Pursuing Petrodollar Interdependence

Saudi Arabia has long been an important country because of the pilgrimage to Mecca, leadership in Muslim institutions, oil wealth, rapid economic and social change, and its controversial role in both opposing and fostering Islamic radicalism. In early 2015 King Salman's succession to the throne initiated a series of changes, particularly in foreign and military affairs, that have increased Saudi Arabia's importance. Understanding current affairs in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a country that has historically been inhospitable to critical research, is therefore vital. The work under review here, Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political, Economic and Religious Change, is a good source of information and analysis for the general public and for specialists.In the introduction (chapter 1) the three editors pose two questions: Why were there no mass mobilizations or protests in Saudi Arabia during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings such as those experienced in other Arab countries? Why have so many analysts erred in their evaluations of Saudi politics? The answer to the first question may be found by reading many of the book's essays. In the view of the editors, the chief answer to the second question is that before the year 2000 few foreign scholars were able to conduct fieldwork in Saudi Arabia. The chief value of this book then resides in recent research conducted chiefly by foreign and some Saudi scholars, as epitomized in the fifteen chapters contained in this volume. The three editors also argue that an analysis of Saudi politics and society based solely on any one factor, such as oil, is inherently flawed, given the complex and dynamic nature of change currently underway in the kingdom. The introduction provides a rapid overview of developments in Saudi society and government, concentrating on the importance of the kingdom for the world, domestic and international challenges to the status quo, material and symbolic resources mobilized by the ruling family to meet these challenges, and contextualization of Saudi strengths and resources showing their strengths and weaknesses.The first theme treated in the book concerns oil, more specifically the role, impact, and effects of oil and the wealth it produces for Saudi Arabia. Oil plays a significant part throughout modern Saudi history and in all parts of this book. However, chapters by F. Gregory Gause, Toby C. Jones, Giacomo Luciani, Bernard Haykel, and Steffen Hertog most directly relate to this topic.Oil wealth is widely presumed to play a key role in determining political events. However, F. Gregory Gause, in his perceptive and timely analysis of this presumption in chapter 2, shows that periods of low oil prices do not automatically lead to political unrest and stress. Indeed, periods of high oil prices and high governmental revenues have often coincided with political mobilization, unrest, and violence, as in 1979–80, 1990–91, and 2003. The key determinants leading to such events were external crises in the Middle East or domestic non-oil factors. The Saudi rulers also were able to use saved investments, domestic borrowing, and tactics designed to raise world oil prices, thereby averting grave threats to the regime from low oil prices.Toby Jones in chapter 3 similarly argues that the benefits of oil wealth are sometimes overrated. Saudi Arabia has remained entirely dependent on oil revenues rather than using wealth to diversify the economy. The King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, which opened in 2009, was meant to re-emphasize the earlier role played by science and scientists in the centralizing of the state, the creation of its institutions, and the development of a political narrative emphasizing progress and development. Here, Jones discusses agriculture as a case study in the use of science by government, a process described at greater length in his book, Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Harvard University Press, 2010).In chapter 5 Giacomo Luciani examines the often-volatile price of oil on the world market and consequent challenges to long-term planning and economic investment. After 1985 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (opec) as a whole and Saudi Arabia in particular have not been able to play the role of price maker, leading the author to note that “statistically, our ability to model or project prices into the future is essentially nil” (74). Volatility has been increasing, as seen in dramatic swings in oil prices in 2007–9, and, one might add, more recently in 2015–16. Political-military upheavals also increase volatility, though Saudi Arabia has in the past increased marginal production of petroleum during such periods, as in 1990–91. Luciani argues for several changes in oil pricing policy that Saudi Arabia should, in his view, undertake; many of these proposed changes relate to the growing importance of China, Japan, and India in world oil consumption. The author predicts that barring such changes the international oil market as presently constituted will collapse.A very different analysis of oil's impact may be found in chapter 7, where Bernard Haykel first briefly discusses opinions and writings about oil among popular poets (Bandar bin Surur), among the ulama (ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn Baz), among Arab nationalists (ʿAbd Allah al-Turayqi), and among the royal family and technocratic bureaucrats. A particularly effective discussion involves the religious-legal claims of the state to ownership of mineral resources (134–35). Even more valuable is Haykel's analysis of al-Qaʿida's radical views on oil wealth that should lead to Saudi oil wealth being shared by all Muslims, and al-Qaʿida's changing opinions on the advisability of attacking oil facilities.In chapter 6 Steffen Hertog describes the regional impact of central government oil revenues, pointing out the