Abstract
Rational‐choice theory, especially in its neo‐institutionalist variants, is a useful tool for the explanation of legislative behaviour. It allows to generate testable hypotheses about the link between the motives of individual parliamentarians, institutional structures and policies. Based on a general theory of action, rational‐choice explanations are deductive and reductionist making them particularly useful for the comparative study of parliaments. Many criticisms of rational‐choice theory do not apply in the well‐structured, competitive context of democratic parliamentary politics. Analytical tools like the concept of the ‘legislative firm’ or the ‘interest‐group approach of government’ help to generate explanations of the link between institutions and policy outputs that are not ad hoc and can be tested against a broad array of empirical data.
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