Abstract
AbstractWe study the influence of stricter rules for determining performance measures for compensation contracts on managers' choice between real and accounting earnings management. Constraints, like accounting regulation or corporate governance, limit managers' influence on performance measures. We find that tighter constraints intensify real earnings manipulation, because they reduce incentives for managers to supply effort on investment activities. In turn, discretion allows managers to anticipate future benefits of investment and reduces real earnings management. The results hold when contracts include forward‐looking information and suggest that constraints on managers' influence on performance measures drive the choice between accounting and real earnings management.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
