Regional Security Regime Emerging in Central Asia

In anticipating the United States' ultimate withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Obama administration has sought to enlist Afghanistan's northern neighbors within Central Asia in an effort to stabilize and invigorate the region politically and economically. In 2011 the administration proposed a Silk initiative linking the world to Afghanistan. The strategy is to enlist the country's Central Asian neighbors in a win-win scenario that will spur trade, energy exports, investment, and peace. The former Soviet stan countries, proposes the administration, will be the drivers of the new Silk Road and thereby enrich themselves while uplifting Afghanistan and ensuring regional stability. This vision is a hopeful one, yet the Central Asian states remain unpersuaded. Instead, they have preferred to paint a dark scenario of a coming Afghan spillover-of conflict and refugees, Islamist extremism and terrorism, and drugs-spreading not just to Pakistan and Iran but also northward to the former Soviet sphere and undermining the fragile stability of the post-Soviet stans.The new Silk Road initiative is presaged on multiple faulty assumptions about Central Asian interests: first, that Afghanistan and Central Asia constitute a natural region sharing a common ethnic, religious, and historical identity, and that this identity will undergird a strong regional relationship; second, that the Central Asian states will not primarily treat Afghanistan as a security threat after the U.S. withdrawal; third, that they have shared economic interests in cooperation in Afghanistan; and fourth, that such economic opportunities in Afghanistan will trump the actions and interests of Russia and China. Each of the above assumptions is extremely problematic. The post-Soviet stans are unlikely to be reliable partners in the U.S. plan for Afghanistan after the withdrawal in 2014. In reality, regime survival, border security, and concrete economic incentives-coming from China, not Afghanistan-will determine the foreign policies of the Central Asian states.In this essay, I first provide a realistic assessment of security threats from Afghanistan. Then I shift to an explanation of how Central Asian states' insecurities will nonetheless undermine a new Silk Road by increasing their cooperation with Russia and decreasing integration with Afghanistan. Next, I demonstrate that economic incentives from Russia and China are directing the Central Asian states to the north and east, undercutting trade and energy routes through Afghanistan. Finally, I discuss the political and religious crackdowns likely to be justified in terms of the Afghan threat.Afghanistan as Threat: Rhetoric and RealityThe Central Asian and Afghan populations do not share an identity despite their Silk Road roots and common religion. Soviet modernization policies set most Central Asian Muslims on a very different path, making them accepting of secular government and suspicious of the Islamic-leaning regimes of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Likewise, being Muslim and Central Asian, and sharing a Soviet legacy of both colonization and development, has not facilitated a sense of shared identity, much less cooperation, among the Central Asian states themselves. Since 1991, multiple external attempts at regional integration have either failed or remained hollow shells of international agreements.1 Mistrust among Central Asian leaders has often led these countries to the brink of armed conflict on their interstate borders and rarely fostered cooperation. The Central Asian republics-with the exception of the enigmatic Turkmenistan-view Afghanistan primarily as a source of instability, refugees, Islamist militancy, and narco-trafficking. Their fears for their security are not unfounded; the U.S. withdrawal is very likely to lead to an escalation of conflict within Afghanistan and potentially even to the collapse of the Karzai regime. Yet although there will be some spillover effects, the anticipated descent into chaos, to borrow Ahmed Rashid's term for the Afghanistan-Pakistan trajectory, is unlikely to dramatically affect the post-Soviet stans. …

