Recentralization in Mexico: Reconfiguring the Center in Intergovernmental Relations

Multi‐level Climate Governance: The global system and selected sub‐systems

Problems of shipping policy jurisdiction between international, supra-national and national levels have been identified at an increasing rate in recent years, and in particular with respect to the maritime sector in the European Union. These problems reflect inadequacies in the shipping policy-making processes which are currently adopted and which derive from an institutional framework dating from the early twentieth century, centred upon the state as the main actor. Revised frameworks including those of ‘polycentric governance’ and ‘multi-level governance’ which are more sensitive to the demands and interests of stakeholders in the maritime industry urgently need to be considered. Suggestions for improvements in the maritime policy-making framework are put forward and recommendations put forward for further development by policy-makers in the maritime sector at all jurisdictional levels.

An institution typically comprises constitutive rules, which give shape and meaning to social interactions and regulative rules, which prescribe agent behaviour in the society. Regulative rules guide social interaction, in particular when they are coupled with reward and punishment regulations that are enforced for (non-)compliance. Institution examples include legislation and contracts. Formal institutional reasoning frameworks automate ascribing social meaning to agent interaction and determining whether those actions have social meanings that comprise (non-)compliant behaviour. Yet, institutions do not just govern societies. Rather, in what is called multi-level governance, institutional designs at lower governance levels (e.g., national legislation at the national level) are governed by higher level institutions (e.g., directives, human rights charters and supranational agreements). When an institution design is found to be non-compliant, punishments can be issued by annulling the legislation or imposing fines on the responsible designers (i.e., government). In order to enforce multi-level governance, higher governance levels (e.g., courts applying human rights) must check lower level institution designs (e.g., national legislation) for compliance; in order to avoid punishment, lower governance levels (e.g., national governments) must check their institution designs are compliant with higher-level institutions before enactment. However, checking non-compliance of institution designs in multi-level governance is non-trivial. In particular, because institutions in multi-level governance operate at different levels of abstraction. Lower level institutions govern with concrete regulations whilst higher level institutions typically comprise increasingly vague and abstract regulations. To address this issue, in this paper we propose a formal framework with a novel semantics that defines compliance between concrete lower level institutions and abstract higher level institutions. The formal framework is complemented by a sound and complete computational framework that automates compliance checking, which we apply to a real-world case study.

Mainstreaming climate adaptation and mitigation policy: Towards multi-level climate governance in Melaka, Malaysia

Transaction costs, power, and multi-level forest governance in Indonesia

Disciplining the State: The role of alliances in contesting multi-level agri-environmental governance

International basins are divided into sub-basins that can be managed at the international, national and local levels, separately or together. Regarding the international level, many actors, beyond the States, participate in water management. This work is a case study on the Columbia River Basin (CRB), which is shared by the United States and Canada and its waters drain off into the Pacific Ocean. There are two theoretical foundations: multi-level governance and integrated water resources management (IWRM). Then, this work will demonstrate the impossibility of implementing IWRM in the CRB, even though there is multi-level governance within it, which allows cooperation between the United States and Canada, avoiding the risk of conflict in this basin.

As it is obviously impossible for the modern ‘demos’ to assemble in order to take political decisions, democratic representation is an inevitable tool in large democracies. Representatives have to stand for and to act for the people as a whole. Accordingly, the principle of representative or parliamentary democracy is a fundamental constitutional principle shared by all the Member States of the Union. Democracy doubtlessly works on the national level; the Member States' decisional powers, however, are fading with the constant transfer of competences towards the European level. This leads to a system of European ‘multi-level governance’ with wide consequences for the linkage between the represented peoples of the Member States and their representatives on both national and European levels.

Introduction The case studies have focussed on the development of the law on STCs in the German and Dutch legal order through codifications, blanket clauses and general principles. In the development of this area of law, interdependence has become apparent. Is the success of the German regime on STCs reflected in sufficient interaction between interdependent actors, in accordance with multilevel governance insights, and can the high quality of the German law on STCs also be attributed to the coexistence of actors, in accordance with pluralist perspectives? Conversely, can the problems in the Dutch law on STCs be traced to a lack of interaction between interdependent actors, in accordance with discourse on multilevel governance? Can its strong points also be attributed to the coexistence of actors, in accordance with pluralist arguments? This chapter will consider the findings of the case studies in the light of multilevel governance and pluralist perspectives more generally and ask whether the coexistence of actors in the development of European private law is, theoretically, more generally problematic or beneficial. Paragraph 6.2. will turn to multilevel governance perspectives and paragraph 6.3 will discuss pluralist perspectives. Paragraph 6.4. will draw a conclusion and sketch the outlay of the book, highlighting what questions will be considered in the light of the findings of the case studies. Multilevel governance perspectives The case studies have indicated that interdependence has developed and will likely become more visible as the aims of national and European actors diverge more clearly. In accordance with debate on multilevel governance more generally, actors are no longer able to independently safeguard the comprehensibility of the law through the use of national techniques. The case studies support the view that the aims of European and national actors diverge, as national actors generally do not prioritise further harmonisation of national private law. The difference between European and German actors is most outspoken as German actors clearly and consistently target maintaining the quality of national law. The aims of national and European state actors diverge especially if state actors do not perceive problems in the law, both in German and Dutch legal order. Notably, despite criticism at the national level, Dutch actors have not aimed to critically consider the quality of the law.

