Red Tape: Radio and Politics in Czechoslovakia 1945–1969, written by Johnston, Rosamund

Red tape is an important topic in administration. For example, the title of the Report of the National Performance Review (NPA), From Red Tape to Results, emphasizes the objective of reducing red tape in government (Gore, 1993). In spite of its prominence, however, scholarly analyses of red tape have been relatively rare. Administrative analysts have conducted much research pertinent to the topic, but often employ a concept other than red tape. In this article, we discuss the results of a survey of public and private managers that explored their perceptions of red tape in their organizations. The survey included questions representing different dimensions of red tape and different ways of measuring it. We analyzed differences between the public and private managers on these measures because theoretical and case-descriptive analyses of red tape often assert that public organizations have more red tape than private ones. We also analyzed the consistency of the questionnaire responses with several different hypotheses about why red tape occurs. The hypotheses included a goal ambiguity hypothesis that claims that ambiguous goals in the public sector cause managers to create red tape; an insecurity hypothesis that argues that public managers initiate red tape because they feel risk-averse and insecure about their authority; and an expectancy hypothesis that depicts red tape as the result of weak linkages between performance and extrinsic rewards such as pay and promotion in the public sector. The results showed some sharp differences between public and private managers' perceptions about certain aspects of red tape. The public managers were much more likely to perceive their personnel rules as making it hard to base a manager's pay and promotion on performance. We also found some support for the goal ambiguity hypothesis, but for both sectors. Similar to some previous surveys, we found no differences between public and private managers on perceived organizational goal ambiguity. We also found that the managers' questionnaire responses showed some consistency with the insecurity and expectancy hypotheses. Red Tape: Definition and Research Issues Red tape can be defined as rules, regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance burden for the organization but have no efficacy for the rules' functional object (Bozeman, 1993; 283). Red tape can originate inside the organization or from external sources. It can have an internal impact or an external impact. This definition implies that red tape is useless and unduly burdensome. That dimension of red tape can be difficult to assess, because what one person sees as irritating red tape, another person may see as essential rules and procedures. Because we were conducting a mail survey, we took the approach of asking managers about their perceptions of red tape and related matters. As described in Appendix A, the survey included questions about the general level of red tape in the organization and about the intensity of rule enforcement. The survey also asked about constraints and delays under personnel rules and procedures, because of their prominence in discussions of red tape in government (Gore, 1993; National Academy of Public Administration, 1986; Thompson, 1994). These questions reflect a working definition of red tape that holds that it exists when managers say it does, when they perceive intensive rule enforcement, and when they perceive constraints and delays from rules and procedures in such areas as personnel. We feel that this is a valuable approach for the present. If the National Performance Review and other initiatives aim to reduce constraining rules in government, we need to develop ways to assess the existing levels of such rules and changes in those levels. We also need more understanding of how these perceptions relate to other responses of managers and to test the sorts of hypotheses we examine here. Comparing public managers' responses to those of private managers gives us further comparative purchase for analyzing these perceptions. …

Despite the general recognition of the importance of on organizations' behaviors and impacts, theory remains poorly developed. The purpose of this article is to develop a theory of the origins of red tape and then to apply the theory to the question Why do government organizations have more red tape? The perspective presented assumes that red tape is best viewed as pathological, whereas that formalization concepts are best viewed as neutral attributes of organizations. The term rule density is introduced to describe the extensiveness of rules and regulations as related to total organization resources. The theory makes a distinction between rules that are at their origin dysfunctional (rule-inception red tape) and rules that initially served a useful function but transformed into red tape (rule-evolved red tape). Specific causes of each type red tape are identified. A distinction is made regarding the internal vs. external production and impact of red tape and a typology is developed which is used in hypotheses about red tape. Finally, the question of govern- ment red tape is considered. A model of the relationship between external control and red tape is presented. The model implies that most factors leading to red tape are not an inherent function of government. However, two inherent factors of government are cited, each of which gives rise to red tape.

Akhil Gupta Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012 368 pp ISBN 978 0 8223 5098 9 (pb) US$ 26.95 Matthew S Hull Government of Paper:...

