Raising the Stakes: The Interests of Non-claimant States in the South China Sea Disputes

ASEAN’s Stakes:The South China Sea’s Challenge to Autonomy and Agency Alice D. Ba (bio) The South China Sea has come to involve important stakes for all involved. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is no different—though its situation is also notably distinct. The South China Sea occupies what Michael Leifer once characterized as the geographic “heart of Southeast Asia.”1 Geography alone means that whatever happens in the South China Sea affects ASEAN states the most directly. Moreover, as smaller powers, these states confront much greater vulnerabilities when it comes to great-power demands, even as they may be particular beneficiaries of great-power association. China’s activities in the South China Sea have no doubt underscored these dilemmas as the ASEAN states all try to navigate between the strategic vulnerabilities and the economic opportunities associated with a rising, more confident China. Nor are ASEAN states’ great-power dilemmas limited to China: the latter’s activities in the South China Sea have also precipitated heightened attention from the United States. ASEAN’s challenge is thus compounded by the fact that the South China Sea has become an important focal point of rivalry and tension between the ASEAN region’s two most important great-power relationships. Maintaining a space between China and the United States—one in which Southeast Asian states can enjoy some range of maneuver and choice—may prove to be the greatest challenge confronting the ASEAN region. This essay considers what is at stake in the South China Sea disputes for ASEAN’s coalition of smaller powers, with special attention paid to institutional interests and constraints. It considers not only the more immediate challenges created by territorial disputes but also the more general great-power dilemmas that heightened tensions have recently thrown into sharp relief. [End Page 47] ASEAN’s Immediate Challenges Most immediately, China’s physical and jurisdictional assertions create the challenge for ASEAN of agreeing on a collective response. This challenge, however, is made more complicated by the fact that it is an intergovernmental organization. Tus, while other governments may have to manage a constellation of domestic interests and agencies, ASEAN as an institution is the expression of ten distinct sovereign actors. States differ not just in the importance they attach to the disputes but also in their relations with China and the kinds of regional responses they prioritize. ASEAN’s unprecedented and very public failure to produce a joint communiqué at its 2012 annual foreign ministers’ meeting chaired by Cambodia in Phnom Penh dramatically illustrated this challenge. Additionally complicating ASEAN’s response is the fact that critical differences exist even among the grouping’s four claimant states. The Philippines and Vietnam have been the most vocal and active in responding to China’s activities, while Brunei and Malaysia—even with recently growing Malaysian concerns—have generally favored softer approaches. Such differences challenge ASEAN’s efforts to adopt a collective position as well as implement possible ad hoc workarounds that might facilitate a way forward. In its response to the South China Sea disputes, ASEAN as a collective has prioritized the pursuit of a regional code of conduct (CoC) because it keeps attention on the principles of international law, as well as existing codes of conduct like ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Following the embarrassment of ASEAN’s 2012 meeting, Indonesia quickly moved to facilitate ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea. This statement identifies the “early conclusion” of a CoC and the “full implementation” of both ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the 2011 guidelines as important priorities alongside self-restraint and the nonuse of force by all parties, “full respect” for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the peaceful resolution of disputes. These six principles continue to provide ASEAN states with an important basis for consensus and action. Indonesia’s moves to quickly correct the failures of the 2012 ASEAN ministers’ meeting under Cambodia’s chairmanship are indicative of the understood risks that the South China Sea disputes pose to the organization. Notably, however, the CoC is “not meant...

