RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE. POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY LESSONS TO LEARN FOR ROMANIA AND THE ROMANIAN ARMY

How the Putin Regime Really Works Celeste A. Wallander (bio) Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order. By Kathryn E. Stoner. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. 344 pp. Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin's Russia. By Timothy Frye. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021. 288 pp. Is President Vladimir Putin an all-powerful dictator, to be feared above all other threats to democracy? Or is the Russian regime to be dismissed as a pale shadow of its Soviet and Czarist past, living off hydrocarbons and a Cold War–era nuclear stockpile? Neither, these two books argue. Though Timothy Frye focuses on the regime's grip on society and Kathryn E. Stoner on its capabilities abroad, the authors arrive at a common conclusion: Russia's actions, purpose, power, and weakness are rooted in the personalistic autocracy that has consolidated since Putin's election in 2000. Putinism is the source of Russian resurgence and also its greatest vulnerability. This conclusion stands out from the simplistic explanations of the Kremlin's behavior prevalent in Western public discourse. Neither Putin's psychology and background nor an exceptional Russian history and culture, Frye explains, account for the authoritarian regime's persistence. Standard measures of power and a static set of national interests, Stoner demonstrates, paint a misleading picture of the regime's weakness on the international stage and inadequately explain the country's post-Soviet foreign policy. Both authors turn to political science to frame their arguments. Frye [End Page 178] asserts that far from being exceptional, Putin's regime mirrors the dynamics of autocracies extensively studied in comparative politics. Authoritarian regimes are typically led by a political party, the national military, or a powerful individual. In the first two types, institutions rule, as is the case in China under the Communist Party and Burma under the military. But in a personalist autocracy, such as Putin's Russia, political power is exercised through individual relationships, and thus state institutions are feeble. Hence we can see why Putin is both "weak" and a "strongman": According to Frye, weak institutions make "it easier for autocrats to take power … but [make] it harder for them to govern once in office" (p. 40). Politics is on manual control: Russia functions when Putin is managing and arbitrating conflicts among elites. These elites, in turn, run the country's most important businesses and control the government economic, financial, social, and security organs that enable Putin to remain in charge: It is a relationship of codependence. And while Putin wields enormous power, weak institutions limit his ability to solve every problem or achieve every goal. So power breeds vulnerability: Because everything depends on a single person, the stakes of Putin's failure (or departure) are extremely high for the elites who have wealth and influence by dint of his effectiveness alone. This presents a dilemma for the leader of a personalist autocracy: Pleasing (or pacifying) inner-circle cronies with the state's resources leaves less for the public. Every elite giveaway stifles economic performance, undermining the regime's grip on society at home and power abroad. From 2003 to 2008, Russia's oil-fueled economy averaged 7 percent annual growth, leaving plenty for Putin to satisfy the rapacious elite while delivering a rising standard of living to the public. But the 2008 global economic crisis and international-sanctions regime imposed since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, combined with the weight of corruption, uncertainty, and predatory business behavior, have slowed the economy, exposing the fragile balance that Putin must maintain to keep control. The regime cannot figure out how to escape this balancing act without risking the political change it fears. Increasingly, Putin turns to repression. The Kremlin criminalized free speech, prohibited criticism as a threat to national security, and in August 2020 poisoned Russia's most effective political-opposition figure, Alexei Navalny. A court sent him to prison for violating parole while he was in a toxin-induced coma. The government declared his grassroots [End Page 179] anticorruption movement an extremist organization, decreed that it must be disbanded, and detained the movement's defense lawyers. Yet as Frye emphasizes, cracking down presents another dilemma. Many...

A little-noted but interesting aspect of the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 was Vladimir Putin's government's attempt to enlist officials from the Republic of Tatarstan to smooth the transition of Crimea back to Russian rule. It makes sense — the Crimean and Volga Tatars are ethnic, linguistic, and religious kin, and both trace their history of statehood back to the Golden Horde successor khanates of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The Crimean Khanate maintained its independence far longer than Kazan was able to; while the defeat of Kazan in 1552 marked the beginning of the expansion of the modern Russian Empire under Ivan IV, the Crimean Khanate retained some form of autonomy until nearly the end of the eighteenth century. During the ensuing years, the fortunes of the two peoples and their states reversed yet again; Tatarstan emerged from Soviet rule as a powerful actor determined to make the new Russian Federation truly a federal state in practice as well as on paper (in part by invoking the heritage of the Kazan Khanate). In contrast the Crimean Tatars, never having recovered demographically or politically from their forced exile to Central Asia by Stalin during World War II, struggled to establish some form of cultural and political autonomy as part of a newly independent Ukraine.

