Religious Liberty and Religious Particularism in a Pluralistic Society: Insights from the ‘Global Ethics’ of Küng and Nussbaum

The Law of Peoples

We live in a liberal, pluralistic, largely secular society where, in theory, there is fundamental protection for freedom of conscience generally and freedom of religion in particular. There is, however, both in statute and common law, increasing pressure on religious believers and conscientious objectors (outside wartime) to act in ways that violate their sincere, deeply held beliefs. This is particularly so in health care, where conscientious objection is coming under extreme pressure. I argue that freedom of religion and conscience need to be put on a sounder footing both legislatively and by the courts, particularly in health care. I examine a number of important legal cases in the UK and US, where freedom of religion and conscience have come into conflict with government mandates or equality and anti-discrimination law. In these and other cases we find one of two results: either the conscientious objector loses out against competing rights, or the conscientious objector succeeds, but due to what I consider unsound judicial reasoning. In particular, cases involving cooperation in what the objector considers morally impermissible according to their beliefs have been wrongly understood by some American courts. I argue that a reasonable theory of cooperation incorporated into judicial thinking would enable more acceptable results that gave sufficient protection to conscientious objectors without risking a judicial backlash against objectors who wanted to take their freedoms too far. I also venture into broader, more controversial waters concerning what I call freedom of dissociation – the fundamental right to withdraw from associating with people, groups, and activities. It is no more than the converse of freedom of association, which all free societies recognise as a basic right. How far should freedom of dissociation go? What might society be like if freedom of dissociation were given more protection in law than it currently has? It would certainly give freedom of religion and conscience a substantial foundation, but it could also lead to discriminatory behaviour to which many people would object. I explore some of these issues, before going back to the narrower area of freedom of conscience and religion in health care, making some proposals about how the law could strengthen these basic pillars of a liberal, free society.

In this chapter, Sevilla engages the following questions: Is global ethics a matter of universal norms independent of historical and cultural specificity? Or is ethics a matter of local moralities? First, this chapter examines of the localizing aspect of Watsuji Tetsuro’s Ethics. It then proceeds to his view of the debate between universal morality and national morals in his earlier essays. Through this, Sevilla clarifies Watsuji’s own unique approach to how universality and particularity might be unified, and how this is applied in global ethics. Finally, Sevilla analyzes the contemporary debates on global ethics (or global justice), focusing on the issue of moral relativism and universalism, and suggesting how Watsuji might contribute to a new way of approaching these discourses.

Freedom of religion is a very important part of the new Constitution of South Africa. Up until its new Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, South African laws have never had a direct article guaranteeing freedom of religion. Now freedom of religion is guaranteed in article 15 of the said Constitution. The content of what this freedom of religion implies for South Africans still to a large extent, has to be developed. For this development different religions, religious groups, church denominations and the state have to co-operate. Religious freedom reaches very deep into the fibre of a people and their deepest convictions and its consequences for many fields of existence in the life of, for instance, a church has to be worked out – how does freedom of religion for instance affect the position in law of a church, its labour relations, its deeds of mercy and its calling to religious education. On all of these issues, and many more, clarity is needed. For this clarity churches can make use of their own traditions, they can look at the way in which these matters are handled in other countries, they can go into dialogue with other religious groups and denominations and they should also go into discussion with the lawmakers of the country to see whether consensus can be found in the filling in of freedom of religion. This presentation is an attempt to co-operation, to see if we can determine the meaning of freedom of religion with regard to religious education in a pluralistic society such as South Africa.

Editorial: Respecting Religious Differences: The Missing Ingredient in Creating a Peaceful World Order