This study brings together two perspectives on managers’ reported levels of red tape. The work motivation perspective explains how managers’ characteristics, such as work engagement (alienation) or commitment, affect their reported levels of red tape. The external control perspective explains how managers’ feedback relations with external actors and organizations reduce miscommunications and conflicts between multiple sources of rules, regulations, and procedures. Hypotheses are derived about the effects of managers’ levels of work engagement, commitment to the organization, and networking activity with external actors and organizations on their levels of reported red tape. The hypotheses are simultaneously tested on a cross-sectional data set of Dutch primary school principals with information about their reported levels of externally generated general red tape (n = 792) and personnel red tape (n = 787). The results of the analyses suggest that work engagement reduces and commitment increases reported levels of red tape. Networking activity with national government is associated with high levels of reported general red tape and personnel red tape. Networking activity with local government and interest organizations in the labor relations domain are associated with low levels of reported personnel red tape. Finally, commitment moderates the effect of networking with national government on general red tape and the effect of networking with interest organizations on personnel red tape. These results are discussed with reference to the two perspectives on red tape.

Public administration research is actively exploring alternatives for the General Red Tape (GRT) scale to measure red tape. Owing to increasing criticism on the GRT scale, scholars proposed the Three-Item Red Tape (TIRT) scale as an alternative. Using a repeated cross-sectional design, this article tests both scales in a before–after analysis of a major change in the organization of administration in a hospital. The results indicate that the GRT scale does not capture the resulting major change in red tape, which raises questions on the instrument's validity in a bottom-up research design within one organization. The TIRT scale, however, which measures red tape at the work environment level, does reflect the change in red tape but shows empirical weaknesses in its design. Additionally, by randomly assigning respondents to substantially different red tape definitions, this article shows that the red tape definition does not significantly impact respondents’ GRT ratings. Points for practitioners The predominantly used GRT scale is not able to capture an increase in red tape in a bottom-up intraorganizational research design in a hospital, which raises questions on the instrument's validity. A more recent alternative for the GRT scale, more specifically the TIRT scale, captures the increase in red tape but shows empirical weaknesses. The wording of the red tape definition does not impact respondents’ answers on the GRT scale.

Introduction This chapter examines the relationship between red tape and performance, and proposes that organizational culture and political support can mitigate the negative effects of red tape. Bureaucratic red tape is a concept that both holds widespread popular appeal and is one of the few ‘homegrown’ theories in the field of public management. Despite this, academic work on red tape has not informed public management changes, or even the broader public management literature. Developments on conceptualizing and measuring red tape (e.g., Bozeman 1993; Pandey and Scott 2002) have had little direct influence on the thinking of reformers who seek to cut red tape (Gore 1993; Osborne and Gaebler 1992), or even the academic discussion of these reforms (e.g., Ingraham et al . 1997; Kettl and DiIulio 1995). While most scholars would probably accept the argument that red tape matters to performance, the recent emergence of an empirical literature on public sector performance also largely excludes explicit consideration of red tape (Ingraham et al . 2003; Lynn et al . 2001; O'Toole and Meier 1999). Red tape, therefore, is an area of public management in which theoretical developments and practical concerns are pulling in different directions. For example, when Vice-President Gore discussed moving from red tape to results during the 1990s, he drew neither on groundbreaking theoretical work by Bozeman (1993) nor on Kaufman's (1977) seminal work. Such separation between theory and practice benefits neither enterprise.

ABSTRACTMuch empirical red tape research utilizes the General Red Tape (GRT) scale, which asks respondents to rate the level of red tape on a scale of 0 to 10 (Rainey, Pandey, and Bozeman 1995). Because “popular usage of the term ‘red tape’ requires no precision” (Bozeman and Feeney 2011, 3) and the GRT scale “assumes that respondents understand the terms to which they are responding” (101), evaluating red tape in this way may be theoretically disadvantageous. This article proposes a new measure—the Three-Item Red Tape (TIRT) scale—consisting of three items drawn from previous rules research on rule characteristics to which respondents characterize organizational rules by how burdensome, unnecessary, and ineffective they are. This measure has several advantages over existing measures: it includes several indicators; it does not include the term “red tape”; and it is drawn directly from Bozeman's (1993; 2000) operational definition of red tape. Using structural equation modeling to model survey data from two local government organizations (n = 1,666), this article evaluates the theoretical and empirical validity of this TIRT scale, compares it with the GRT scale, tests its relationship with formalization, which is known as a distinct concept, and addresses implications of this scale on red tape theory.

