of Moscow in 1918.

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between religion and politics with a focus on Orthodoxy and Catholicism in Belarus. Currently, various religions coexist in Belarus and officially there is no conflict between religions. Religious freedom is ensured by the constitution, and the people have a right not to be discriminated against based on their religion. However, in reality, it is an Orthodox church that takes the initiative in dealing with actual religious life in Belarus. The Catholic church has also exerted a strong influence compared to other Eastern Slavic countries. In Belarus, Orthodoxy and Catholicism can be understood as indicators of cultural identity as well as religious identity. Those who identify with the Eastern Slavic community call themselves Orthodox, whereas representatives of the national intelligentsia more often associate themselves with Catholicism. Historically, in the western part of the country where borders Poland and Lithuania, the Catholics have made up the majority of believers, whereas in the eastern part, the Orthodox Church have dominated people’s life since the era of Kievan Rus. In Belarus, the religion is closely related to the national and ethnic identity.BR After the collapse of Soviet Union, the state power has played an important role in the process of revival of religion in Belarus. The religious policy of the early government of Republic of Belarus was to ensure the equality before the law for religions and believers. This could be called the democratization of the state-religious relationship. However, the Orthodoxy and Catholicism have led the public opinions in the moment of national and political crisis, and as a result, it led to the politicization of religious groups and religious activists. Whereas the Orthodox church emphasizes the traditional values of the nation, the Catholic church tends to be more liberal to evaluate the social and political phenomenon. This difference between Orthodox and Catholic church can be found in the response to the result of the 2020 presidential election of Belarus.BR This paper examines the characteristics of religion of Belarus in the historical and political context. Supporting the political ideology of governing group, or representing the public opinion, the religions of Belarus have been competing to take dominant position in political and social territory. This situation became stronger after the 2020 presidential election.

The modern problems of obtaining autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are analyzed. The centennial struggle for autocephaly of the UOC proves that the problem of obtaining independence from the Russian Orthodox Church îf the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) is very complicated, both according to the legislation of Ukraine and the canons of the church law. The Kyiv metropolis was an integral part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from 988 to 1686, when it was, from the point of view of many Orthodox churches, illegally and not canonically annexed to the Moscow Patriarchate. In this movement the Orthodox Church was divided into three separate churches – the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which now calls itself simply «the UOC»; UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate (KP), established in 1992 and not recognized by the Ecumenical Orthodoxy as canonical and God-inspired, and The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), which arose in 1919-1921. It should be noted that in the period of the Ukrainian Revolutions of 2004 and 2014 and at the beginning of the war in the Eastern Ukraine, the hierarchs of the UOC-MP organized an open antiUkrainian and anti-constitutional campaign, both behind the walls of temples, and at mass events. During the presidential election, this church illegally campaigned for one a pro-Russian Candidate only. In these conditions, the question of the separation of the UOC from the Moscow Patriarchate became more pressing and urgent.Proponents of autocephaly point out that the grounds for granting UOC Tomos for autocephaly are identical to that of the Polish version of 1924. However, we consider the obvious difficulties that distinguish the situation with Orthodoxy in Ukraine, compared with the UOC of Poland. In order to make the Russian Orthodox Church not to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine, not to agitate against the state of Ukraine, include in the name of the UOC the phrase that it is an Orthodox Church in Ukraine with a center abroad – in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine two bills – No. 4511 and No. 5309, which since 2016 it was never accepted, because they duplicate the existing Law and contradict Art. 35 of the Constitution. However, as we see, de facto the ROC (MP), directly and indirectly, is campaigning for so-called – «Russian World». For example, just recently the Russian edition of «Orthodoxy and World» published an interview with a member of the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and a supporter of Ukrainian autocephaly by the Metropolitan of Prussia Elpidophor, from which the publication dropped unwanted phrases.On April 22, 2018, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate adopted a petition from the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to give Tomos on autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Resolution in support of this appeal, and the appeal of the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches – KP and UAOC and some of the ÌPs. Similar Tomos is now awaiting northern Macedonia. History shows that the procedure for the delivery of Tomos for autocephaly is not easy, long-term.The analysis shows that, despite the difficulties of securing the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate by legislative means, there are grounds to expect that the UOC of Tomos would be still received. This decision is not obvious, since some autocephalous Orthodox churches against it and support arguments of the Russian Orthodox Church. The petition of the state authorities concerning the autocephaly of the church is a long-standing claim by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Thus, Ukraine has to wait for the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I to hold the Unifying Synod.