The following article aims to determine under which circumstances the establishment of denominational schools must be allowed in democratic societies. The possible opening of a Muslim Brotherhood School in Spain requires a new approach on the presence of religious schools through the study of the collision between two protected goods raise: freedom of religion and democratic citizenship. Thus, it is first considered which space democratic States must grant to religious institu-tions, turning to Cécile Laborde’s considerations on French laicism from a liberal Span-ish perspective. Subsequently, the article proceeds to reconcile freedom of religion and democratic citizenship education, choosing the political liberal approach over the com-prehensive liberal approach, since it provides solutions that are easier to assume by the standard reasonable citizen. Once the theoretical framework has been established, the tension between these two goods is analyzed through the triangle of actors of Arneson and Saphiro, in order to determine under what circumstances the existence of denomina-tional schools must be tolerated. Said triangle shows the tension between the State, who seeks to educate good citizens (democratic citizenship education), the parents, who seek that their children share their same conception of the good life (freedom of religion) and, in between, the children, whose best interest must come first. On the one hand, the results do not only show that religious institutions are compatible with democratic States, but also that said States must guarantee, in pluralistic societies, the different conceptions of the good life. On the other hand, regarding the conciliation between freedom of religion and democratic citizenship, the article showcases that, in order for the best interest of the child to be guaranteed, neither the State nor the parents can prevail, rather both interests must balance in the following way: the State must allow the existence of confessional schools as long as they teach the core contents of demo-cratic citizenship education. Finally, the article argues that democratic citizenship education in confessional schools is not inferior to that of public schools, and criticizes the positions according to which citi-zens must put aside the religious aspect in democratic societies. The article pretends to discuss the traditional liberal theoretical framework, from which it has reflected the reli-gious education, compelling a re-reading of the triangle of actors.

Ecumenical Chronicle

This article addresses the question: Is a global ethics possible? The authors suggest developing a global ethics is a subject of critical importance to the practice of public administration. Ethics is important in public administration, especially at the international level. However the form and pace of globalization—rapidly changing the very nature of work in both the public and private sectors—are removing many familiar organizational, regional and even cultural norms and ethics. Considering the world’s diversity, is it even logical to assume that a universally accepted global ethics is possible? The authors propose that it is both logical and possible. The article first summarizes the ideas of the most noted scholar on global ethic—Hans Kung. It next presents an abbreviated explanation of the common spiritual wisdom literature, which is built on the five largest religious traditions. The article then applies the Kung criteria set to the spiritual wisdom literature and concludes that it is a viable candidate for being considered a universal global ethics.

This chapter examines freedom of religion or belief in relation to freedom of opinion and expression. While these rights have their distinct features and applications, they at the same time share many characteristics. Foremost among these is their role in protecting intellectual and communicative freedoms that contribute to a democratic discourse in pluralistic societies. In addition, the legal formulations in articles 18 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights show striking similarities. It is all the more surprising that freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression have come to be seen as allegedly standing in contradiction towards each other. Recapturing their close interrelatedness is also important for designing effective policies of combating incitement to acts of religious hatred, in line with the 2012 Rabat Plan of Action elaborated by the United Nations.

This article assesses Richard Vernon's attempted reconciliation of compatriot preference with global justice by analyzing the iteration proviso (IP), which says that a group of people can legitimately set out to confer special advantages upon each other if others, outside that group, are free to do the same in their own case. Part I outlines how duties to outsiders are typically characterized in two leading accounts of global justice — moral universalism and associativism. The IP is motivated by Vernon's desire to transcend the binary opposition between, and the limitations of, these two views. Part II sketches the version of contractualism that Vernon deploys to surmount these limitations and explains the role of the IP therein. Part III elucidates two different interpretations of the IP and shows that neither seems plausible.

The paper examines the notion of global justice in the changing context of International Relations and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) approved by world leaders in 2015. Structural differentiation of states and the international system is presented as a way to explain limitations and possibilities in the quest of poverty eradication and global justice. The paper ends by assessing how international poverty law and human rights approaches can team up in the search for accountability, defined as the key to transit towards a more just world. It concludes that the political and legal responsibilities emerging from the universal policy agenda of the SDGs (to be implemented according to rights and obligations of states under international law) could pave the way towards global (social) justice.

Chapter 4 demonstrates that Interfaith and the Patriots developed different ways of enacting active citizenship in the course of their work together, and specifically their efforts to put their faith in action. Although both groups asserted that there was a public role for religion in diverse and pluralistic democratic societies, they differed in their understandings of how this should work in practice. Interfaith’s efforts to put their faith in action were driven primarily by concerns about religious inclusion, while the Patriots were driven primarily by concerns about religious liberty. Participants in the groups thus emphasized subtly different religious values, developed different ways of engaging with religious others, and engaged in different kinds of religious (and civil religious) practices. The chapter concludes by tracing the groups’ choices about how to put their faith in action to differences in their democratic imaginaries—their ways of understanding how democracy works and the proper role of active citizens in it.

