Reform of state-owned capital authorised operation system and expense stickiness: evidence from state-owned listed companies

Promoting the transformation of the state‐owned assets supervision system (SASS) from ‘managing assets’ to ‘managing capital’ is the key direction of the new round of state‐owned assets reform. This article takes the policy implementation of state‐owned capital investment and operation companies (‘two types of companies’) as a quasi‐natural experiment, selects Chinese A‐share listed state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2009 to 2022 as the research sample, and investigates the impact of SASS reform on the performance of SOEs using a multi‐period difference‐in‐differences model. The results suggest that SASS reform can significantly improve the performance of SOEs. Mechanism analysis indicates that SASS reform enhances the performance of SOEs by weakening government intervention, increasing external pay gaps, and reducing agency costs. Heterogeneity analysis shows that SASS reform on the performance of SOEs is affected by the administrative levels, industry attributes, and external institutional environments. The performance‐enhancing effect of SASS reform is more significant in central SOEs, competitive SOEs, and SOEs with a better external institutional environment. The findings enrich the research on the economic consequences of SASS reform and the factors affecting the performance of SOEs, providing empirical evidence for deepening the reform of state‐owned capital and SOEs and promoting the high‐quality development of SOEs.

The differential compensation distribution of executives is an important direction of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The compensation of SOEs is mainly decided by SASAC according to the unified compensation management method, and tends to adopt the equalitarian compensation distribution mode, leading to the generally low pay dispersion among non-CEO executives in SOEs, which greatly frustrates the work enthusiasm of the executives in SOEs, and often leads to more serious executive agency problems. However, there are few studies on the difference of compensation incentives in the top management team, which mainly focus on the vertical compensation gap between CEO and non-CEO executives, and the research on the internal compensation allocation of non-CEO executives is relatively scarce.Using the compensation data of all the non-CEO executives in listed SOEs from 2005 to 2017, this paper studies whether the pay dispersion among non-CEO executives has a positive governance effect in reducing the executive agency costs of SOEs. We find that, the pay dispersion among non-CEO executives can effectively reduce the executive agency costs of SOEs, and the results are still robust after adopting the IVs and the differential compensation reform of SOEs in 2015 as the exogenous event to control the endogenous problem. Further, we document that reducing the supervision cost and improving the incentive efficiency of non-CEO executives are two potential mechanisms. Specifically, when there are more supervision costs and less incentives for non-CEO executives, the above positive governance effect are more salient.This paper offers empirical evidence for the positive governance effect of the pay dispersion among non-CEO executives in SOEs, and makes up for the deficiency of negative effects such as high turnover and poor corporate performance caused by the pay dispersion among non-CEO executives. This paper not only enriches the literature on the pay dispersion among non-CEO executives, but also extends the related literature on the executive agency costs of SOEs. In addition, this paper has certain policy reference value for further deepening the reform of SOEs and improving the differential compensation distribution system of executives in SOEs. The promulgation of Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of SOEs in 2015 means that, in the context of a new round of comprehensively deepening the compensation reform of SOEs, the incentive mechanism of executives in SOEs should not be limited to the level of executive compensation, but should consider whether the compensation distribution within the top management team is reasonable. Increasing the pay dispersion among the top management team is not only an efficiency issue, but also a fair issue. The underlying economic logic is that the pay dispersion among the top management team is an institutional arrangement for SOEs to reduce the agency costs under the specific governance environment in China. Only by truly realizing differentiated incentives for the top management team, can the enthusiasm of executives in SOEs be effectively activated, the agency efficiency be improved, and the high-quality development of SOEs be realized.

The tax burden of state-owned enterprises has been widely disputed under the intervention of the government, and the tax collection and management audit can effectively restrain the intervention of local governments. Therefore, this paper theoretically analyzes the impact of audit management system reform on the tax burden of state-owned enterprises and the mechanism of action. The research shows that the audit reform has a catalytic effect on reducing the tax burden of local state-owned enterprises, which is mainly reflected in the reduction of the circulation tax burden of local state-owned enterprises, and the reduction of the tax burden of state-owned enterprises by reducing the degree of local government intervention.