This study assessed the requirements for music education among Orthodox and Pentecostal churches in Abeokuta, Ogun State, Nigeria. Based on the quantitative research method, multi-stage sampling procedure was used to select 367 choristers from Abeokuta metropolis, Ogun State. Structured questionnaires were used for data collection and subjected to descriptive statistics at 5% level of significance. The results indicate that choristers within the age group of ≤ 40 in Pentecostal churches outnumbered their counterpart in Orthodox churches. Although female choristers dominate church music practice broadly, the number of people within the household range of 1–5 among Pentecostal choristers (81.8%) was greater than those found in Orthodox churches (75.4%). Whereas a little more than half of the membership (50.4%) received University education, a majority (80.7%) had ≥ 20 years of experience. A significant relationship existed between the necessity for church music education and choristers’ demographic characteristics such as age (c2 = 5.393), educational status (c2 = 14.722), voice parts used (c2 = 14.883) and years spent as choristers (c2 = 7.132). Similarly, there was significant difference in the mean rating of respondents’ need for music education across churches (t = 1.028; p < .05). Taken together, church music education is strongly advised for all churches. It is recommended that self-discipline must be strengthened particularly among Orthodox choristers for meaningful development as well as meeting the needs for church music education.

The Orthodox church and stronghold complex located in Radruż is so famous that it is considered one of the most fabulous executions of defensive-sacral wooden architecture in Poland. Built in the 16th century, it comprises the church and other elements that constitute an outstanding illustration of Orthodox Church building art, its symbolism and principles according to which hundreds of similar Orthodox or Greek Catholic churches were constructed. On the other hand, it is clearly defensive in nature, resembling a small medieval fortification, and the conjunction of the religious and defence function is what makes it unique. Conservation works performed in recent years were concluded in 2013 with listing this complex – and three other Orthodox churches situated in the same area – among world heritage by UNESCO. Largely because of this, Radruż – a small Polish borderland village that was almost completely unknown several years ago – nowadays attracts tourists from around the world. This clearly testifies to the fact that the conservation and renovation of historical churches can contribute hugely to the development of such vast, little populated, but beautiful areas and to their increased popularity.

The article discusses seven melodies of the Christian Orthodox church hymns, which have counterparts in Uniate, Catholic and Protestant church music since the first influences in the 17th century until the 21st century. The Lithuanian Orthodox, Catholic, Uniate and Protestant church singing has been widely researched; the author has discussed the parallels between Orthodox and Uniate singing in her previous publications, yet paleographic data of the musical text of the Uniate and Orthodox hymnals (irmologions) dating from the 17th–18th centuries allows supplementing and clarifying the data regarding “Vilnius” Uniate and Orthodox hymns of the 17th–18th centuries as well as presenting transcriptions of the melodies carried out by the author. Correspondences between the Orthodox church melodies of the 18th–21st centuries in the Catholic and Protestant church singing in Lithuania have never been studied. The comparative analysis of the melodies of the Christian church hymns from Vilnius reveals that the related Orthodox and Uniate and Orthodox and Catholic melodies were connected by the common historical sources, namely, the “Greek” and “Bulgarian” melodies of the post-Byzantine singing style that was common on the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 17th–18th centuries, while current interconnections between the Vilnius Protestant and Orthodox church singing are reflected in the church music created by composers.