The reception of the Barmen Declaration in South Africa

Michael Raposa has offered his readers a compelling method for philosophical theology in his Theosemiotic: Religion, Reading, and the Gift of Meaning—one that is steeped in the Peircean logic of relations, pragmaticistically oriented toward action, and advances a “semiotic consciousness” (to use a John Deely-ism). My task in this essay is to further query Raposa in order to learn the extent to which it might be compatible with the aims of Christian theology, specifically a form of which I call “semiotic theology.” Given theosemiotic's and semiotic theology's common conceptual grounding in Peirce's philosophy, there is, ostensibly, considerable promise; however, there are certain ambiguities that remain in Theosemiotic that require explanation, especially those which are rooted in the claim that it may make ground in theological inquiry “without any practical or strategic purpose.”1 I am hoping that Raposa might then clarify his project so that a confessional, philosophical theologian like myself might better understand its relation to semiotic theology.Toward that end, I have identified three specific subject matters about which I would be grateful for further elucidation: (1), the extent to which theosemiotic could endorse a kataphatic theology (or any specific theology at all), which would permit determining “God” in certain important respects; (2), whether theosemiotic would welcome any doctrinal claims about humanity's final end that might sharpen its emphasis on religious action; and, (3), whether semiotic complementarity is able to maintain the distinctions of lived religious traditions for preserving unified, communal practices. Having these questions answered, it would go a long way toward understanding how, and in what senses, theosemiotic might become partner with semiotic theology. But, before exploring these matters in depth, I will briefly address the character of semiotic theology.Semiotic theology may be described as an effort to revise Christian theology into a form of discourse that operates upon a semiotic rationale. It attempts to take the history of biblical, theological, and doctrinal reasoning and critically judge and reinterpret its conclusions according to a framework that embraces the paradigm-shifting work of semiotics, especially Peirce's and the community of inquiry that has followed in his footsteps. I believe this is important for Christian theological discourse to advance beyond various impasses that have been created by centuries of misplaced philosophical and theological bases (e.g., substance metaphysics; the division between nature and supernature; conception/perception dichotomies; and so on) and am personally committed to a project that seeks to rethink what a confessional theology should look like given the insights of semiotics.To give some concreteness to this project, my own attempt to describe the foundational structures of semiotic theology—insofar as it concerns the reasonableness of speaking about a meaningful relation between God and creatures—was offered in my recent book, The Analogy of Signs: Rethinking Theological Language with Charles S. Peirce.2 Therein, I argued that discourse about God in the Christian tradition is untenable if framed as sufficiently described through an analogy of being (i.e., an ontological principle establishing a connection between God's being and the creature's being), grammatical analogy (i.e., a linguistic practice that connects God and creatures through an expressive performance), or analogy of faith (i.e., a relation that enables the creature's acts of free obedience to God in imitation of Jesus Christ). That is because these views reflect a dependence upon deceiving metaphysical dualisms, largely derived from classical Greek philosophy. For instance, the distinction between matter and form has done much to create an unbridgeable gap between divine and human realms. It holds that, whereas form is the basis of the cognizable, matter is merely the unintelligible stuff that receives a form to be cognized. Such a distinction effectively negates any possible continuity between God and creatures when theologians presume God is pure form and human conception is inextricably based in sense experience mediated by material stuff (as in, say, Aquinas). On such a set of views, speech about God can only be non-sense, for no association of ideas to conceptual objects can be allowed to be determinately meaningful for an object totally different from what is conceived.By my lights, the only sufficient way to enable theological discourse is to found it on an analogy of signs: God and creatures are commensurate in the action of signs, for both are meaningful through the univocity of semiosis—that is, the triadic relational process wherein representamen, object, and interpretant interact. The pivotal, confessional component in such an account is establishing Jesus Christ at the intersection of the analogy of signs’ formula: Jesus the God-Man demonstrates by his life the compatibility of divine and human signs. So, in Jesus is disclosed the reality of semiotic univocity, and divinity is determinately knowable and interpretable in his person as a result. Any metaphysical claim is contingent upon that semiotic univocity, but inferences made from Jesus’ sign activity must be analogical insofar as those signs are abstracted and rendered generalizable with our own. Yet, whatever inequality those signs might express in their constant fluctuation (whether through growth or atrophy), the univocity of semiosis establishes their core commensurability.Having recognized the semiotic touchstone for Christian theology, the rest of it must be based on this prolegomenal framing for the discourse to be intelligible. In so doing, all doctrinal claims must be made semiotically