Government environment is the main determinant in attracting private investment into public–private partnership (PPP) projects, especially in developing countries. Red tape, an indicator of a government's efficiency, plays a critical role in private investment in PPP projects. Reasonable levels of red tape can enhance government transparency and promote private investment, while excessive red tape usually represents low governance efficiency and imposes further risk on private investors. This article explores how developing countries’ red tape affects private investment in PPP projects by examining the moderating effect of corruption. Analyzing a database of 308 PPP projects in 111 developing countries, the study reveals an inverted U-shaped relationship between red tape and private investment. Corruption weakens the positive relationship between red tape and private investment at low levels of red tape and mitigates their negative relationship at high levels. The study integrates the inconsistent results of previous research that postulated either a positive or negative relationship between red tape and private investment by proposing a nonlinear model. It also theorizes the moderating effect of corruption based on real management practice and illustrates its mechanism in absorbing private investment in PPP projects.

Almost all red tape research is anchored in a relatively small number of theoretical formulations and formal red tape concepts. My article analyzes these concepts, including Kaufman's red tape concept, organizational red tape, and stakeholder red tape. After reviewing previous concepts of red tape I suggest a new one, multidimensional red tape. The basic idea of multidimensional red tape is that red tape is subject-dependent and that rules and regulations may be pathological in some elements and not others, even with respect to the same stakeholder. Multidimensional red tape seeks to provide a conceptual platform for enhancing researchers’ ability to assess multiple costs and benefits of rules and, thereby, to identify rules in need of reform, even in cases where rules are not judged to be red tape.

Background: Public Hospitals are hierarchical organizations characterized by the features of bureaucracy described by Max Weber. Tiring rules and regulations, endless paperwork, and strict legal requirements are some of the adverse outcomes of bureaucracy, termed bureaucratic Red Tape. They have detrimental effects on organizational performance. Objective: To assess employees’ perceptions of bureaucratic Red Tape in the administrative section of the District General Hospital, Kalutara.Methods: This study utilized a case study approach employing mixed methods. Office employees were selected using purposive sampling, and a semi-structured questionnaire that featured a ten-point scale to measure Red Tape with close-ended and open-ended questions was used to explore the causes. Key informant interviews with managers and focus group discussions with office employees were conducted to obtain management perspectives on the causes and suggestions to alleviate Red Tape. Potential solutions for the Red Tape were discussed at a stakeholder meeting. In addition to descriptive analysis, inferential statistical analysis was performed for demographic variables and operational factors to explore any correlation with Red Tape. Thematic analysis was performed using qualitative data.Results: The mean perceived bureaucratic red tape score was 5.03 (95% CI: 4.25–5.81), slightly above the midpoint of the scale, indicating inefficiencies in existing rules or procedures, as the literature suggests that even such levels of perceived red tape are significant and warrant attention. Key factors contributing to Red Tape include deficient technology for information management; problematic procedural formats; insufficient in-service training; lack of modern infrastructure; and challenges in rules, regulations, and procedures. Stakeholder suggestions to alleviate Red Tape included training; establishing a committee to investigate, review, and seek suggestions; technology integration; supporting managers; job rotation; increasing access to information on procedures; and streamlining the documentation process.Conclusions and Recommendations: The employee-perceived Red Tape was slightly above the expected level in the administrative section, primarily due to inefficient administrative practices and outdated technology, highlighting the need for targeted interventions. The study identified enhancing employee training in administrative processes, streamlining procedures, integrating advanced information technologies, and fostering a supportive leadership culture to mitigate the effects of bureaucratic Red Tape. Continuous feedback mechanisms are also recommended to ensure the adaptability and effectiveness of administrative processes.