Promising pipelines and hydrocarbon nationalism: the sociality of unbuilt infrastructure in indigenous Siberia

Following the February 2014 fall of Viktor Yanukovych as president of Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Western government in Kiev, Russia initiated an irredentist intervention to annex the Crimean peninsula. Although much attention has focused on the use of military forces without country or unit insignia (the ‘little green men’ of irregular warfare), a crucial part of this operation involved a complex and multilayered perception management campaign to advance a self-interested narrative, which defined the contours of debate, justified their actions at home and abroad, and provided those actions with legal and normative legitimacy. This article examines the Kremlin’s rhetoric in three areas: Crimea’s secession from Ukraine was a legal act of self-determination; Russia possesses justifiable historical, cultural, and legal claims to Crimea; and, Western criticism of Russia’s actions are dishonest and a reflection of their anti-Russian, Cold War mentality.

Arthropod-borne diseases such as malaria, dengue, scrub typhus, and leishmaniasis continue to pose a significant threat to U.S. military forces deployed in support of operational and humanitarian missions. These diseases are transmitted by a variety of arthropods, including mosquitoes, ticks, chiggers, sand flies, and biting midges. In addition to disease threats, biting arthropods can cause dermatitis, allergic reactions, and sleep loss; therefore, monitoring of vector impact and integrated use of personal protective measures (PPM) and methods to reduce the vector populations are needed to protect service members. The U.S. military has played a vital role in vector identification tools and the development and testing of many of the most effective PPM and vector control products available today, including the topical repellent DEET and the repellent/insecticide permethrin, which is applied to clothing and bed nets. Efforts to develop superior products are ongoing. Although the U.S. military often needs vector control products with rather specific properties (e.g., undetectable, long-lasting in multiple climates) in order to protect its service members, many Department of Defense vector control products have had global impacts on endemic disease control. The impact of vector-borne disease on military operations is well known (Engelman and Joy 1975, Peterson 1995, Withers and Craig 2003). Combat experiences with yellow fever in the Spanish-American War led to the deployment, in 1900, of the Yellow Fever Commission to Cuba (Engelman and Joy 1975, Lang 1988). Major Walter Reed and other researchers were sent to Cuba to investigate the causes and transmission of yellow fever. By 1901, the commission proved that yellow fever was transmitted by the Aedes mosquito. Using this knowledge, Major William Gorgas implemented programs that eliminated yellow fever in the Panama Canal region and in the United States. The last case of yellow fever in the Panama Canal Zone was reported in May 1906 (Byerly 2005, Pierce and Writer 2005). Major Gorgas also succeeded in controlling malaria in the Panama Canal Zone, and this improvement in disease conditions made it possible for the United States to complete the canal (Engelman and Joy 1975). These initial successes in the field of medical entomology set the stage for subsequent efforts by the U.S. military to control vectors and prevent vector-borne diseases that expanded during World War II. Last minute delousing of service members using the newly-discovered insecticide DDT halted an epidemic of louse-borne typhus (Lang 1988). Problems with malaria in the Pacific theater led Army malaria control teams to use DDT for mosquito control in 1944 (Engelman and Joy 1975). These U.S. combat experiences led to the commissioning of military entomologists and the formation of vector-borne disease control units (Lang 1988). Ultimately, this has grown into a career field and program that produces and supports world-class research in vector control. The U.S. military is prepared to deploy service members anywhere in the world in support of humanitarian efforts and operational missions vital to national security. U.S. military personnel and civilian support staff are presently deployed in over 130 countries, including many places where diseases transmitted by arthropods (e.g., insects, chiggers, and ticks) are still prevalent. Therefore, U.S. personnel may be exposed to a wide range of vector-borne diseases to which they have no acquired natural immunity and for which U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensed vaccines are not yet available (Dickens 1990). Biting and stinging arthropods can degrade mission readiness and combat effectiveness even in the absence of disease transmission, because persistent pests and itching bites are associated with lack of sleep, dermatitis, secondary infections, and death from allergic reactions. A recently published quantitative algorithm, utilizing information from the U.S. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (renamed the National Center for Medical Intelligence in 2008) to score the relative importance of various diseases by taking into account their severity and the likelihood of infection, found that arthropod-borne diseases account for 28 of the top 40 endemic disease threats impacting deployed U.S. troop operations (resulting in lost manpower days, decreased unit morale, and medical costs), which suggests that improved vector control products are needed (Table 1) (Burnette et al. 2008). Malaria, dengue fever, and diarrhea (often caused by bacteria that can be transmitted by flies) are currently the top three threats and have been important threats in past wars. In late 1992 through early 1993, 131 U.S. military members contracted malaria, including at least 11 cases of Plasmodium falciparum, while deployed to Somalia (Sharp et al. 1995, Wallace et al. 1996). In 2003, 80 (28%) of 290 Marines who went ashore in Liberia to oversee a civil transition acquired malaria (Debboun et al. 2006). Because malaria can be a relapsing disease and because the female Anopheles mosquitoes capable of transmitting malaria exist in the United States, returning troops can transmit malaria to others (Brunetti et al. 1954). Malaria remains a continuing threat for troops deployed to Afghanistan and South Korea (Ciminera and Brundage 2007). Dengue fever is transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes in both rural and urban areas in some regions. Although rarely fatal in adults, this disease often necessitates hospitalization for supportive care. Diarrhea and/or vomiting have been a problem for some 60% of service members deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF), although it is unclear how many of these cases are due to fly-transmitted disease (Monteville et al. 2006). Other vector-borne diseases that have significantly affected recent U.S. military operations include leishmaniasis and sand fly fever (both transmitted by sand flies) (Aronson et al. 2006). Among hospitalized U.S. service members during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, there were 12 cases of visceral leishmaniasis (a potentially fatal infection affecting multiple organs) caused by Leishmania tropica protozoa. There have been more than 1,000 incident diagnoses/reports among U.S. service members deployed to OIF/OEF of cutaneous leishmaniasis, a potentially disfiguring parasitic skin disease; most of these cases were caused by L. major protozoa. (Approximately 1,000 cutaneous leishmaniasis cases occurred among U.S. service members in the Persian Gulf Command during World War II.) In addition, at least four service members in OIF/OEF have acquired visceral leishmaniasis caused by L. infantum protozoa (Myles et al. 2007). There is concern that asymptomatic latent leishmaniasis infection could be occurring in deployed troops that might cause subsequent disease in service members who later become immunosuppressed because of other diseases. Due to their small size and the fact that not enough is known about their biology, sand flies are difficult to control; to date, the use of air-conditioned quarters by service members in Iraq has proven to be the only effective countermeasure (Coleman et al. 2006, Sanders et al. 2005). Scrub typhus, a potentially life-threatening disease caused by Orientia tsutsugamushi bacteria that is transmitted to humans via bites from infected chiggers, has also impacted U.S. troops, particularly those engaged in jungle warfare in the Far East in World War II and the Vietnam War. To manage vector-related threats, the U.S. military utilizes medical entomologists in preventive medicine teams to assess impacts of vectors and vector-borne diseases and optimize use of available personal protective equipment and pest management practices by deployed forces. This effort receives input from the Armed Forces Pest Management Board and the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) (Debboun et al. 2006). Research to develop new products to diagnose, prevent, and treat many of the vector-borne diseases affecting U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) personnel is funded by the Military Infectious Diseases Research Program (MIDRP). In addition, efforts to identify vectors and improve and replace currently available DoD vector control products continue; product evaluation often involves overseas laboratories. Repellents and pesticides used by the U.S. military at present must be U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registered. However, the U.S. military has additional criteria (e.g., little to no odor, efficacy in multiple climates, efficacy against multiple arthropods, compatibility with U.S. military materials) and is therefore engaged in further testing of EPA-registered repellents to determine whether these products meet U.S. military needs. Bed nets have been used as a means of protection against arthropod-borne diseases for hundreds and perhaps thousands of years. Bed net use became compulsory for U.S. soldiers in the Pacific during World War II following severe outbreaks of malaria and dengue fever (Sapero 1946, Bwire 2000). Since that time, the U.S. military has been involved in developing and testing improved versions of bed nets. Controlled trials in the 1980s demonstrated that bed net use could provide significant protection against malaria and, in particular, evaluated the effect on civilians of bed nets treated with permethrin, an insecticide/repellent often applied to bed nets to help further prevent insect bites (Lines et al. 1987). At present, only pyrethroid-based insecticides are registered by the EPA for application to bed nets. Current U.S. military research includes evaluation of synthetic pyrethroids (permethrin, deltamethrin, or alpha-cypermethrin) for optimum performance against sand flies, with the goal of incorporating the selected compound into future versions of the U.S. military bed net. Research such as the trials mentioned above has helped lead to a greater role for bed nets in the implementation of malaria control programs worldwide. For example, international health groups are providing long-lasting, insecticide-treated nets (LLIN) to residents in malaria-endemic areas of underdeveloped countries, particularly in Africa. In such areas, regular use of insecticide-treated bed nets can reduce childhood mortality up to 20% and severe disease up to 50% (Lindsay et al. 1991, Gimnig et al. 2003). The use of LLINs is a key component of the U.S. President's Malaria Initiative, established in 2005 and coordinated by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The goal of this program is to reduce deaths due to malaria by 50% in 15 African countries. This objective will be met in part by ensuring that at least 85% of children less than 5 years of age and of pregnant women have access to and routinely use LLINs. The U.S. military standard insect bed net that has been used for many years (it is not impregnated with an arthropod repellent) requires four 36-inch poles to be set up for use with military cots and must be completely tucked in on all sides of the cot to prevent biting insects from entering. The Self-Supporting Low-Profile (SS-LP) bed net is a smaller bed net recently developed for short-term use by highly mobile forces (e.g., Infantry, Rangers, Special Forces) by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) in collaboration with Breakthrough Technologies. This lightweight bed net constructed of flame-retardant materials and rip-stop fabric includes an internal, self-supporting flexible vinyl ester/fiberglass frame, a waterproof floor, two zippered doors, and a mesh top. The frame pops open automatically from a 12-inch-diameter backpack package so that the bed net is ready for immediate use on bare ground or over a standard military cot or hospital bed (Frances et al. 2003). The tightly woven mesh is intended to exclude small