Abstract: The Xi Jinping administration has introduced two major governance reforms for the state sector, each with differing and even contradictory objectives: (i) enhancing Party control within state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by integrating Party committees into their governance structures; and (ii) transitioning from asset management to capital management, including reorganising state-owned holding groups into investment companies. While the literature often highlights Party control mechanisms, the transformation of holding groups into state-owned capital investment and operation companies (SCIOCs) has not been thoroughly examined. This article investigates SCIOCs within the broader historical context of China’s state sector governance, analysing the implications, risks and challenges of this novel governance framework.

In China, as in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, economic reform initiatives seek to increase productivity by introducing elements of market-oriented policies and institutions into an economy formerly dominated by state planning. Efforts to evaluate the impact of reform of Chinese industry have focused on the measurement of productivity change in state enterprises. This study expands the prior framework of analysis in several directions. Our investigation of productivity trends is not limited to state enterprises but includes quantitative comparisons with China's fast-growing collective industries, which contributed 36% of overall industrial output in 1988.1 Unlike previous studies, our analysis works with gross rather than net output. This permits us to investigate changes in the productivity of intermediate inputs, which occupy a large portion of total costs in Chinese industry, as well as labor and capital. To do this, we develop a "quasi-frontier" estimation procedure which seems appropriate for comparisons of total factor productivity based on Chinese industrial data. Finally, we offer a quantitative perspective on the extent to which reform efforts have moved industrial resource allocation toward patterns expected of a market system. The analysis confirms our previous finding, based on a restricted framework employing only labor, fixed capital, and net output, that multifactor productivity in state industry has risen substantially during

Anwar Nasution: It is my pleasure to comment on this excellent paper on the important topic of analyzing the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) reforms over the past decade to move toward internationalizing the Renminbi (RMB). The RMB is beginning to be used as an international medium of exchange in dominating and setting cross-border trade and financial transactions. The paper summarizes the benefits and costs of RMB internationalization from a theoretical point of view. There are also econometric studies on the impacts of RMB internationalization on financial development in the PRC and the estimate of seigniorage revenue of RMB, but there is no estimate on the inflationary tax enjoyed by the PRC from foreign holdings of its currency. In addition, internationalization of the RMB allows the PRC to borrow from the international community with liabilities denominated in that currency without exchange rate risk. Unfortunately, there are no brief summaries of PRC government policies on how to make the RMB become an international unit of account, medium of exchange, and store of value. Also there is no information provided in the paper on the size of capital markets in the PRC: the structural financial system, the size of public sector debt and security market, and their liquidity.

In the critical stage of economic transformation and upgrading, the government has a strong incentive to intervene in the investment behaviour of enterprises under the double assessment of political and economic indicators. This paper found that government intervention has a significant impact on enterprise investment, by providing financial support and other means to promote enterprises to expand investment, but due to the lack of effective guidance, it turns into over-investment. After further distinguishing the nature of ownership between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, the phenomenon that government intervention affects enterprise investment is more obvious in state-owned enterprises, which is reflected in promoting over-investment and restraining under-investment. Therefore, government intervention will affect the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises to a greater extent and make them develop in the direction of over-investment. This paper provides an overall perspective to explore the impact of government intervention on enterprise investment behaviour under the rapid economic growth.

We examine the impacts of governmental intervention on firms’ leverages ratios based on Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 1998 to 2016. Research finds: 1) Governmental intervention is positively correlated with SOEs’ leverage ratios, and this relationship is more notable when there are higher levels of governmental intervention; 2) SOEs’ leverage ratios are negatively correlated with actual tax rates, and this relationship is more noteworthy for more profitable SOEs. These results also indicate: 1) In transitional countries such as China, government may serve as an important factor in firms’ financing decisions. Firms can raise leverage ratios to escalate their bargaining powers with government and resist loss from governmental intervention; 2) SOEs may use debt as a tool to reduce their tax burdens in this way.