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, new rules forced public servants to work remotely or under strict guidelines at the office. These rules were often perceived as red tape, creating a compliance burden and limiting flexibility. While red tape is commonly seen as a job demand associated with reduced well-being and performance among public servants, the effects of COVID-19-related red tape remain unexplored. This research investigates how perceived COVID-19-related red tape is associated with public servants’ well-being and self-perceived performance and examines the moderating roles of coping strategies (supervisor support) and recovery strategies (work detachment, relaxation, mastery, and control). Data from 3,332 Dutch public servants reveal two key findings. First, COVID-19-related red tape, shaped by rapidly changing work conditions, can foster adaptation and inspire extra effort despite its challenges. Second, recovery strategies are more effective than coping strategies in mitigating the negative associations of perceived COVID-19-related red tape with employee well-being.

Although there is consensus among scholars that red tape has negative consequences, there is a lack of synthesis on these negative effects. We conduct a meta‐analysis and meta‐regression of public administration evidence and ask: What is the impact of red tape on organizational performance and employee outcomes, and which conditions moderate this impact? Our meta‐analysis finds that red tape has a significant, negative, and small‐to‐medium impact on both organizational performance and employee outcomes. Meta‐regression shows that red tape imposed by the organization itself is more harmful than red tape imposed by external parties. Moreover, red tape's negative impact remains quite stable across sectors, administrative traditions, and research methods. In conclusion, an agenda for future public administration research on red tape is presented. We recommend that future research syntheses on red tape include research on concepts that bear a family resemblance (e.g., sludge, administrative burden) and also encourage analyses of differing discourses to identify common themes.

Research has shown that red tape negatively affects both innovation and collaboration. Yet studies on barriers to collaborative innovation rarely consider red tape. Through a systematic literature review, we examined 74 empirical studies linking red tape to innovation and collaboration. They were analyzed taking into account the dimensions of red tape discussed (budget, communication and information, personnel, and procurement red tape) and red tape’s effects on collaboration and innovation. This way we identified four different categories of effects red tape can have on collaborative innovation. We discovered that these effects could be linked to specific red tape dimensions.

PurposeThis paper builds on and extends the theory of planned behavior (TPB) by examining empirically the underlying mechanism through which red tape is associated with employee change-supportive intention (CSI). It investigates red tape as an antecedent of CSI and examines the mediation role of change-related attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control (PBC) in the relationship between red tape and CSI.Design/methodology/approachTo test the study's hypotheses, cross-sectional data were collected from 183 employees working at a public organization in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq that was going through a major change. Regression analyses and the PROCESS macro for SPSS were used.FindingsConsistent with our expectations, the results indicate that red tape negatively predicts CSI. Red tape also predicts change-related attitude, subjective norm and PBC, which consequently predict CSI. The results also reveal that the relationship between red tape and CSI is mediated by change-related attitude and subjective norm.Research limitations/implicationsThe study is limited in using cross-sectional data at a point in time and in investigating intention only, rather than actual behavior.Originality/valueWhile prior work shows that red tape is a relevant factor that may affect employee responses to change in public sector, the psychological processes on which this relationship is based are still not fully explained. Therefore, this is the first study that aims to shed some light on this relationship.

An important conversation in red tape studies focuses on the debate of whether red tape can be objectively or subjectively assessed. The economic benefit-cost view defines red tape in terms of objective expenditure of organizational resources while the psychological process view suggests that red tape is perceptual in nature and thus subjective so that changing stakeholder impressions regarding burdensome rules may reduce red tape, even if the underlying rules themselves remain the same. Untangling this debate requires first understanding what objectivity is for any social phenomenon. The debate can then be disaggregated into two specific questions: Is red tape ontologically subjective, and can it be epistemologically objective? The answer to both questions is “yes.” An epistemological objectivity approach thus goes beyond the two views, suggesting that all social entities like red tape are ontologically subjective. However, epistemically they fall on a spectrum from completely subjective to fully objective: The greater the extent to which they are subject to stable beliefs (e.g., about how burdensome and ineffective a rule is) and consistent deontics (e.g., about rights and duties that a burdensome and ineffective rule can possibly entail), the more objective they become.