insects such as midges and sand flies, and all fabric surfaces are impregnated with EXPEL, an EPA-registered permethrin-based insecticide. A comparison of the SS-LP bed net with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) mosquito bed net found that both bed nets provided greater than 97.9% protection compared to unprotected personnel (Frances et al. 2003), and the insecticide-untreated SS-LP bed net provided better night-time protection than the untreated ADF bed net. However, the small dimensions can provoke claustrophobia and the fine mesh of the SS-LP bed net limits air flow, which can cause overheating and noncompliance in hot climates (Coleman et al. 2006). WRAIR is working with several companies to develop a new erectable, durable, low-weight bed net that is sufficiently tall to allow a soldier to sit up on a cot within the bed net. The DoD is evaluating long-lasting net products that are already commercially available as well as new long-lasting netting materials being developed by companies supported by military Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program funding. The goal is a bed net constructed of high-denier polymer fabric with integrated insecticide to help protect against small biting insects, but with a mesh large enough to permit adequate air flow. Use of battery-operated fans to improve air flow within the new bed net and improve vector control has been considered, but employing products that require batteries increases the logistical burden on deployed troops. The revised bed net could be useful to civilians as well as the U.S. military. However, some troops decline to use any bed nets because of concerns that they will not be able to escape blast injuries while confined in a bed net. Development of a repellent-impregnated fabric belt to be worn over pants around the waist area (thereby avoiding skin contact issues) could provide an alternative means of vector control for such individuals. Many cultures use plants or plant material to repel insects. The smoke produced by burning plant material is thought to work by increasing heat, lowering humidity (thereby reducing mosquito sensory input), and masking human-produced carbon dioxide (Davis and Bowen 1994). Plants can also be used more directly. Many plants (e.g., eucalyptus, citronella, catnip, sage, lavender, basil, thyme, and the tea tree) contain oils that repel arthropods when applied to skin, hair, or wood (that keeps insects out of an area where humans or animals dwell) (Moore et al. 2007). In fact, the use of plants as natural repellents can be an inexpensive and aesthetically appealing option. However, both of these methods have drawbacks that limit their use in military situations. Smoke has adverse health effects and can reveal the locations of deployed personnel to potential adversaries. Similarly, strong plant odors emanating from natural oils can reveal personnel locations. In addition, insect repellents are only effective in the vapor phase and plant-related repellent compounds are generally highly volatile. Therefore, application to human skin results in an initially strong but often short-lived repellent effect. Although it may be possible to lengthen repellent activity by incorporating these natural oils from plants into ointment or gel formulations, at least one drawback remains. Deployed service members do not always have access to clean running water for hand washing and showers and thus often do not wish to apply sticky or oily repellents to already oily skin. Plants with components that can kill insects include nicotine, Mentha (mint) species, and pyrethrum daisies. Pyrethrum, a natural plant oil with minimal mammalian toxicity derived from two species of pyrethrum daisies (Tanacetum cinerariifolium and Tanacetum coccineum), has been used for centuries to control pests. Pyrethrins, the insecticidal components of pyrethrum, are located in tiny oil-containing glands in the flower head. Pyrethrum was probably introduced into Europe circa 1300 by Marco Polo, and pyrethrum powders were used by military troops from the time of Napoleon to kill head and body lice. Because insects avoid pyrethrum, pyrethrum also has repellent effects. Major Gorgas used pyrethrum in Cuba to control yellow fever and malaria by burning it inside sealed dwellings. Spiral-shaped burnable mosquito repellents containing mixtures of pyrethrum powder have been marketed since 1902 and these items are still widely used in Asia. Pyrethrum daisies were grown in the United States from approximately 1870 to the early 1900s and then imported from Japan until World War II, at which time the United States supported efforts to grow pyrethrum crops in Kenya to make pyrethrum products available to Allied troops. More potent and photostable pyrethroids (synthetic analogs of pyrethrum) were developed in Europe beginning in the 1930s (Moore and Debboun 2007, Moore et al. 2007). Permethrin was first synthesized in 1972 in the United Kingdom and registered for agricultural use in 1979 by the EPA. Permethrin is an odorless, water-based, and ultimately biodegradable compound with low mammalian toxicity that will not damage plastics, is harmless to natural and synthetic fabrics, and is somewhat resistant to degradation by sunlight (Hossain et al. 1989, Macedo et al. 2007). Although useful as a topical treatment for human head lice and scabies and as an insecticide/repellent when applied to horses, permethrin is ineffective as an insecticide/repellent when applied to human skin because the compound does not bond to human skin. Important early research on permethrin was conducted by Wellcome Research Laboratories. The DoD began evaluating permethrin for clothing treatments in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1979. In a three-day field evaluation at Camp Lejeune, NC, 21 subjects participated in studies that demonstrated that permethrin-treated clothing protected against chigger mites (Breeden et al. 1982). The effectiveness of pressurized sprays of permethrin on clothing for protection against the lone star tick (Amblyomma americanum) has been demonstrated (Schreck et al. 1982). Pressurized sprays of commercially available permethrin (0.5%) or DEET (20% or 30% concentrations) applied to military field uniforms were evaluated in May 1984 as protectants against bites by the Ixodes dammini tick in Massachusetts. A one-minute application of permethrin to the exterior surface of pants and jackets provided 100% protection against attack by all life stages of the