In this article, we argue that Central Asian (CA) states' approach to the Ukrainian crisis should be defined as strategic silence. Such foreign policy reflects how CA's ideological and geographic factors and a shared information space, largely dominated by Russian and Russian-language media, facilitate the understanding of historical continuity among Russian and CA leaders. However, we also demonstrate that CA public officials' and general public's uses of strategic silence reflect the complicated reality of CA states. Their leaders and populations are cognizant of both their dependence on educational and labor opportunities in Russia and their necessity for postwar coexistence with Russia, China, and other states that are not sympathetic to the intentions of the European Union/USA in CA. Therefore, strategic silence is an approach for CA states to voice their disagreement with Russia's approach to Ukraine while avoiding being victimized by Russia and its allies for an openly anti-war stance.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1991s Central Asian nations and Japan established diplomatic relations and partnerships began to increase steadily as manifested by the level of official contacts. In 1997 the “Silk Road” Diplomacy concept was formulated for Japan’s policy toward Central Asia. At the beginning of the 21st century, we see the activation of new actors including India, Korea, and Japan in Central Asia, which were mainly welcomed in the region. Tokyo recognized the growing strategic importance of Central Asia in the context of international security and sought to play a more active role as an Asian nation in Eurasia. During two decades Central Asian nations and Japan began to increase steadily. Japan is one of the largest assistants to Central Asia in structural reforms and Japanese investments in the different aspects of the region's economy and transport communication add up to several billion. There are several areas of special interest to Japan in its relations with Central Asia, including cooperation in education, economic development of the region, political reforms, as well as energy resources. Japan’s effort in creating the “Central Asia plus Japan” dialog is part of its multilateral diplomacy. At the same time, there are some challenges and problems in Central Asia–Japan relations. However, there are potentialities for future bilateral and multilateral relations. Japan like Korea, India, and other countries has a strong positive image in Central Asia, which could be regarded as an additional factor for fostering partnerships between Central and East Asia as well as interregional relations with the vast Asian continent and beyond. This article explores the interests of the Central Asian states as members of the SCO, and their compatibility with the SCO goals. This study shows that the SCO is compatible with the Central Asian states' security and economic interests, regional cooperation, and the need for balanced relations with the great powers— China, Russia, and the United States.

The development of the international political changes in Central and South Asia is analyzed in the article in connection with the consequences of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s second rise to power (the first one was in 1996). It is shown that the peaceful transformation of Afghanistan is impeded by such persistent threats as religious extremism, terrorism, illegal drug trafficking. The complex mosaic of regional relations, in which Afghanistan is becoming an important element due to the changes that have happened in this country, is determined in Asia by the growing rivalry and competitive struggle of major economic states of the region, as well as global players, and by the efforts of all of them to build various international coalitions (Shanghai Cooperation Organization, RIC – Russia, India, China; Quadripartite Security Dialogue – QUAD, C5+1, Organization of Turkic States, etc.). Of particular interest in this regard is the position of the neighboring states – the three Central Asian nations (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), as well as China, Pakistan, India and Iran. Apart from that, this study also outlines the most important challenges for the national security interests of Afghanistan’s Asian neighbors. An optimal scenario for both Afghanistan’s Asian neighbors and Russia would imply achieving a stable consensus in this country. Afghanistan becoming a full member of such an influential international bloc as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Russia, Central Asian states and major Asian economic powers are already represented, can have positive consequences for the stabilization of the situation in the country and the whole Asian region. This would create favorable conditions for successful economic and political interaction between the Central and South Asian states. In conclusion the author emphasizes that the transformations in Afghanistan have complicated regional challenges, prompting neighboring states to focus on the military-political component of their security. Aiming to prevent a negative scenario in Afghanistan, they also multiplied diplomatic contacts with the current leadership of the country. The new international political configuration that is emerging in modern Asia dictates new approaches in the security sphere for the Asian states.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) connects the People’s Republic of China (PRC) mainly by road and maritime transport routes to the European Union (EU) through Central Asia, the Middle East, and adjacent waterways. As the Initiative continues to grow, it positions the PRC at the center of the largest concentration of the world’s population, capital, labor production potential, energy, trade, and investment and financial funds that will inevitably increase China’s overall geopolitical importance. Through the BRI, China has designed a long-term economic strategy of new external relations to promote stable economic growth and development among participants and the involved neighboring countries. This work studies three key countries in the middle section of the overland connection between China and the EU: Iran and Turkey in the Middle East and Kazakhstan in Central Asia. These three countries are crucial for the success of the BRI. Each has a substantial population and/or a sizable territorial expanse. Iran and Kazakhstan belong to the world’s key hydrocarbon-rich countries. Turkey and Iran have relatively diversified industries, and both are militarily active beyond their state borders. The diverse external policy orientations of Kazakhstan, Iran, and Turkey (among other countries involved in the BRI) have established regional networks for cooperation on the BRI. Numerous studies and publications on the origin, nature, and activities of the BRI exist and continue to grow, however, empirical studies on the opportunities and challenges for each of the countries along the BRI remain relatively underdeveloped. The objective of this work is to fill in that gap by expanding investigations of the BRI’s economic activities (namely trade, investment, and finance) in Kazakhstan, Iran, and Turkey through a comparative case study. We argue that the BRI provides new opportunities for Kazakhstan, Iran, and Turkey to develop their economies. The realization of Chinese energy and infrastructure projects in developed as well as underdeveloped (sub)regions is creating a foundation on which other Chinese companies can develop and extend their global value chains and/or cooperate with local companies, potentially leading toward the integration of the Eurasian economies and related industries, with China at its center. However, the process of deepening diplomatic and economic relations between China and the Middle East, Central Asia, and particularly our cases is not without problems. The main challenges the BRI faces are related to domestic political (in)stability and the geopolitical economy. China is able to mobilize all Middle Eastern and Central Asian states in the context of its BRI projects, which is the main concern for the United States, leading to a deeper rift between the two that is set to become the main geopolitical reality of the region. Simultaneously, the opportunity to cooperate with China, and therefore balance against the US hegemony as a “counter-hegemonic state”, is one of the attractive forces for states in these two regions.