Chairman’s government background, excess employment and government subsidies: Evidence from Chinese local state-owned enterprises

Comment on “The Current Wave of State Enterprise Reform in China: A Preliminary Appraisal”

ABSTRACTThis study examines the impact of China's State Capital Investing and Operating Company (SCIOC) reform on the financialization of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). While previous studies have explored the influence of institutional innovations on SOEs' investment efficiency, less attention has been paid to the impact of SCIOC reform on SOEs' financial investment. Using data from a sample of 13,294 observations of Chinese A‐share listed firms from 2008 to 2022 and a difference‐in‐differences model, we find that SCIOC reform can significantly suppress SOEs' financialization. Mechanism tests confirm that reducing agency costs, enhancing board governance participation motivation, and strengthening internal control quality are core approaches. Heterogeneity analyses demonstrate that the negative effect of the reform on financialization is more pronounced in central SOEs and those in eastern China. Further discussion reveals that the reform can spur the operational capacity of SOEs. These findings have pivotal implications for continually optimizing SCIOC reform in China, clarifying its micro‐governance effect, and restricting SOEs' financialization.

This study aims to evaluate the financial risk, debt, and efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Indonesia’s construction industry and compare these aspects with those of private companies through financial ratio analysis and efficiency analysis approaches. Four SOEs from the construction sector were evaluated and compared to five private companies with financial data ranging from 2015 to 2022. Financial ratio analysis was applied to assess debt and financial risk, while efficiency analysis utilized data envelopment analysis (DEA) and paired t-tests to validate differences between the two groups of companies. This study reveals that the financial ratio performance of state-owned companies is relatively poor, with low profitability, critical liquidity, and a high debt ratio. Debt, as a source of capital in financing construction projects, causes companies to face a greater debt risk. This study also validates that SOEs have lower efficiency compared to private companies. In response to current challenges, SOEs should prioritize enhancing liquidity through faster receivable collections, debt restructuring, capital infusions, and divestment, reducing non-essential investments, focusing on asset recycling, and improving project efficiency.

The effects of corporate governance uncertainty on state-owned enterprises' green innovation in China: Perspective from the participation of non-state-owned shareholders

Technical efficiency (TE) and total factor productivity (TFP) are important criteria to ensure the enhancement of the quality and efficiency of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and function as important indicators to assess the quality of their accomplishments. The purpose of this study is to explore whether the efficiency of SOEs is higher or lower than that of private enterprises. Transcendental logarithmic production function and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) are used to assess the TE and TFP of listed central SOEs, local SOEs, and private enterprises, the data of which were taken from 2006–2020. The results show that the sampled private enterprises had the highest average TE during the study period, followed by the central and local SOEs. The private enterprises also had the highest average TFP growth rate, followed by the local and central SOEs. The TFP decompositions show that the TE change (TEC) and technical change (TC) indices of the SOEs were lower than those of the private enterprises. The TC, TEC, and scale change (SC) are limiting the TFP growth rates of the SOEs in labor-intensive industries. The SC of the SOEs has changed less than that of private enterprises in the sampled capital-intensive industries. Northern and southern China had the highest rates of TE and TFP growth. Indeed, this paper measures and decomposes TFP, and analyzes the efficiency of SOEs and private enterprises in different industries and regions in an international context.

This paper analysis the efficiency of enterprises of different ownership in China's iron and steel industry based on Malmquist index from 1999 to 2009. Through analysis, we can find that total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises rise more obvious and enterprises of different ownership turn to be consistent in technology advance. State-owned enterprises in the scale efficiency have a certain gap compared with private and foreign iron and steel enterprises. In contrast, the impact of external factors on the efficiency of state-owned iron and steel enterprises is more than private and foreign enterprises. The key to reduce the efficiency gap between State-owned enterprises and private and foreign enterprises is improving scale efficiency.