tick, whereas application of DEET provided much less protection. Field evaluations in in the of results in of service members from bites of the U.S. in demonstrated that long-lasting permethrin clothing can be via an with both and methods used by the DoD to clothing have been registered by the and permethrin-treated clothing was for DoD use in and civilian use in et al. et al. et al. 1989, et al. insecticidal effect on clothing can last two to but is by A has been when large groups of personnel permethrin-treated uniforms are U.S. service members are on and provided with methods to combat uniforms with permethrin and a long-lasting DEET for application to exposed skin, as part of an integrated when deployed to where vector-borne diseases exist et al. and The U.S. uniforms that have been with Although there have been of efficacy of permethrin as an insecticide for some vectors in some areas, permethrin is still a useful clothing repellent et al. impacting U.S. troops is that because the of currently used uniforms do not permethrin the of vector-borne diseases in OIF/OEF personnel could that the threat of in OIF/OEF is the use of uniforms is for U.S. Army ground A for synthetic insect repellents and insecticides for U.S. troops was during World War II, when Japan and were the major for pyrethrum as well as as the of during the World development of synthetic by U.S. military the burden of disease by Allied troops malaria, dengue, and scrub research on synthetic insect repellents (Sapero The U.S. military on the insecticide beginning in insecticidal properties of this compound were by the and helped develop products 2000). and over potential repellent/insecticide compounds many synthetic were by with U.S. War Department and demonstrated significant protection against in and (Moore and Debboun 2007). provided protection against of these to clothing and skin significantly the of scrub typhus among troops in the Pacific theater during World War II In researchers and William developed small pressurized by to vector control World War II, a repellent known as known as or that and became in the United States. However, products containing were from the U.S. and in following identification of toxicity (Moore and Debboun 2007). The development of DEET was an important et al. 1954). DEET is a insect repellent that is effective against mosquitoes when applied to skin. DEET products became available to the in the of the EPA in The EPA registered and this product remains the most widely used and widely DEET has been used for a with minimal reported adverse many of which involved or use of this DEET have been and it has been for human including children and pregnant women and The (that the was developed by and supported through DoD funding. This was when applied to skin areas with or because of the and was effective for only one to two the U.S. Army and in developing the and is a containing DEET with that and of the repellent et al. This DEET by and registered by the EPA in 1991, is used by the U.S. and to of protection conditions et al. et al. its as a DEET does have on and protective and can synthetic suggests that some DEET the oily and and, in particular, service members have about its effectiveness and et al. 2005). This has led to efforts in repellent research by the U.S. military. control of vectors and arthropod-borne diseases necessitates development of means of key vector and U.S. military vectors of malaria and yellow fever in the late and 1990). In when a major of the mosquitoes in was by the U.S. Army Medical in the for a more the of the became the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical in became The was that this could be conducted at the National of in supported by a from the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development The of in the Department of was as the most to its in the the of mosquito and the of mosquito have been used to identify this Army the and the The Walter Reed located at the Center of the in the beginning in The is an that is to the and of important The has developed to the important mosquitoes of the and which can be via the Military preventive medicine deployed in an operational can and arthropods capable of transmitting endemic diseases to identify many of these vectors via and this information to assess the likelihood of human and develop and effectiveness of control The also supports vector research such as and repellent and insecticide The staff includes three research entomologists an Army and two There are also for staff and research and National Research are by the vector research and is provided by the with the that the mosquito will be and at the The identification to mosquitoes of the U.S. Pacific Command of and U.S. Command of are To date, new species of mosquitoes and new species of biting midges have been future include the development of mosquito for important African mosquitoes and sand have been published in to military 11 civilian and A of studies and major identification have been published et al. and et al. et al. 2005, and et al. 1990). that identify in vectors help U.S. military preventive medicine service members vector-borne disease A malaria for of malaria in mosquitoes has been developed and marketed by with Army and overseas DoD have the for and A was by Medical et al. and development of a used to identify and in mosquitoes was also supported by U.S. Army funding. Other used by the U.S. military to diseases in vectors since include fever and during the and and sand fly fever and and and et al. The U.S. Force has developed for and identification of dengue in mosquitoes et al. 2007). endemic in service members via testing

This book explores how the Volga Tatars, the largest ethnic minority within the Russian Federation, a Muslim minority, achieved a great deal of autonomy for Tatarstan in the years 1988 to 1992, but then lost this autonomy gradually over the course of the Putin era. It sets the issue in context, tracing the history of the Volga Tatars, the descendants of the Golden Horde whose Khans exercised overlordship over Muscovy in medieval times, and outlining Tsarist and Soviet nationalities policies and their enduring effects. It argues that a key factor driving the decline of greater autonomy, besides Putin’s policies of harmonisation and centralisation, was the behaviour of the minority elites, who were, despite their earlier engagement in ethnic mobilization, very acquiescent to the new Putin regime, deciding that co-operation would maximise their privileges.