Policy Implementation in a Frontier Region: the case of deforestation in the Amazon

The article defines the role and place of the chambers of commerce and industry of Ukraine in the institutional infrastructure of international entrepreneurship as a system of state, non-state and private institutions that coordinate joint activities within the framework of the national and international market infrastructure of entrepreneurship. Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Ukraine, as non-state subjects of international entrepreneurship, are endowed with a special institutional and legal status to represent the foreign economic interests of national entrepreneurship at the international level. They, as stipulated by the principles of multi-level public governance "governance", help take into account the national economic interests of society, build the international architecture of economic relations with the national economies of other countries, taking into account the international division and integration of labor. Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the system of multi-level public governance operate at different territorial levels from local to international. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Ukraine, regional chambers of commerce and industry, the Ukrainian National Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce have their own functional tasks, but the entire system of chambers of commerce and industry of Ukraine has the general purpose of integrating the national economy into the world economic system through the fulfillment of tasks by each level of chambers of commerce and industry of a local, national and global nature. Most of these tasks are related to the implementation of trade and economic transactions, both at the national and international levels. The characteristic of the organization of interaction between the subjects of the infrastructure of international entrepreneurship is given. It takes place at the national level with access to the international level, including through auxiliary state specialized structures of Ukraine, such as the Ukrainian Entrepreneurship Support Fund, the Business Ombudsman Council. It is shown that reaching the international level is carried out through the establishment of communications with similar national and regional structures of the countries of the world. For more effective interaction with foreign partners, representative offices are opened abroad, mixed chambers of commerce and business councils are created. In this way, the system of chambers of commerce and industry of Ukraine supports and promotes the interests of Ukrainian entrepreneurship at the international level.

This article proposes a theoretical framework combining multi‐level governance (MLG) with bounded rationality. MLG theories have become increasingly popular to understand European Union (EU) policy‐making and interactions between national, sub‐national and EU levels. At the same time, principles of bounded rationality are entering the public policy debate, highlighting the role of cognitive biases in policy formation. However, these two developments have been separate, as bounded rationality has been little used in EU studies. The article therefore proposes a framework integrating the two lenses. This sheds new light on the optimal allocation of tasks between EU and national levels, given the prevalence of different cognitive biases at each level. Findings are that EU‐level policy‐making can be hampered by availability heuristics and undefined preferences, whilst national policy‐making is prone to zero‐sum bias and myopia. Insights are applied to research policy as an example, helping to explain obstacles to EU integration in this area.

This article aims at illuminating the role of Swedish and Norwegian municipalities as legal actors in multi-level governance. The research question is threefold: What is the role of Swedish and Norwegian municipalities as legal actors in relation to the European level? How do these roles affect local autonomy at the national level? What is the impact of the different affiliations at the European level, Sweden's full membership, and Norway only being a party to the EEA Agreement on these questions? Previous research has shown that municipalities have been able to magnify their influence, both externally and internally, through the intermediary of the European Union. The ability to magnify their influence will depend on the national constitutional framework and the formal affiliation to the European level, among other things. In this study, the role of the municipalities in Norway and Sweden is described by analysing the constitutional position of municipalities at the national level, the municipal influence on the drafting of EU legislation, the Nordic municipalities as actors before the ECJ and the EFTA Court and the municipal implementation of EU/EEA law. On a general level, the study found that the constitutional structures are mainly monolithic, although there are polycentric features. The ability of Norwegian and Swedish municipalities to by-pass national authorities is visible but cannot be described as strong. The role of the municipalities in acting at the European level is noteworthy, but the legal framework does not allow for a significant increase in local autonomy. The EEA affiliation of Norway implies that the municipalities have a weaker position at the European level.

This article assesses the impact of multi-level approaches to the problem of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs) on the rule of law at the national and global level. Based on a single-case study of the 2016 Gambian UCG, this article concludes that multi-level governance tends to strengthen the rule of law at the national level, but only if certain conditions are met. These include an agreement about the rules of the road regulating how the different layers of governance interact – subsidiarity v. precedence for organizations from higher levels of governance – and the definition of a common purpose. Such unity of purpose is easier to attain if the (geo)political stakes of a crisis are relatively low, the prospects of success of a military intervention high, and if the perpetrators of the UCG have forfeited their legitimacy both locally and globally. This prevents them from exploiting institutional rivalries and shrinks their space for diplomatic manoeuvre and thus their ability to use forum shopping for their benefit. If these conditions are met, then multi-level responses to UCG will strengthen the rule of law at the domestic level, while at the same time potentially undermining the rule of law at the global level.

The Labour years (1997–2010) ushered in a new era for the British capital for two main reasons. First, London benefited from a transfer of power that fundamentally reshaped its governance, particularly in the fields of housing and planning. Second, London has undergone fundamental demographic and physical change since the 1990s. However, London can also be seen as the perfect illustration of some of the policy problems thrown up by multilevel governance as various agencies have had to work together to achieve their goals. These were set at the national level and were intended to make London a more progressive and inclusive city. The article will thus seek to analyse how the first two successive mayoral administrations of Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson (2000–2016) managed (or not) to reconcile sometimes conflicting demands. It will show that, in the field of housing, the mayors sought to achieve the progressive goals set at the national (macro) level without always controlling the necessary policy levers at their own (meso) level.