interpretable—that is, they must be subject to semiosis's triadic relation, and potentially instantiated within a taxonomy of signs (which is not to say entirely reducible to any particular sign-type; but, rather, could be articulated as belonging among sign-types). The theologian cannot merely jump from a study of what appears in experience (i.e., phenomenology) to the most general categories of reality (i.e., metaphysics), but must mediate them with semiotic (including, in Peircean terms, both the study of signs proper in speculative grammar, and the study of arguments in logical critic). The upshot is that—to borrow a metaphor from Peirce—all religious reflection must have first come through the gate of semiotic, or be “arrested as unauthorized by reason.”3 Whether that concerns theology proper, protology, anthropology, Christology, ecclesiology, eschatology, etc., all theological expressions stand on the solid rock of semiosis. Conversely, putative religious or theological symbols that are incompatible with semiotic classification are useless at best, and—under the guise of meaningful expression—destructive at worst; in either case, a theologian should have nothing to do with such symbols.Thus, the theologian must not be simply aware of the discipline of semiotic, or have some speculations about how certain doctrines can be interpreted along semiotic lines; no, the theologian must be a semiotician. If Christians might generally agree with Paul Tillich that theology is “the methodological interpretation of the contents of Christian faith,”4 interpretation must here be understood as the practice of rendering judgments intelligible through sign-action and its specific classes. A theologian who cannot regard her claims with semiotic consciousness should be regarded with the utmost suspicion. This is not to say that her claims populate a semantic wasteland, but rather to advocate the suspension of judgment over their theological veracity until the claims are semiotically coherent.So much, then, for a précis of semiotic theology. What I hope has been made clear is the following about it: (1), operating within the Christian theological tradition, it does not seek to do away with that tradition's sources of theological truth, but to primarily reinterpret its contents while excising those elements that play no semiotic role;5 (2), it takes the insights of semiotics to be crucial to structuring theological discourse, both for establishing its intelligibility and acting as a judge over its constructive claims; and, (3), it understands the theologian as semiotician: as reasonably reflecting upon Christian revelation in semiotic consciousness.To turn to the main objective of this essay, my question for Raposa is this: to what extent may theosemiotic become a partner with semiotic theology in its efforts to rethink and reframe Christian theology? Surely, Raposa's goals for his book are not identical with mine for semiotic theology; however, our common interest in theology that is constructive, spiritually edifying, important for the health of living religious traditions, and keen to read the universe of signs purposively, seems to go some way to prepare a potential convergence and, perhaps, symbiotic relationship between the two. It is this potential that intrigues me about Raposa's project, and so I will begin by questioning him on theosemiotic's ultimate referent.“God, of course,” one might reply. But, Raposa continually reminds his reader about the imprecision of the idea of God, and this leads me to ask about what sort of claims can be applied to the object of religious thought and devotion. He writes that theosemiotic “embrac[es] a form of apophatic or negative theology, a theology of mystery,” and this is informed by Peirce's logic of vagueness, which consequently must hold that “all talk about God must be necessarily and exceedingly vague” (TS, 7). Much of chapter 3 explores what this means.Before proceeding, though, it is worth spending a moment to consider Peirce's logic of vagueness, for it will be important as the paper proceeds, and Raposa himself does not offer an explicit description of its logical function in the book. Peirce takes vagueness to be a property of signs, those gears upon which logic turns: “a sign that is objectively indeterminate in any respect is objectively vague in so far as it reserves further determination to be made in some other conceivable sign, or at least does not appoint the interpreter as its deputy in this office” (EP 2:351, 1905). In other words, a vague sign requires some other sign—and not the interpreter of the vague sign—to either affirm or deny some character or predicate to the vague sign. Until that other sign is presented, the principle of contradiction “does not apply”6 to that character or predicate. Thus, “That pen is mine . . . ” allows the recipient of the statement to neither affirm nor deny the pen is the black, blue, or red one in a group; rather, the speaker (or something else) would need to offer some other sign to further determine the vague sign (say, “ . . . the black one,” “ . . . not the black one,” or by gesturing in the black one's vicinity). We should notice three things here: (1), the initially vague sign itself is not entirely indeterminate of character: it is a statement about a known kind of object in some proximate space belonging to the utterer; (2), the recipient may still be successful in guessing the correct pen without the “other conceivable sign,” but nothing in the vague sign by itself will establish the correctness of the guess made; and, (3), only the other sign—the statement or gesture, in this case—is privileged to determine positively or negatively the character or predicate for the recipient. Thus, (a), the usefulness of vague signs is contingent upon the respects in which it is determinate; (b), vague signs