This paper addresses the use of force by the Russian Federation in Crimea. In the first section, it shows that the two reported instances of the use of force (the use of units deployed in Crimea under the agreements with Ukraine and the presence of so called ‘little green men’) both qualify as prima facie violations of the prohibition of the use of force as well as acts of aggression and, when assessed in combination, an armed attack. In the second section, the paper discusses legal grounds that the Russian Federation has, albeit usually implicitly, put forward to justify these prima facie violations (self-defence, intervention by invitation, the use of force in support of self-determination, protection of nationals/humanitarian intervention), concluding that none of them is truly convincing.

Author's Response:A Russian Reckoning? Timothy Frye (bio) The only thing better than reading a smart review of your book is to read four smart reviews, as is the case with this Asia Policy book review roundtable. I thank Aleksandar Matovski, Christopher Miller, Andrew Monaghan, and Mark Katz for their close readings of Weak Strongman: The Limits of Power in Putin's Russia. They not only provide many useful insights but also raise important questions that can help set a research agenda for studying Russia going forward. All book reviews are written in the shadow of current events, and few events have recently loomed larger than Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I was pleased to see that the reviewers found the book's emphasis on Russia's institutional pathologies to be a useful framework for understanding the invasion in all its senselessness. I address some of these issues in more detail in a new foreword to the paperback version that will appear in September. I was also pleased to see the broad acceptance of the main arguments of the book, such as the benefits of looking beyond Putin, the importance of a comparative perspective, and the value of social science research for comprehending Russian politics. Rather than dwell on the points of agreement, though, this essay will focus on the reviewers' calls to give greater attention to particular issues. I am sympathetic to this call for more detail. In writing a book aimed at the intersection of specialist and general interest readers, I recognized the trade-off in achieving the depth necessary to persuade the specialist reader while not straining the patience of the general interest reader. This made for some uncomfortable choices and hard cuts. Matovksi and Miller applaud the book's emphasis on the importance of public opinion for Putin's regime but each would like to push the argument in slightly different directions. Matovski calls for a deeper probe into Russia's national identity politics and makes the very helpful suggestion of comparing Russia to other post-imperial countries like Weimar Germany and Turkey, to which one might add Britain and France as well. Miller makes a similar insight by noting that "we will need to explore how this [End Page 197] apparently deep-set nationalism interacts with the wobbly state apparatus and political structure" to understand Russian politics. This critique to pay greater attention to nationalism has much going for it. In trying to downplay the "magical" qualities often attributed to Vladimir Putin's popularity, such as his publicity stunts, personal charisma, and Russians' supposed support for strong leaders, I urged observers to look at the more mundane factors that are often critical to a leader's popularity but often discounted in general discussions of Russian politics. I argue that performance matters for the popularity of leaders like Putin—not just information or propaganda about performance, but actual performance. It matters for Putin's support that living standards in Russia soared, that Russia annexed Crimea without bloodshed, and that pensions have been paid on time. Green and Robertson find that even controlling for personality traits, respondents whose economic situation improved in the last year were more likely to vote for and approve of Putin.1 But Matovski and Miller are surely right that we need a better understanding of the causes and consequences of nationalism and national identity. Recent works have made some progress. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova uses social identity theory to argue that Putin has exploited the trauma of the 1990s.2 Green and Robertson point to the intense emotional appeals that bolstered Putin after the annexation of Crimea.3 Matovski's own work on Putin's exploitation of crises and fears of political instability fills an important need.4 These are all important contributions, but this is hard work. Nations have multiple identities that change over time. One person's historic trauma is another person's historic opportunity. National identities are not given in nature but are contested political creations. Identities and interests interact in ways that are difficult for observers to capture. Understanding why and when appeals to identity strike home is not easy. After the anti-government demonstrations of 2011, Putin banged...