Europe and Maritime Security in the South China Sea:Beyond Principled Statements? Mathieu Duchâtel (bio) The European Union, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom all signed the G-7 Foreign Ministers’ Declaration on Maritime Security in Lübeck in April 2015. The declaration reiterates their commitment to “freedoms of navigation and overfight” and to an “international maritime order based upon the principles of international law, in particular as reflected in UNCLOS [the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea].” The declaration also makes clear that Europe shares the concerns of the United States and Japan regarding “unilateral actions” in the East and South China Seas.1 However, despite this diplomatic support, Europe has been by far a marginal player in the South China Sea and appears disconnected from the Asian security debate that takes place in Washington—for example, only a very tiny minority of individuals in European capitals has discussed the possibility of freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. This essay examines European interests in the South China Sea and argues that Europe faces a gap between intentions and capabilities regarding Asian security. This gap is widening as a result of the deteriorating security environment in Europe’s immediate neighborhood—the wars in eastern Ukraine and Syria, the refugee crisis, and the necessity of protecting European populations from terrorist actions. For the United States, Europe should be taken for what it is—a partner in values that can only make limited contributions to improving the security environment in the South China Sea. As long as tensions in the South China Sea remain below the threshold of armed confrontation, the policy debate in Europe will remain focused on how to best formulate statements. [End Page 54] Europe’s Declaratory Diplomacy Europe has been generally restrained in commenting on recent developments in the South China Sea. At the EU level, the response to deteriorating security trends has come in the form of reactive statements reaffirming the principles of peaceful settlement, international law, and the importance of confidence building. This approach is summarized in the 2012 “Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia.” The document defines the European interests in the South China Sea in terms of the promotion of a “rules-based international system [and] the principle of freedom of navigation” and mentions “the risk of tensions impacting on the consistent increase in trade and investment, with negative consequences for a ll.” 2 The document also encourages the claimants to resolve their “disputes through peaceful and cooperative solutions and in accordance with international law (in particular UNCLOS), while encouraging all parties to clarify the basis for their claims.”3 The EU reiterates these general principles whenever a major development occurs in the South China Sea. In May 2014, it issued a statement when China deployed an oil rig in waters disputed with Vietnam, leading to a tense standoff that lasted two months. The statement mentions the international law of the sea and the importance of a “peaceful and cooperative solution.” The main adjustment in the May 2014 statement concerns the greater insistence on freedom of navigation and the need to refrain from unilateral actions. Further statements became slightly more specific, including one released on the occasion of Vietnamese prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to Brussels in December 2015 that emphasized Europe’s “serious concerns” regarding “massive land reclamation.” 4 A final notable feature of the European approach is the constant reaffirmation of the importance of all processes led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to guarantee peace and stability in the South China Sea. Repeated in all meetings where the EU has a voice—such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia-Europe Meeting—this diplomatic language suggests that the essence of the European approach is to remain [End Page 55] at the general level of principles and avoid taking clear sides.5 Similar to other external stakeholders, the EU does not have a stance on territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. At the same time, the European choice has been to emphasize international law without stating clearly which elements of UNCLOS or...

The South China Sea has long been a source of regional tension, and disputes have heated up significantly in recent years. Disagreements over competing territorial sovereignty and maritime claims between Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam are the main source of this tension. Singapore, as a non-claimant country to the South China Sea disputes, does not take sides nor judge the merits of the rival claims. It has consistently urged parties to manage their differences calmly and peacefully in accordance with international law, including [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea].1Not being a claimant does not mean that Singapore has no interest in the South China Sea. Much to the contrary, as a small state, it has an interest in ensuring that all claimant states always act in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.2 Moreover, as an island state, Singapore has an interest in ensuring that international law preserves freedom of navigation and overflights and that such law is interpreted and applied consistently. Finally, as a Southeast Asian state, Singapore has an interest in ensuring that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains cohesive and united and that its processes effectively advance common interests by engendering a high degree of cooperation and integration among all member states. However, little progress has been made in negotiating a binding code of conduct (C°C) in the South China Sea since the adoption of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (D°C). Singapore, as the current country coordinator for ASEAN-China dialogue relations, hopes to make progress on that front.This essay examines Singapore's interests and role in the South China Sea in four areas: the commitment to upholding the rule of law in the relations between states, the defense of the right to freedom of navigation and overflight, the attention Singapore gives to ASEAN and the role of multilateralism in the region, and its current role as country coordinator of ASEAN-China dialogue relations.Rule of LawSingapore consistently has advocated for all parties to manage their differences calmly and peacefully in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. As a small country, Singapore has a fundamental interest in the peaceful settlement of international disputes in accordance with international law and its sanctioned processes rather than on the basis that might is right.3 Sovereignty disputes are governed by customary international law on the acquisition and loss of territory, not by the 1982 UNCLOS-a rather common misperception. Having presided over negotiations of the 1982 UNCLOS, Tommy Koh has iterated on various occasions that UNCLOS contains no provisions on how to resolve sovereignty disputes over islands or other geographic features. 4 The convention does set the various maritime zones that such features could potentially generate, defines the rights and obligations in those maritime zones, and in the event that there are overlapping maritime claims, determines how the maritime boundaries can be delimited in accordance with international law. Alas, claimant states in the South China Sea have taken unilateral actions in disputed areas, such as reclaiming and building artificial islands, conducting oil and gas exploration and exploitation, and increasing military and enforcement presence, all worrying trends.At this stage, where disputes are unlikely to be resolved by negotiation, Singapore advocates reliance on rules-based regimes and mechanisms to ensure peaceful settlement of the matter. Under no circumstances should force or the threat of force be used to settle disputes among states. Practical recommendations for managing the current level of tensions include a sweeping halt to all unilateral actions contrary to international law and for claimants to clarify the extent of the various claims. …