Electronic health records and data exchange in the WHO European region: A subregional analysis of achievements, challenges, and prospects

This thesis presents an exhaustive review of the media environment and suggests a direction for the development of a Media Corridor between Pakistan and the Central Asian States. Since Independence Day the CARs have acquired the attention of regional and global powers because geographically this region has locked but very rich in oil and natural resources. Especially Pakistan and Central Asia have a common history, culture, religion, and agriculture. Their friendly relations are reflected in policy statements delivered by the Government’s officials who are appearing in the national and international media. Theoretically, the Media can affect foreign policies through its agenda setting, agenda reflecting and agenda building policies. According to the different studies that the role of media has been less debated but this study makes an endeavor to fill up these gaps, moreover, in this research, the researcher has focused to develop a concept of “Media Corridor” between Pakistan and the Central Asian States. The objectives of this study are to find out the possible media’s role in strengthening the relationship between Pakistan and Central Asia and to explore the prospects and challenges for developing a suggested Media Corridor between Pakistan and Central Asia. The main purpose of this research is to identify the obstacles and opportunities in relations between Media organizations and peoples belong to Media Houses in Pakistan and Central Asia. For this study, the researcher has opted for a qualitative methodology in which the 10 in-depth interviews (IDI) have been conducted for this study. Three of them with the media experts, six interviews with academic professors (two of them from Uzbekistan), and one with the Press Secretary from the Embassy of Kazakhstan in Islamabad. The agenda-setting theory has been applied to the theoretical perspective of the research. The key conclusion is that the media in both ends instead of playing a very important role in building the relationship between Pakistan and the Central Asian States follows the official narrative of the governments. For this purpose, the researcher concludes with the arguments that there is a die need to develop a Media Corridor in between Pakistan and the Central Asian States.

Central Asia and South-West Asia have become more important in world politics in recent years, especially when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and after it left at the start of the US-Afghan war. In other words, the closing of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century have developed multifaceted political environments in the region, which have involved Pakistan as well. Central Asia is the second largest energy reservoir of oil, gas, and hydrocarbons after the Persian Gulf and is the core region of the Asian continent, whereas Pakistan is located at the convergence of South Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia and provides the shortest access to warm water seas for all landlocked Central Asian states. Pakistan also acts as a junction of multiple corridors of economic cooperation between these three regions in the fields of energy, trade, transportation, and tourism. Pakistan will become an economic centre and spur interregional economic activity as a result of the communication and commercial links that connect South Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia. Most of the research available on Central Asia and Pakistan is focused either on the Great Game and internal instability of Central Asian states or on the historical linkage and cultural association of Pakistan with Central Asia, with a superficial discussion on regional trade between them. No research has been done on the geopolitical and economic position of Pakistan in Central Asia, and the instability in Afghanistan is also affecting the associations between Pakistan and Central Asian States. In this research paper, the emphasis has been laid on why geostrategic and economic relations between Pakistan and Central Asian states are significant. Certain other questions have also been answered, like: what is the geopolitical significance of Pakistan and the CARs in world politics? What are the divergent interests of local and international powers in Central Asia? And how has the conflict of interests among these actors hampered the economic development of Pakistan and the CARs? Descriptive and analytical research methodologies are used to probe into the phenomenon of global politics.