will not affirm or deny the truth of further determinations made by the interpreter; and, (c), vague signs require another sign, not vague in the same respect, to further determine them.As I said, Raposa makes much use of the notion of vagueness, which for him seems to amount to “determining a range of possible meanings [wherein a symbol's] interpretation [is] left indeterminate to some extent and in certain respects” (4). But, compared to what was just said above, this presents an incomplete picture: specifically, it leaves out the interpreter's limitations in further determining the vague sign or symbol, and the requirement for the “other conceivable sign” to accomplish that task. It is not surprising that Theosemiotic presents this partial view of vagueness, since it is being used with an eye toward one of its particular aspects: it opens up the door to many possible meanings for the idea of God without affirming or denying their truth status. But the result is that the other side of the coin of vagueness, the consequent loss of particular meaning, is treated with less scrutiny. The upshot is that Raposa seems more concerned to avoid “idolatry,” and less “vacuous nonsense” (85). On the one hand, he says, theosemiotic need not hold to the “personal deity” of theism in order to pursue “genuine theological reflection” (TS, 75–76). Of course, following Peirce's lead in the “Neglected Argument,” Raposa will claim that some classical idea of God as creator is a legitimate and fruitful hypothesis; however, the idea that follows from that argument is itself quite indeterminate, and holding to its conclusion is no requirement for belonging within theosemiotic's bounds (hence the inclusion of Buddhism, Daoism, and contemporary forms of religious naturalism within its parameters [e.g., 76, 85, 218, 252]). Indeed, theosemiotic distinguishes itself by marking “the limits of semiosis,” and upholds the notion that takes ultimate reality to be “no-determinate-thing” (85), and potentially the totally different “ground of being” of all determinate things, which therefore would “not possess consciousness, have purposes, or display agency” (90).But, on the other hand, closing the door against a “collapse into meaninglessness” is Scotus's view of the univocity of being—the claim that ultimate reality and contingent reality share in a single sense of “being.” But, given theosemiotic's brand of apophaticism mentioned above, this looks to be a vacuous affirmation if not joined with some semiotic sense of similarity; alone, it is a distinction from non-univocity without a difference. The appeal to continuity between ultimate and contingent reality needs to be demonstrated in some specific way. Raposa is not ignorant of this problem: he writes that the apophaticism espoused by theosemiotic must be a qualified one, wherein the “extreme vagueness of [“God”] does not rule out the critique of various ways in which it might be interpreted, nor does it suggest that in the matter of such interpretation ‘anything goes’” (95). But, the explanation for this qualification leaves much unanswered.Raposa claims, with Peirce, that some kind of anthropomorphism is appropriate for understanding “God,” yet it is likely also a term more capaciously inclusive of senses than even “love” (TS, 87). He also says that God is “living” and “personal” as love's perfect object (95), but it is difficult to see how those terms could be made meaningful by theosemiotic, given how capacious the concept of ultimate reality may be within it. It is not satisfying to be told the idea is one that is instinctual (88). Instinct is that “inherited [or acquired] disposition” representing “some general principle working in a man's nature to determine how he will act” (CP 2.170, 1902); the judgments resulting from instinct are vague, yes, but not overly indeterminate, as evidenced by the fact that they lead one to act in general ways (“Fight back against an attacker!”), which then may be refined upon receiving some other information (e.g., “Strike the bear in the eyes!”).But, in the case of the idea of God, one sees a double challenge in its necessary and exceeding vagueness: first, discerning the particular character that may be known of its idea that leads us to act; and, second, securing the character and authority of the “other conceivable sign” that may affect the interpreter's thought and action about that vague idea. I am not so sure that theosemiotic meets this challenge adequately. In one case Raposa writes that, though “divine reality” cannot be “perfectly captured in signs,” these signs can somehow be “seized by” that reality to “get itself thought” (TS, 138). But, however that reality may “crus[h] our symbols, and then bring new ones to life in the semiotic debris,” we still trade in semiotic vocabulary that forms its residue—so, what is therein discerned about divine reality, if only so slight, fleeting, or fragmentary? do the new symbols have any authority in the for truth over those that In another case, he says that the God of Peirce's theosemiotic is mediated by signs,” but this seems to any if those signs “all of the signs that it is possible for one to Surely, if any particular is to make then some signs must be at of to But, how would one be able to judge their if ultimate reality is just as by nothing in particular as in a specific would be to the If theosemiotic might be used to a notion that God is if and so on (CP then it is to see how it could Raposa seems to suggest it the of (TS, or It would be one to say that theosemiotic makes no claims one way or the other about but such a of ideas would not for a philosophical theology that Raposa to So, to the double what does such an idea of God that is to such and what meaningful signs vague may to the vague idea to make it more determinate in a way that the interpreter's without