The South China Sea disputes are becoming increasingly tense with more and more countries expressing their views on legal issues and actions of claimant Statess in the South China Sea. In December 2019, Malaysia deposited a partial submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to establish the limits of its extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the northern part of the South China Sea. The submission sparked a new legal battle of diplomatic notes with the participation of South China Sea coastal States which can also be regarded as claimant States in the contet of the South China Sea disputes (Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Viet Nam) as well as non-claimant States (Australia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States). Following the article “South China Sea: New Battle of the Diplomatic Notes among claimants in 2019–2021” published in the Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy 6 (2021), this paper provides an analysis of the exchange of diplomatic notes between China and non-claimant States with the aim of understanding the impact of these exchanges on the prospect for the peaceful settlement of the maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

The tensions resulting from the territorial and maritime jurisdictional disputes between China and five Southeast Asian countries--Brunei, Indonesia, (1) Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam--have for years dominated the headlines on the South China Sea and defined the lens through which the issue is seen. While the United States has at times expressed its concerns over incidents in which destabilizing actions occurred, these developments had minimal impact on the US grand strategy of preventing the rise of a potential hegemon in the Western Pacific. Prior to China's push to enlarge the features it occupies in the Spratly Islands, US officials largely viewed the sovereignty dispute as a matter to be resolved between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and were careful in framing the issue as a diplomatic rather than a military challenge. While Washington had always emphasized its commitment to, and the need for all sides to respect, freedom of navigation and overflight and the unimpeded flow of global commerce, it has never enunciated in unequivocal terms what the United States would do to uphold these principles. This position would change as a result of US assessments of the implications of China's artificial island building beginning in late 2013. The United States is not a party to the South China Sea dispute. Yet it is a party to a disagreement and contest with a rising China on the meaning of freedom of the seas--a principle that is central to US core interests--and what the regional security landscape of the Asia-Pacific ought to look like in future years. Understanding the crux of this contest is important for grasping the role that the South China Sea plays in US grand strategy, and factors that can lead to substantive changes in US policy on the issue, or lack thereof. This article begins by deciphering what the United States views as its core interests in the South China Sea that have the potential to either support or upend US grand strategy. It posits that the United States has two fundamental and enduring core interests in the South China Sea: defending its view on freedom of the seas, and maintaining the naval and air superiority of the United States in the Western Pacific. The article moves on to offer an overview of America's South China Sea policy in the context of the US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, and is based on the premise that US officials began to devote significantly more attention and resources to the issue as a result of greater US focus on regional issues, especially with regard to Southeast Asia. This section also sheds light on the evolving nature of the disagreement between Beijing and Washington in light of the US rebalance. It presents a context for understanding how China's artificial island building, if strategically deployed, can be a nexus between these two sets of disputes, with the of causing the fundamental disagreement between the United States and China to spill over into the South China Sea. The following section elaborates official US views on China's reclamation activities and its implications for US core interests and grand strategy in the Asia Pacific. It seeks to capture the shift in US strategy on the South China Sea. This article concludes that the United States has responded with a new, active strategy that aims to: first, deter China from taking further actions at its reclaimed features that would alter the existing military balance of power in the region; and second, make it pay a net effect for its behaviour--should it continue to pursue an aggressive course of action--by engaging more forcibly with Southeast Asian partners. The final section outlines how the new shift in US policy has manifested itself to date, and analyzes the extent of its effectiveness as of this writing towards China's actions and for US core interests. This article seeks to capture a US-centric view of the evolving nature of the South China Sea dispute in relation to its grand strategy. …