Worldwide experience has shown that interstate economic integration can help states in strengthening of management of transboundary waters and international water law serves as a reference for developing of relevant interstate cooperation. Transboundary waters in Central Asia play important role in the economic cooperation among riparian states, including those who are members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). At the current stage of transboundary waters management in Central Asia, the obsolete legal status is evident. The international water law sources developed under the United Nations’ auspices have no binding application due to luck of formal membership of the EAEU states in these treaties. Also the regional set of regulations, especially for the Aral Sea Basin, needs further enhancement and more efficient implementation. The bilateral interstate regulatory framework of the managemennt of waters shared by EAEU states in Central Asia requires development of additional rules to enable better accommodation of challenges existing in terms of the current interstate cooperation. Having said that can one further assume that EAEU could serve as a new legal framework for more effective cooperation on transboundary watercourses in Central Asia? The answer might be yes, but… the current stage of the legal framework for cooperation on transboundary waters within the EAEU requires sufficient enhancements in terms of developing its legal and institutional framework. The first condition for EAEU to serve as framework for cooperation on transboundary waters of Central Asia is to strengthen the regulatory framework for the cooperation of EAEU member states regarding environmental issues in general and transboundary water relations in particular, able to accommodate two main goals: environmental protection on the one hand and economic development on the other hand. The EAEU legal framework shall also lead to improvement of existing institutional cooperation and a dispute settlement mechanism on transboundary waters shared by the member states of the EAEU.

The European Union’s geopolitical turn leads to a revision of the bloc’s external action, including towards Central Asia (CA). Based on a postcolonial approach that views colonization as a key structuring factor of contemporary international relations, and the method of discourse analysis, this study consisting of 2 separate publications clarifies how connectivity, which has become in the context of the geopolitical turn a priority of EU policy in Central Asia, affects the structure of the EU’s normative hegemony in the region as well as the Central Asian states’ normative agency. To set the stage for postcolonial analysis, Part I of this research traces the formation of a hierarchical normative structure in the experience of interaction between the European Union and Central Asian states before the geopolitical turn began. To this end, the models of EU normative influence central to this study are theorized — normative power Europe and resilience, then an analysis is carried out how Brussels, permanently positioning itself as a normative centre, changed its approach to the transfer of its norms in Central Asia, and finally, the functioning of the normative hegemony of the European Union is demonstrated, i. e., a situation in which the EU is recognized by Central Asian actors as an authoritative source of the normal. Part II of this research first outlines the basic principles of the postcolonial approach; further, taking into account the dialogic model adopted in postcolonial studies, an explanation is given of why the colonized is capable of not only submitting to the normative requirements of the colonizer, but also influencing the latter’s policy; in the final part of the study, the concept of EU connectivity is analyzed and a conclusion is drawn on how Central Asian states can strengthen their normative agency in relation to Brussels through participation in European connectivity projects.

The European Union’s geopolitical turn leads to a revision of the bloc’s external action, including towards Central Asia (CA). Based on a postcolonial approach that views colonization as a key structuring factor of contemporary international relations, and the method of discourse analysis, this study consisting of 2 separate publications clarifies how connectivity, which has become in the context of the geopolitical turn a priority of EU policy in Central Asia, affects the structure of the EU’s normative hegemony in the region as well as the Central Asian states’ normative agency. To set the stage for postcolonial analysis, Part I of this research traces the formation of a hierarchical normative structure in the experience of interaction between the European Union and Central Asian states before the geopolitical turn began. To this end, the models of EU normative influence central to this study are theorized—normative power Europe and resilience, then an analysis is carried out how Brussels, permanently positioning itself as a normative centre, changed its approach to the transfer of its norms in Central Asia, and finally, the functioning of the normative hegemony of the European Union is demonstrated, i.e., a situation in which the EU is recognized by Central Asian actors as an authoritative source of the normal. Part II of this research first outlines the basic principles of the postcolonial approach; further, taking into account the dialogic model adopted in postcolonial studies, an explanation is given of why the colonized is capable of not only submitting to the normative requirements of the colonizer, but also influencing the latter’s policy; in the final part of the study, the concept of EU connectivity is analyzed and a conclusion is drawn on how Central Asian states can strengthen their normative agency in relation to Brussels through participation in European connectivity projects.

