Abstract
This research considers how reference dependence impacts choice in a primary election. The normative advice is to weigh personal political preference against the greater ability of a more electable candidate to win the later general election. Here a behavioral view of primary elections is developed by adding reference dependence to a Hotelling model of political competition. The model details the impact of references on voter choice and generates recommendations as to the reference marketers for any candidate would like primary voters to employ. The advice to a more electable, that is, moderate, candidate is to encourage voters to compare the primary candidates to the extremes of the opposite party. A less electable candidate should encourage voters to compare the candidates to positions within their own party.
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