Former president Vladimir Putin still appears to dominate an unassailable regime from the position of prime minister. However, parallels with imperial Russia shortly before the tsar's overthrow, and with its Soviet successor in the year before the union collapsed, suggest that the security of the regime should not be taken for granted. The failure of ‘experts’ to identify the weakness of the earlier regimes should teach us to be prepared for the unexpected. The parallels between tsarist Russia and the mature Soviet Union are strong, and Putin has publicly shown his appreciation of both previous regimes. In some respects, Putin's regime is close to its tsarist predecessor, and in some the parallels with the Soviet case are compelling; but the wealth of oil and gas appeared to give Putin's Russia a measure of invulnerability that neither earlier regime enjoyed. Yet technological disasters, the possible limits to the Russian nation's legendary patience, the expressed apprehensions on the part of the intelligentsia, and the shock of the global economic crisis of the autumn of 2008, place the regime's supposed invulnerability in a different light. In particular, it lacks a clear and inspiring ideology that could be used to unite the population round the regime. The sudden demise of the regime is not inevitable, but history teaches us not to be surprised by the unforeseen.

Vladimir Putin has been the undisputed leader of Russia (either as president or prime minister) for almost 25 years. Barring an accident or assassination, Putin seems almost certain to surpass Joseph Stalin's record long reign over the Soviet Union of 29 years. The durability of Putin's regime comes despite a record of endemic corruption, poor governance, economic growth that gave way to recession, a poorly managed COVID response, and a disastrous invasion of a peaceful neighbor in 2022. Despite all of this, Putin endures. How does he do it? A new book by Hannah Chapman, Dialogue with the Dictator: Authoritarian Legitimation and Information Management in Putin's Russia is a welcome addition to a lengthening list of recent studies seeking to explain the resilience and potential vulnerabilities of authoritarianism and of Putin's regime in particular. In one way or another, all of these books focus on the question that also puzzles Russia's opposition politicians: Why is Putin's autocracy so resilient? Chapman offers one answer in exploring the ways in which his regime uses “participatory technologies” to not only enhance regime legitimacy from Russian society but also to control what information reaches Russian citizens. This article reviews her book in the context of other recent studies of how Putin's autocracy works and why it has lasted so long.

The article analyzes the policy and practice of neo-imperialism in the Russian Federation, examines the specificity of Putinizm as a historical challenge posed by the post-Soviet post-colonial elites of the former USSR, in this case, the Ukrainian ones. Existing certain toleration of the culture of the colonizer, inherent in a large number of representatives of the Ukrainian elites, both political, and economic and creative, is one of the hallmarks of their unshakable post-colonialism, which, in turn, hinders the transformation of Ukraine into a modern European civilized state and a full-fledged modern nation. The need for a more determined opposition to the political and ideological influences of the modern Kremlin, its neo-imperial actions, theprovision of more effective and tougher resistance to the aggressor-Putin's Russia, which invaded Ukraine and imposed a hybrid war on its people, is not only a requirement that is relevant to self-preservation and consolidation Ukrainian independent nation, but also a persistent advice from the politicians of different countries who are committed to Ukraine and advanced analysts from the present-day Russia. Moreover, the real history of post-Soviet Ukraine and the post-Soviet Russia is a confirmation of the differences, including ideological, between the two peoples. At a time when post-colonial Ukraine was looking for itself in the labyrinths of many, and especially of the two-vectored, having finally ended on the road to a common European home, Russia tried to become democratic, but its efforts in this direction ended in defeat. Some of the contemporary Russian philosophers generally argue that the post-Soviet period in Russia went on an effort to return to the USSR. The Russian post-Soviet postcolonial period tried to get rid of their own "humiliation" and "to rise from their knees". A number of contemporary Russian intellectuals even argues that raising the people from their knees is the only real merit of the President of the Russian Federation VV. Putin before the Russian people. For example, the president of Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė has repeatedly expressed the opinion that Ukraine should take a much more resolute stand against the policies and actions of Putin's Russia. The ability to effectively confront an insidious aggressor - Putin's Russia - has become an exam today for Ukrainian elites regarding their viability and effectiveness.

