Abstract
In this paper, we study Nash equilibria for real R&D options in a context of non-cooperative oligopoly under fuzzy uncertainty in market shares and revealed information. In particular, we consider a duopoly fuzzy game in which each firm has two available strategies, that is to invest or to defer its research investment. The deferring option gives the benefit of the information revelation about market reaction but, on the other hand, the disadvantage of a lower market share. Since these two effects are not easily to quantify, we describe the revealed information and the market shares as fuzzy numbers. As shown by numerical examples, the proposed fuzzy framework allows to reach different firms' strategic behaviours and new Nash equilibria with respect to the crisp case.
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