South China Sea Territorial Dispute: A Lesson for Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

This chapter contributes to the ongoing debates regarding Cambodia's position on the South China Sea (SCS) dispute between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimant states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam. It talks about how Cambodia balances between ASEAN, the West, and China on the contentious issue of the SCS. It also mentions how China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has put ASEAN states, other actors, and Cambodia in a challenging strategic situation. The chapter points out how the SCS is not of direct concern to Cambodia as it is a non-claimant state, but it still holds great relevance to the country as a member of ASEAN and as a nation that is a significant beneficiary of Chinese aid and investment. It assesses the foreign policy approach that Cambodia has pursued to align with China on the issue of the South China Sea, which presents both opportunities and challenges.

The Mekong Subregional Cooperation Framework:A Geopolitical Dilemma and the Ways Forward Charadine Pich (bio) In the current environment of regional security architecture dynamics, complex geopolitical dilemmas, and the congestion of subregional cooperation mechanisms, the Mekong is no longer just a river but also a core ground for competition in a broader context for power play among the major powers. Some observers have even highlighted that the issue of Mekong geopolitics could follow the trajectory of the South China Sea disputes in the near future if it is not taken seriously. For the riparian states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), successfully managing geopolitical contestation over the river and its resources is of critical importance. ASEAN and the Mekong: A Diverging Path? The Mekong River (known as the Lancang in China) begins in the Tibetan Plateau and passes through China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam before joining the South China Sea. The Mekong basin is one of the most biodiverse areas in the world, sustaining around sixty-six million people. This figure amounts to 10% of ASEAN's total population and includes "most of the population of Laos and Cambodia, one-third of Thailand's sixty-five million, and one-fifth of Vietnam's ninety million people."1 At stake in the river's management are issues such as water sharing, dams and hydroelectricity production, fisheries, irrigation, environmental conservation, and climate change mitigation. The ASEAN countries are mostly divided into two camps over issues pertaining to the river: mainland Southeast Asia and maritime Southeast Asia. States in the former put the Mekong River among their top priorities because of the river's importance to the livelihoods of their people as well as their vulnerability to changes in the water flow from upstream by virtue of residing in the Lower Mekong region. States in the latter group, on the other hand, do not have a share of the river and consider issues regarding [End Page 57] the Mekong not primarily as security concerns but more in terms of their technical and environmental aspects. The troubles over the Mekong River have been largely viewed through an environmental and socioeconomic lens and seen as affecting only the mainland countries of ASEAN rather than ASEAN as a whole. Hence, the river's linkages with the region's broader security and geopolitical considerations have been given less attention. In contrast, although not all ASEAN member states are claimants in the South China Sea disputes, this particular issue is largely considered a wider security dilemma in the broader region of Southeast Asia and beyond and a major threat to regional peace, security, and stability. Although it might not be entirely fair to compare Mekong geopolitics to those of the South China Sea, there is no better approach to understand the Mekong security dilemma than to look at it through that benchmark. The disputes have been widely regarded as an alarming security threat for all of Southeast Asia that could jeopardize regional peace and security if not cautiously monitored. This risk is due to the diverse military presence and, to a certain extent, the arms race surrounding the area. While the Mekong security dilemma has not yet warranted this same level of heightened concern, many regional analysts are cautious of unprecedented trends in the Mekong given the increasing involvement of external actors and development partners alike. The Mekong issue has not yet attained a regional status or posed "alarming" threats that encourage discussions at the regional level among all the ASEAN member states or priority placement on any existing ASEAN agenda. In fact, Vietnam tried to slot the Mekong agenda into the wider discourse within ASEAN platforms during its 2020 chairmanship but found "very limited success."2 In part, this omission was due to the Covid-19 outbreak, which disrupted traditional ASEAN practices and shifted regional attention to focus more on public health and economic recovery. Nonetheless, Vietnam's attempt to highlight the Mekong on the ASEAN agenda was met with reservations from both maritime and mainland members. The maritime ASEAN states see Mekong issues as only affecting the mainland states and thus believe they should be dealt with through existing frameworks at the...