REVIEWS 581 attempts to get Maslow to New York, but he died suddenly in Havana, very likely murdered by Stalinist assassins. This is a well written and meticulously researched study about two tragic figures of the KPD. It tells the story of a couple inextricably linked by their political convictions and their shared fate, with their political careers culminating in a short period of leadership. Fischer (and Maslow) forced through the Bolshevization of the party only to find themselves amongst its first victims. One of the most intriguing parts of the story is Fischer’s political confusion after the murder of her partner. She wrote a book critical of German Communism that combined ‘the authenticity of an ex-communist […] with the same dogmatism and lack of nuance that she had displayed during her political life in the KPD’ (p. 191). She subsequently realized her mistake and reapproached Communism, and in doing so, showed herself to have been a far more complex figure than Maslow ever was. Leipzig University Udo Grashoff Clark, Roland. Sectarianism and Renewal in 1920s Romania: The Limits of Orthodoxy and Nation-Building. Bloomsbury Academic, London and New York, 2021. ix + 222 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £85.00. Over the past decade, several important books have been published on religious renewal movements in the Balkans. One of these, Aleksandra Djurić Milovanović and Radmila Radić’s collected volume, Orthodox Christian Renewal Movements in Eastern Europe (Basingstoke, 2017) includes a chapter on the Lord’s Army in Romania by Corneliu Contantineanu. Although Constantineanu gives a thorough account of the formation and influence of the Lord’s Army, he does not explain how Protestant Pietist and Stundist ideas influenced Romanian Orthodox theologians such as Iosif Trifa (the founder of the Lord’s Army), and Dumitru Cornilescu and Tudor Popescu (the founders of the Stork’s Nest), all three of whom were Orthodox clergymen who fell out of favour with the Romanian Orthodox Church. Roland Clark’s new book sets out to fill this gap and to expand upon it by devoting an entire study to Romania’s religious renewal movements. To do so, Clark takes a major detour to explore the full panoply of religious life in 1920s Romania, and also the nationalism that was rampant in the country, especially after 1918, the year of the formation of Greater Romania, following the First World War. Thus he demonstrates how the Orthodox and (to a lesser degree) Greek Catholic Churches tried to monopolize nineteenth-century nationalism and use it SEER, 99, 3, JULY 2021 582 against their smaller competitors, alleging that these various denominations were not real Romanians but foreigners who engaged in anti-Romanian propaganda. The entire process of nation-building recognized, beyond the rhetoric of ‘us against them’, ‘a collection of diverse religious communities responding to rapid social change in different ways’. These social changes, Clark argues, included ‘rising literacy rates, new religious practices, new ways of engaging with Scripture, a newly empowered laity inspired by universal male suffrage, a growing civil society that was taking control of community organizing and the sudden expansion of the Romanian nation-state’ (p. 9). Clark applies to the Stork’s Nest and the Lord’s Army James Kapalo’s concept of ‘liminal Orthodoxy’ — forms of Orthodox Christianity suspended between Orthodoxy and other religious traditions — characterizing them as reform movements where the social tensions between the majority Orthodox Church and the so-called ‘Repenter’ denominations were experienced inside the Orthodox Church itself. Popular in 1920s Romania, the term ‘Repenter’ is a derogatory label widely used initially by the Orthodox to refer to evangelical groups such as Baptists, Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and so on, that ended up being adopted by these groups themselves. Rather than be driven by methodology, Clark focuses on contemporary details, drawing on a wide range of primary sources — sermons, pamphlets, newspapers and magazines — which enable him to delineate these various denominations, to expose their mutual hostility and reveal the scope of the competition between the majority Orthodox Church and these many smaller (some of them really tiny) groups. By detailing each group’s account of itself and their misrepresentation of others Clark brings them into lively conversation with each other...