Recently we see a repeating story: hacked data, leaked data, and disinformation are all powerful tools used alongside cyber sabotage and military force in different parts of the Western world. Many of these attacks are covert, raising the question of how scholars and citizens can detect these incursions in real time. In February 2014, Ukraine ousted its President Yanukovych, who was Russian President Putin's protege; Russia retaliated with physical and cyber aggression. An occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine by clandestine Russian forces was accompanied by a massive disinformation campaign. Russia also infiltrated Ukrainian governmental networks with spying software, broke into the servers of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission to influence the outcome of the presidential election, and hacked and disabled important components of the Ukrainian critical infrastructure. After the United States (U.S.) and European Union (E.U.) imposed sanctions against Russia, Putin's regime intensified its information warfare against Western institutions as well. As weaponized data has been used in elections in Ukraine and the U.S., it may well continue during future election campaigns in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and beyond. In this paper we consider the nature of 'data' in an information-warfare environment. We also discuss and analyze Russian global information warfare since 2014, discuss how to detect its influence, and offer recommendations to mitigate its effects. While it is difficult to forensically prove who carried out recent attacks we describe, researchers agree that Russian government structures are behind these cyber and informational assaults. We use data from open sources, as well as data drawn from communications with other experts, to enhance clarity on info-warfare and gain insight into the everyday challenges presented by current-day Russian cyberactivity. As researchers, we aim to simply present a set of data and offer analyses relevant for citizens, scholars, and practitioners.

The authors used a mixed methods approach to examine if the reputation of a housing area has bearing on residential wellbeing and social trust in three pairs of socioeconomically contrasting neighborhoods in a Swedish urban municipality. Multilevel logistic regression analyses were performed to examine associations between area reputation and residential wellbeing and social trust, controlling for the random effect of neighborhood and individual level sociodemographic factors. Qualitative data were analyzed to identify mechanisms of how neighborhood reputations were established. The housing area reputation was found to be strongly associated with wellbeing and social trust. The area reputation also seemed to be a determinant of position in the local social structure; residents were found to position themselves in a rank order. The results suggest that area reputation is an important and probably underestimated dimension in the development of residential wellbeing and social trust in housing. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Two concepts have developed around the world - single object and multi-object real estate. The choice of the model determines the systematics of rights in rem over real estate. At the present stage of development of the legislation of countries where a land plot is regarded as a single real estate object, this concept does not always effectively regulate the relations of persons having a legal interest in real estate. The concept of a single object has been replaced abroad by the idea of a parcel unit which allows for the recognition of rights in rem to separate spaces: underground, above-ground and aerial. The concept of parcels implies granting a number of privileges to property owners within the boundaries of a land plot. Analogous to the concept of parcels in Russian law may be the concept of composite immovable property. Applying the concept of composite immovable property to multifunctional complexes, cottage settlements, blocks of flats and property of garage co-operatives with vesting property owners with rights of common ownership of common use property (if any) seems more relevant to the interests of such persons compared to the current regulatory model. The system of rights in rem over land plots in accordance with the concept of a single object in a multi-object real estate will not work efficiently. The approach proposed in the Draft Amendments to the section on rights in rem of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation is aimed at duplicating the already existing structures and giving the rights of obligation in rem and the negative easement the status of rights in rem. This confusion destabilises the circulation of real estate that has developed over decades. Gratuitous and perpetual rights to use land plots must be retained as the basis for the functioning of special public legal entities and the support of subjects for socially important purposes. However, the capacity of the holders of such rights can be expanded by granting the right to own a land plot. In order to distinguish between real and compulsory lease regime, it is possible to distinguish between user (compulsory) lease and user-owner (real) lease. It is also necessary to expand the range of security transactions with respect to land plots by providing for the possibility of leasing and sale with the right to buy it back. For easements in the Russian Federation, an open list of types of private easements should be established, while public easements, on the contrary, should be subject to a closed list. For the Russian Federation, the introduction of a reciprocal easement structure could be relevant. In the case of personal easements, the potential of such rights in relation to land plots cannot be appreciated and the need to duplicate existing rights through such a construction. A similar problem is characteristic of usufruct and rights in rem. In this respect, it would be more reasonable to introduce the property rights in real estate in Russian law that are endowed with a succession effect.

The impact of crisis in Ukraine on EU–Russia relations appears twofold. On the one hand, it revealed the high degree of disdain all across Europe to Moscow's neo-imperial approach. On the other hand, it unveiled a great deal of affection and sympathy to Kremlin's policy among a number of non-mainstream but significant groups within the EU. In this article, we mirror the major troubles of today’s Europe, as seen from Moscow’s perspective, with four nodal points of the Kremlin’s hegemonic discourse: social conservatism, nation state-based policies, independence from the US influence and the glorification of Russia’s self-inflicted mission of fighting contemporary neo-fascism. Our analysis of non-mainstream political parties in EU member states, sensitive and responsive to the Kremlin’s agenda, suggests that Putin's regime and Russia sympathizers in Europe pragmatically use each other, thereby challenging the classical ideological paradigms. This translates Russia’s policies into a trans-ideological repertoire of different discourses that differently resonate among the groups of Russia sympathizers.