Rape and evolutionary psychology: a critique of Thornhill and Palmer's theory

Abstract

In this article, we present a critical evaluation of Thornhill and Palmer's [(2000). Rape: a natural history. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.] evolutionary theory of rape. This theory attempts to explain rape in terms of evolutionary theory and asserts that rape is either directly or indirectly associated with inherited mechanisms that increased our ancestors' reproductive success. We first provide an introduction and overview of some of the fundamental concepts in the field of evolutionary psychology (EP) and then summarize the major elements of Thornhill and Palmer's theory. Thornhill and Palmer offer two main lines of argument in support of their theory — a positive and a negative argument. The positive argument involves the development of an explicit case for the coherency, scope, empirical adequacy, and explanatory depth of their evolutionary account of rape. The negative argument relies upon refuting what Thornhill and Palmer call the “standard social science model” (SSSM) of rape. The present paper advances some general criticisms of Thornhill and Palmer's theory and then specifically addresses both their positive and negative arguments. We conclude that Thornhill and Palmer have not established that their evolutionary theory of rape is a better theory than social science explanations. At best, their argument presents a strong case for the important, but not exclusive, role of biological factors in the etiology of rape and gender relationships. At this point in time, there are too many unanswered questions concerning the nature of the relevant adaptations and the contribution of environmental and cultural factors to conclude that evolutionary theories are sufficient to explain sexual aggression.