Environmental leadership and eco-theology have not been a priority for Evangelical and Orthodox Christians in the countries of the former Soviet Union (particularly, Ukraine and Russia) due to various historical, political, social, and theological reasons. However, contemporary environmental global challenges suggest that both Orthodox and Evangelical Christians should revisit their perspectives and efforts related to responsible stewardship by humankind of the earth and its life forms. This article presents the analysis of multiple forms of data (relevant Orthodox and Evangelical documents, specialized literature, and individual interviews/focus groups). We conducted individual interviews and focus groups with 101 Evangelical and 50 Orthodox Christians from Russia and Ukraine. Although the majority of interviewees agreed that the ecological crisis exists and should be addressed, only some of them admitted that they actively care for creation. While Orthodox Christians are more active in practical care for creation, Evangelicals have a stronger grasp of the biblical teaching concerning nature and humans’ responsibility for it. We argue that Evangelical and Orthodox Churches in Ukraine and Russia can learn from each other and impact their communities: engage minds, touch hearts, feed souls, and respond to environmental challenges as an expression of their faith and leadership.

This chapter explores the conditions leading to the emergence of Greek nationalism. Emphasis is given to the change of the political conditions in the Ottoman Empire and in Europe after the seventeenth century, leading to power shifts among Christian Orthodox, to the emergence of Greek diaspora communities in non-Ottoman Europe as well as of an economically robust new entrepreneurial class. Both the Greek diaspora and the new entrepreneurial class supported the Greek education and contributed to the advancement of a “Hellenic self-consciousness” among many Christian Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire and abroad who sought political emancipation from the Ottoman Empire. The chapter analyzes the connection between the rise of Greek nationalism and outbreak of the Greek War of Independence (1821–1832). It discusses the beginning, the evolution, the international dimension, shifting political and military loyalties by the fighting sides and the outcome of the war. The chapter also examines atrocities committed by the Ottomans against the rebels as well as by Greek insurgents against Muslims and Jews living in the rebellious areas. Finally, the chapter explores the close relationship between Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Greek nationalism, as well as the role of Christian Orthodoxy as a mobilizing factor against the Ottomans among the Christian Orthodox during the war. The war paved the way for Orthodox Christianity to become the dominant religion, legally, of the newly established Kingdom of Hellas in 1832, which in itself reset the living conditions for Orthodox and non-Orthodox Christians, leading many Muslims and Jews to embrace Orthodox Christianity.

In 1918 the independent republic of Poland was proclaimed. In 1920-1921, after the Polish-Soviet war, the Polish border was moved 200 km east of the Curzon line, which is more or less the Soviet-polish border of 1945. During the 2nd Polish Republic the Orthodox Church was not supported by an ascendancy of the authority yet, but was identified with the Russian invader’s religion. The Polish authorities treated Orthodoxy not as the religion of their people, but as the faith of the former occupant. The transfer of Orthodox Church property was part of the government’s policy of building a revived Polish state and its national unity on the basis of Roman Catholicism. This policy meant decreasing the number of Orthodox parishes and monasteries, the confiscation of church property by the state or its transfer to the Roman Catholic Church, closing Orthodox churches, and converting the faithful to Roman Catholicism. Throughout the mid-war period (1938-1939) the Orthodox Church had no regulated legal status. It was only after the transfer of Orthodox churches and estates by the state and the Roman Catholic Church that president Ignacy Mościcki signed a decree of 18 November 1938 On the attitude towards the Autocephalous Orthodox Church. On the basis of that decree the position of the highest authority governing the matters of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church was given to the General Council (Sobor) which consisted of bishops and representatives of the clergy and faithful. The executive body of the Church was a synod consisting of the metropolitan, the army bishop and two diocese bishops. The 1938 decree was the first document in the history of the Orthodox Church in the Second Polish Republic, which settled the relations between the Polish state and the Orthodox Church. It removed the state temporariness criticised by the clergy and faithful. On the basis of this decree the Orthodox Church was greatly subjected to the state and its policy. Within three weeks of issuing the decree, on 10 December 1938, a governmental decree was issued containing “The Internal Statute of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church”. It settled in detail the competence of the Orthodox metropolitan, the General Council, the Bishops’ Council and the Bishops’ Synod.