being some to the idea of God or some authority to certain signs to make that idea more I am of what can be said for on these in the and the of wherein is the sort of inquiry that Peirce's it is not clear what about a in God is to one to The object of that form of inquiry is understood to have an in the of the and then to lead one into in with the (TS, But, what sort of about the object are that should then have this Surely, this must be more than the in a (EP what about the (TS, would suggest authority over my and practical What is there to in the in to simply does one for the being of because of it to questions like I to see how theosemiotic could its object of or what it could be I that being framed as a method many to itself into the of indeterminate and Peirce's anthropomorphism will not the to it into the the resulting vagueness both intelligible speech about the object of religious and other religious that would further determine the object signs may offer . . . potential of (TS, but that potential has to be other signs to something specific for there is nothing to lead our thought or action in one way or the I do not see how theosemiotic has the apophaticism and with respect to its kataphatic elements in this philosophical theology, then, I am to say that theosemiotic's God is it rather, just and Such a conclusion is, of course, to be incompatible with semiotic theology, which with Christian theology and other living religious traditions a to speaking reasonably about God as certain (i.e., determining and not (i.e., determining as (TS, because they are or that are of something general or living such as on a are things with of specific semiotic This seems to be for a should not be to some abstracted (i.e., or (i.e., but should be regarded as a wherein of through as Raposa the as living can only be so understood for this of is some through the and for some But it is this more view that I about when one the what is this specifically, what are the toward which theosemiotic the to seems to be a question for many of the book, but I will three to here: and the first, Raposa out the notion of as one that is to the one and that does so without any will not to what or but to whatever to just as it (TS, But what seems from this of is what one's in its should for the of the On the most we can say, as Raposa that it would the however, to that as the end of is to express something with use for What is the that is to be and that toward which one how is that with what is in the Peirce says in that seeks out the of in the it into and makes it for sees the as an of itself (EP Thus, seems to be for some in the hope of the by a (TS, something But the question what is the or of the that one might seek to into its is its own If and are in the way that Peirce seems to then what can we about them that makes them Raposa seems to be aware of concerns like He of as a as a in between (TS, The described is one made out of for the of that sign presents to one who is to and to But, while this might describe a of and in the it does not what the object of is other than that which to offer meaning, which could be does it address that for which one to be a for the of seems to be important for marking a between the that Raposa one Peirce's and the religious naturalism that would that on the one hand, for God as the vague of all is rather on the other hand, the religious of a for being as such at a vague of there that would make this of Peirce's theism more if a of is what a person should come to what is that to be If is to the of a theology as then what about that and for instance, the of the which Raposa upon at various for my (i.e., do I and do or just of what might amount to a in theosemiotic If in what regard to one of the of chapter we another of the least the form about which Raposa a to to through some (TS, Theosemiotic embraces the notion that theology is a that the religious of the in which we (e.g., and the one in it (e.g., But, the character of the to be in such is Raposa to or but what do these He on the of various forms of action that such a as as but the aims of these remain what do the and what is If the of is certain of the to to which ones should we and If theology toward what is the character of a better be I neither seek from Raposa that his will not nor some . . . in it is about the that might be offered about these to be to the in the of as would any should this be If there is some of (TS, that is for by a religious it seems important to what that if it is as a sort of (as in the of in to a of and advance into divine (say, the within of the to these would turn out to be quite those Thus, it makes sense that theosemiotic to take a more on the to This up against the first matter if the subject of is the as living and some of its growth is the of then we still must for what does one we into the of what an may and what sort of is within theosemiotic's Raposa reminds his reader that will some of the question is, what as He does that by theosemiotic must be and so as to what “all would (TS, I am not so certain that the final on would be so vague, but, at any the of ideas from and Peirce does not to bring to any clear rule for to the reader does to become something more than when a of it is the for to be to not own What are for that are to consider the to or believe is the object of the and theosemiotic to some and of these ideas to a concept for practical action, and that can toward Raposa at one how far the concept of community can without if and with I whether theosemiotic has itself been by vagueness so that it cannot these questions about of in chapter first seems to us in a Raposa writes that is act of (TS, as his is of love's relational not its or it is difficult to the and of what is one what is the of and in what sense are these done in “a certain in love's display as as and without a

