Abstract
Washington believed it had accepted the Revolution and set out a highly pragmatic approach to resurrecting US interests in the region. This chapter shows how US policy-makers placed their hopes in a small group of elites who seemed capable of defining Iran’s geopolitical interests in the terms understood by US officials. It shows how US diplomats tried to demonstrate their acceptance of the Revolution and some of the practical steps they took to try and repair US—Iranian relations. It also shows how US policy understood and reacted to changing political and security conditions in Iran. US diplomats in Iran had also to cope with a changing domestic situation in America, where the excesses of the Revolution had provoked virulent criticism of the new Iranian government. Equally, the ebb and flow of US—Soviet relations and the collapse of detente would affect assessments of the Soviet threat in Iran (and indeed Soviet estimates of US policy in the region).
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