Religious experience and the principle of credulity

Abstract

In 1939 there appeared a very important essay by C. D. Broad on the argument from religious experience to the existence of God.1 In that essay Broad set forth what he took to be a basic principle which we commonly apply to various experiences in our efforts to make some rational judgments as to whether the experiences are veridical or delusory. Roughly put, Broad suggested that when someone has an experience which he takes to be an experience of x, it is rational to conclude that he really did experience x unless we have some positive reason for thinking otherwise. Broad then argued (1) that it is unreasonable to refuse to apply this principle to religious experience, (2) that there are no reasons of genuine merit for thinking that religious experiences are delusive, and concluded (3) that, therefore, probably religious experiences are veridical, probably they really are experiences of the objects which those who have the experiences take them to be of.2 Recently, Richard Swinburne has set forth a principle similar to Broad's, labeled it "The Principle of Credulity," and argued, like Broad, that the principle is applicable to religious experiences, that the special considerations that limit the principle (Broad's "positive reasons" for thinking some experience/s is/are delusive) are not present in any significant degree in many religious experiences, and concluded that probably religious experiences really are experiences of the objects which they seem to be of.3 In this paper I wish to discuss the Broad-Swinburne defense of the argument from religious experience. Before engaging in this discussion, certain remarks must be made concerning the nature and content of religious experience. These remarks are not altogether uncontroversial and they will have some bearing on the ultimate judgment I make on the Broad -Swinburne defense of the argument from religious experience. My aim in making these remarks, however, is not to weaken the Broad-Swinburne defense, but to set it on as strong a foundation as can reasonably be constructed for it. I shall define a religious experience as an experience which the subject takes to be an experience of God or some supernatural thing. This definition may be too narrow. Perhaps someone has an experience which he takes to be an awareness of some natural thing endowed momentarily with some supernatural quality. Perhaps such an experience should be regarded as religious. If so, then we can expand my