This chapter examines the recent developments in the South China Sea (SCS) by focusing on the actions taken by Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the past few years to ensure the effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) and move toward the eventual conclusion of a regional code of conduct (COC) in the SCS. It discusses the adoption of the DOC, the difficulties ASEAN encountered in dealing with the SCS issues as a group, and recent actions taken by ASEAN in relation to the implementation of the DOC and adoption of a regional COC in the SCS. The chapter concludes with remarks on the prospect for implementation of the DOC and adoption of a regional COC, and a call for Taiwan's inclusion in the negotiating process that deals with the SCS issues and in particular the DOC and COC-related matters. Keywords: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); code of conduct (COC); Declaration on the Conduct (DOC); South China Sea (SCS); Taiwan

Japan’s principal security interest in Southeast Asia is the safety and security of regional sea lanes. Over the past several years, Japan has expressed growing concern at rising tensions in the South China Sea and the lack of progress by the claimants to negotiate effective conflict management mechanisms. Japan is not a claimant in the dispute, but as a major maritime trading nation, it is a significant stakeholder. Japan has two major concerns over the South China Sea. First, that instability has the potential to disrupt the free flow of maritime trade on which the country’s economic prosperity depends, and, second, that if China is able to persuade or coerce other Asian nations into accepting its claimed ‘historic rights’ in the South China Sea, existing international legal norms would be undermined. Moreover, Tokyo is alarmed at China’s increasingly assertive posture in the maritime domain, and views the disputes in the South and East China Seas as linked. To mitigate its concerns over the South China Sea, Japan is pursuing a number of strategies: it raises the problem at regional security forums; it seeks to enhance cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on issues of maritime security and encourage unity within the organization on the South China Sea; it discusses the problem bilaterally with Southeast Asian countries and has started to provide capacity-building support to selected claimants (principally, the Philippines); and it seeks closer ties with other external stakeholders that share its concerns.

The South China Sea region has been a site of conflict for decades, with numerous states holding competing territorial claims due to its abundance of resources and strategic importance. Recently, China’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea has escalated tensions in the region and has strained efforts to bring peace. This paper observes the role of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in resolving the conflict in the South China Sea. First, this paper studies the ASEAN-China code of conduct, the dispute management approach currently being negotiated between ASEAN and China. This code of conduct will govern the conduct of the countries involved in the South China Sea disputes. Furthermore, this paper proposes key provisions that should be incorporated into this code of conduct to make it more effective. Second, this paper reviews the conflicting views of ASEAN member states that impede the creation and adoption of the code of conduct. To conclude, this paper recommends an alternative solution through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), proposing that the conciliation procedure provided in UNCLOS be adopted to resolve the long standing South China Sea disputes.

This chapter addresses Singapore's South China Sea (SCS) portfolio by mainly addressing development-oriented issues. It talks about how Singapore has re-postulated the SCS issue in the broader context of great-power wrestling and regional terrorist attack, while preferring to maintain flexibility as much as possible in handling it. It also notes that the overriding national interests would post daunting challenges to future Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) integration. The chapter views the SCS issue as an integral part of the reconfiguration of a transnational order in Southeast Asia, noting that its discussions can only be comprehensive when various aspects are factored into the deliberation. It argues that the transnational order is mainly economic-oriented, while regionalization has been a major push force.