Over the past two decades of independent history, the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have developed pragmatic and largely non-ideological national security strategies rooted in their perceptions and prioritization of the complex regional realities. The states' attempts to match their military and security services capabilities to handle a variety of external and internal security challenges highlights the fact that the Central Asian states regard these capabilities as critical elements of hard power. At the same time, while often utilized to help quell various sources of domestic instability, all Central Asian militaries have lacked up-to-date operational experience. A review of their tactical proficiency in dealing with internal conflicts shows that although Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have contained socio-political unrest better than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all the states struggled to reform and adapt their armed forces to successfully deliver on their doctrinal obligations. This is because they have remained largely outside of contemporary international military interventions such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, the International Security Assistance Force or Kosovo Forces.This paper outlines the national security objectives of the Central Asian states and analyzes available information on the size, funding, combat readiness and the overall performance of the militaries in recent domestic conflicts. In attempting to effectively respond to the security challenges envisioned in the respective national defense strategies and doctrines, all Central Asian militaries have often struggled with fundamental operational issues and acted in similarly heavy-handed fashion. The continuous balancing of Russian, U.S. and Chinese regional security agendas aided by reform and modernization of the armed services are important to ensuring the Central Asian militaries' successes in fulfilling their current doctrinal obligations. An examination of the great magnitude of challenges faced by the Kyrgyz and Tajik militaries reveals a particularly compelling explanation for their strategic reliance on Russia in the event of a state emergency.The collective Central Asian military experience of handling recent internal instabilities suggests that as long as a military establishment is capable of containing security challenges in a relatively short period of time and without causing politically unacceptable casualties, it is unlikely to undergo major structural changes. Provided these states' stability is maintained and a restive area resumes government control, a combination of significant operational setbacks, lack of tactical expertise and human rights abuses is not bound to cause a sweeping reformation of the armed forces and security services. At the same time, internalization of the sum of all the operational experiences and lessons learned can be expected to influence national geopolitical choices insofar as prompting a country to seek allies most willing to assist it with meeting its key security and military modernization needs. For players outside the region such as the United States and Europe, a rationale for maintaining the current level of regional engagements in Central Asia becomes an almost Clausewitzian derivative of their broader geopolitical strategies. While far from harboring any Great Game type of ambitions, continued Western involvement in Central Asia, including in the realm of security cooperation, helps the West gain additional avenues of cooperation with China, possess at least moderate influence over Russian ambitions in the latter's near abroad and, in the case of robust security cooperation with Tajikistan, secure a potential engagement opportunity with Iran.Regional Threats and ChallengesAs identified by contemporary Uzbek political expert Shavkat Arifhanov, at a broad regional level all Central Asian states look at their military and security structures in the context of the following threats and concerns: border security focused on post-ISAF Afghanistan and prevention of the flow of terrorists, narcotics and weapons from Afghanistan into the region (as a source of instability, post-ISAF Afghanistan has the least relevance for Kazakhstan); containing the threat of homegrown and externally-supported religious extremists; preventing escalation of interregional tensions in the potential conflict zone of the Fergana valley (for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and responding to domestic, social and ethnic unrest caused by increasing unemployment and deteriorating living conditions. …

Central Asia in recent history is a vast region with five Muslim States-new actors in modern international relations. The countries of Central Asia, having become sovereign States, at the turn of the XX–XXI centuries are trying to peaceful interaction not only with their underdeveloped neighbors, but also with the far-off prosperous West. At the same time, the United States and Western European countries, in their centrosilic ambitions, seek to increase their military and political presence in Central Asia and use the military bases of the region’s States as a springboard for supplying their troops during anti-terrorist and other operations. With the active support of the West, the Central Asian States were accepted as members of the United Nations. For monitoring and exerting diplomatic influence on the regional environment, the administration of the President of the Russian Federation H. W. Bush established U.S. embassies in all Central Asian States. Turkey, a NATO member and secular Islamic state, was used as a lever of indirect Western influence over Central Asian governments, and its model of successful development was presented as an example to follow.

