Recognition Beyond the State

Abstract

In the Introduction to this volume, it was observed that to date nearly all attempts to formulate a political theory of recognition have taken as their object the basic structure of a society regarded as what John Rawls called ‘a closed system isolated from other societies’ (Rawls, 1971: 8).1 Only Nancy Fraser has proved an exception to this rule, with her development of an account of justice in which the power to determine the boundaries of political associations plays a significant role (Fraser, 2008c [2005]). However, even her efforts have thus far fallen well short of a fully fleshed out theory of global justice. Up to now, the other leading contender in the field — Axel Honneth — has shown little interest in global justice, focusing almost exclusively on principles of recognition that are already institutionalized in what he refers to as ‘highly developed capitalist countries’ (Honneth, 2003a: 112).2 It was also suggested in the Introduction that this neglect of the global dimension to justice is probably the result not merely of oversight on the part of theorists of recognition. Rather it is the consequence of their powerful although often tacit assumption that relations of recognition take place in the context of particular lifeworlds, which are implicitly equated with particular societies.