Canada’s growing interest in trade with countries in the Indo-Pacific region corresponds with an ominous growth in geopolitical instability and insecurity in that part of the globe. With Indo-Pacific hunger for oil expected to soar – especially in China, where demand will translate to 80 per cent of imports in 10 years – Canada needs to develop policies to deal with the region’s turbulent realities. The Indo-Pacific comprises countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and includes such unstable and unpredictable players as North Korea and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons and long-simmering border tensions. India is an emerging economic and military rival to China. In the next 20 years, China and India are expected to lead the global demand for gas as coal consumption continues to decline, and Canada has a stake in this prosperous future. Along with territorial squabbles in the region, Canada will have to deal with complex issues such as terrorism, human trafficking, transnational crime, piracy and cyber-crime, as well as the struggle for global dominance between China and the U.S. One key area for potential conflict is China’s recent construction and militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea. The Canadian government’s new military strategy, Strong, Secure, Engaged does little more than make a plea for peace and the rule of law in the South China Sea. However, more trade crosses the Pacific Ocean from Canada than crosses the Atlantic. And with Canada signing on to the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the region’s troubles will need to be resolved by more than good intentions on paper. Canada must shift more diplomatic, security and military resources to the Indo-Pacific; otherwise, its efforts will be spread too thinly to be effective in the region. Trade, especially through a major route like the Strait of Malacca, could easily be disrupted by any one of a number of disputes, such as a conflict between China and Taiwan or if historic resentments boil over among competing territorial claimants in the region. Thus, Canada needs to step up and reaffirm its security commitments to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a partner in the region. Participating in maritime exercises and Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations would also help to reinforce to countries in the region the importance of abiding by international law. Meanwhile, Canada should set aside for now any intentions to negotiate a free trade agreement with China. China does not share some of Canada’s key trade and security goals and its aggressive behaviour in the South and East China Seas clearly signal that now is not the time to talk about a trade pact. China must demonstrate that it is willing to take a more cooperative approach to resolving trade and security issues in the Indo-Pacific and to support and respect the rule of law in the region. Canada has the potential to become a reliable, stable source of energy for Indo-Pacific countries. There is also an opportunity for provinces such as Alberta to strike their own strategic deals to provide energy resources to countries in that region, in return for trade and investment benefits. However, while investing at home in the necessary infrastructure and export capability to expand its role, Canada must also strive to bring its own unique approach to enhancing regional and energy security in the Indo-Pacific.

This chapter implies that the actions of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimants and non-claimants in the South China Sea (SCS) are driven by their respective strategic national interest in the dispute, amid various historical narratives and legal arguments. It elaborates that the effort to maintain a balance of power in the region creates a dilemma for individual ASEAN countries as they attempt to navigate between the strategic dependence on the US and the economic opportunities presented by China. It also talks about the challenges and constraints the ASEAN will face for playing a role in managing security in the SCS as the Sino-American strategic rivalry intensifies. The chapter traces the evolution of ASEAN's intervention in the disputes and accounts for ASEAN's achievements and failures. It describes the divisions within ASEAN that prevented a unified response to the SCS and highlights the implications for ASEAN centrality within the fast-evolving regional security architecture.

This article investigates and examines the efficacy of the multilateral and bilateral modalities or mechanisms in managing the South China Sea dispute between China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claimant states. There are three multilateral modalities in the management and control of the South China Sea dispute: the “ASEAN + China,” “ASEAN + X” and “ASEAN-X” modalities. At the bilateral level, mechanisms have developed between China and the Philippines, China and Vietnam, and China and Malaysia. It is argued in this article that the “ASEAN + China” modality remains the most realistic multilateral arrangement currently, while the alternative options of “ASEAN + X” and “ASEAN-X” might be feasible in the long term. Meanwhile, while bilateral mechanisms have fostered trust building and pragmatic maritime cooperation in the South China Sea, they are facing a number of challenges.