The article deals with the Czechia's bilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia (CA) at the post-socialist era. Before the special military operation in Ukraine in 2022, the states of the region had not attracted much attention from Prague because of the focus on the Euro-Atlantic states, the small size of the internal market of CA, and prejudices about the non-democratic nature of the local political regimes.Despite the attempts by several Czech politicians to boost relations with Central Asian states, positive dynamics of co-operation was observed only with Kazakhstan, which is an important provider of energy resources. The author notes that the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis in 2022 led to a surge in Czech interest in CA, because of the general policy of the European Union, which declared the importance of promoting the interests of the association in this foreign policy track, Prague's desire to strengthen its own voice in the international stage, and the desire to support local producers, who have acutely felt the consequences of restrictions on exports of their products to Russia. It has been revealed that in 2022–2023, the Czechia's political dialogue with the Central Asian countries visibly strengthened, trade and economic relations increased. In these two years, trade turnover between the CA countries (except Turkmenistan) and the Czechia demonstrated a multiple growth both in absolute and relative terms. However, such an unnatural spurt was justified mainly by using Central Asian states as re-export points for goods intended for shipment to Russia.The author claims that this situation confronts the pragmatic and value-based position of the Czech authorities: on the one hand, they promoted Czech business, by maintaining a high level of relations with Central Asian states, but on the other hand, they also deliberately violated the anti-Russian sanctions, by supplying goods to Central Asia.

Few of the countries examined (India, Japan, Iran, Turkey and South Korea on the one hand, the five Central Asian countries on the other) have included one another in their national strategy papers, with the exception of Turkey. Ankara features prominently in the foreign policy strategies of all five of the Central Asian states. With deep historical ties, since their independence, Central Asian states have relied on Turkey’s assistance to enter international economic, financial and political multilateral organisations. The majority of Central Asian states have also supported Japan in its bid for a UN Security Council seat and vote alongside South Korea in UN votes. Even where strategic alliances have not been outlined in overarching foreign policy, these countries have signed extensive bilateral political agreements with one another covering a variety of fields of cooperation. These have often followed periods of high levels of activity in bilateral relations and high-level (including heads of state) meetings and visits. Bilateral relations are further solidified by reciprocal diplomatic representation in each state and a variety of visa free regimes. Political ties are also underscored by shared security threats and challenges. The continued instability in Afghanistan, in particular, is a concern for countries in this region given that drug trafficking as well as the potential risks around radicalisation and terrorism remain a considerable challenge. Afghanistan is a particular driver of activity for India, Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, Central Asian republics and South Korea have a similar understanding of responsibility for international security and stability in Asia. Central Asian states and the other Asian states covered in this paper have had few disputes. There has in the past been political tension between Turkey and several Central Asian states for a variety of reasons. Iran has had a variety of disputes over territorial boundaries and natural resources, as well as Iran’s nuclear programme and the resulting restrictions placed on Iran in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement between the EU and Iran on curtailing Iran’s nuclear programme. Indeed, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty also ensured that the support for a country’s nuclear weapons programme was limited. Despite this, Iran has, by some countries, been used as a counterbalance to Russian influence in Central Asia. More recently, there have been growing tensions between Iran and Tajikistan, which reflects a concern across the region about the Islamic Republic’s negative influence. Of all the Asian states examined in this paper, India and South Korea are the most involved in the sphere of defence and security relations. They have engaged in military training, exercises, as well as arms sales and military modernisation, and India has sought the lease of an airbase in Tajikistan. Turkey has limited, but growing, potential in this area for greater cooperation.