Increasing social and political polarization in our society continues to exact a heavy toll marked by, among other social ills, a rise in uncivility, an increase in reported hate crimes, and a more pronounced overall climate of intolerance—for viewpoints, causes, and identities alike. Intolerance, either a cause or a consequence of our fraying networks of social engagement, is rampant, hindering our ability to live up to our de facto national motto, “E Pluribus Unum,” or “Out of Many, One” and prompting calls for how best to build a cohesive civil society. Within the public school—an institution conceived primarily for the purpose of inculcating civic virtues thought necessary to foster solidarity in a pluralistic society—the intolerance has contributed to increased bias-based bullying, particularly toward transgender and gender diverse students. The devastating impacts of intolerance and exclusion on transgender and gender-diverse students include disproportionate rates of psychological distress, physical ailments, increased risk of homelessness, and other negative outcomes. As schools ponder how best to meet their needs and create safe and supportive learning environments, some parents have attempted to assert exclusive authority in this domain, challenging practices such as the adoption of gender-complex and LGBTQ-inclusive curricula as well as gender-affirming policies and practices. Parents allege that attempts by schools to accommodate transgender and gender diverse students infringe on their parental rights and the privacy rights of their cisgender children. While some schools have yielded to parental objections, others have resisted. This Article presents a compelling approach for schools both to address the challenges posed by objecting parents and to carry out their original mission of inculcating an appreciation for democratic norms—namely, civility, tolerance, and equality— through the adoption of gender complex and LGBTQ-inclusive curricula. Relying on both long-standing limitations on parents’ ability to exercise curricular control and research on the benefits of inclusive and comprehensive curricula, this Article makes the case that the educational purposes served by gender complex and LGBTQ-inclusive curricula more than justify any alleged burden on parents’ free exercise of religion as protected by the First Amendment or any alleged infringement upon parents’ substantive due process rights as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It posits that although both parents and the state share responsibility for shaping our youngest citizens, parental interests should be subordinate to the interests of the state in promoting proteophilic competence—an appreciation for diversity—through public education. This critical educational mission holds the promise of reaching beyond the scope of gender to include the inculcation of civic virtues essential to the health of an increasingly demographically diverse nation: Respect for “other-ness” and the development of skills needed for effective democratic self-governance.