key role of this money in the Saudi political economy and in the creation of an integrated business elite. The Najd in the central part of the country has received a higher proportion of spending than its population would warrant. Hertog argues that the most disadvantaged regions are neither the oil-rich east nor the cosmopolitan Hijaz in the west, but rather the southern regions close to Yemen. Government employment, promotions to high office, population growth, registration of private companies, real estate loans—in all these matters government most promotes the Najd, then the Hijaz, and last the southern regions. This argument expands upon and revises the earlier work of Kiren Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth (Cornell University Press, 1997).The second theme of the book is the role of Islam in Saudi Arabia. Chapters by David Commins, Nabil Mouline, Stéphane Lacroix, Saud Al-Sarhan, and Thomas Hegghammer discuss various aspects of Islam in the kingdom.In chapter 8 David Commins addresses the terminology used to describe the strand of Islam begun by Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century, often labeled Wahhabism. Foreign defenders of this approach first labeled it as a variety of Hanbali Sunnism that followed medieval thinkers like Ibn Taymiyya. After the third Saudi state led by King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz conquered the Hijaz in the mid-1920s some supporters in Egypt, including the influential Rashid Rida, argued that so-called Wahhabism was a variety of Salafism, seeking to return Islam to the practices of early Muslims. By the 1970s establishment Saudi clerics used the term Salafism to describe themselves, though they rejected the liberal strand of Salafism. Identification with Salafism became a tool used by Saudi religious figures against the pretensions of the Muslim Brotherhood and various Muslim radicals.Nabil Mouline's chapter argues that the Saudi political authorities sought to gain ascendancy over the Wahhabi ulama by the creation in 1971 of the Committee of Senior Scholars and a raft of similar groups designed to curb and organize the clerical power. However, the ulama expanded their own organizations, bureaucratized them, and adapted themselves to the new challenges of the 1990s. Mouline examines the powers, working arrangements, and political importance of the Committee of Senior Scholars. In this regard his chapter could be usefully supplemented by reading Muhammad al-Atawneh, Wahhabi Islam Facing the Challenges of Modernity: Dar al-Ifta in the Modern Saudi State (E. J. Brill, 2010), though both works need to be revised to include recent changes.One aspect of Islam in Saudi Arabia that has gained a great deal of attention since the 2003 attacks on New York City by al-Qaʿida Saudi recruits is radical terrorism. Stéphane Lacroix in chapter 9 looks at the opposite of this phenomenon: urban Islamist networks, particularly in educational institutions, that implicitly mobilized support for the regime from the 1960s onward. Employing social movement theory, Lacroix discusses the Islamic networks' effective opposition to al-Qaʿida in the Arabian Peninsula in 2003–5, thereby denying al-Qaʿida support from most Saudi religious youths. The Islamic networks played a dominant part in the 2005 municipal elections as well.In chapter 10 Saud al-Sarhan adopts a more familiar point of view, by analyzing the ideas and actions of three jihadi-salafist radicals—Humud ibn ʿAbd ʿAllah al-ʿUqla al-Shuʿaybi, Nasir ibn Hamad al-Fahd, and ʿAli ibn Khudayr al-Khudayr—for the years 1997–2003. These three opposed the monarchy, the official ulama, the alliance of Saudi Arabia with the United States, and the prevalent Saudi interpretation of the obligation to wage jihad (holy war), but their influence waned after 2003.Chapter 11 contains an informative essay on the causes of the weakness of violent radicalism in Saudi Arabia written by Thomas Hegghammer. In his view, “transnational Islamist militancy” is divided into those favoring “foreign fighter activism” such as ʿAbd Allah ʿAzzam and those espousing “anti-Western terrorism” such as Usama bin Ladin (207). Saudis generally favored classical jihadist theory and practice, thus participation in anti-Russian fighting in Chechnya and post-2003 Iraq was far more popular than al-Qaʿida's attacks against the United States or its terrorism inside Saudi Arabia itself in 2003–5.The third theme of the book, social change, is treated in two chapters dealing with Bedouins and genealogy (chapters 12 and 13, both written by Abdulaziz H. Al Fahad), and two chapters dealing with Saudi women (chapter 14 by Madawi Al-Rasheed, chapter 15 by Amélie Le Renard).Abdulaziz Al Fahad looks carefully in chapter 12 at the lament of the Najdi Bedouin poet Bandar bin Surur for the ending of nomadic lifestyles as a means to show one of the crucial aspects of modern Saudi rule—a centralization of political power that represented the settled inhabitants (hadar) at the expense of the nomadic tribes. The Saudi government ended tribal raiding, so Bedouins like Bandar bin Surur had to pursue other careers—in his case, becoming a truck driver and itinerant poet who celebrated the heroism, hospitality, and anti-hadar values of his ancestors, but who despised the new social order. Along the same lines, Al Fahad in chapter 13 discusses the flood of genealogical writings that starting in the 1980s seemed to show “a reaction against the decline of traditional modes of social and political organization, the atomization of society, the homogenizing powers of the modern state, and the failure of civil society to take root” (265–66). Both tribal and town identities were diminished; instead, the author argues that the Saudi state insisted on direct power over individuals, as seen, for example, in a national system of allocating male names or in the state selecting tribal leaders. In response, family associations emerged as private kin groups filling a void in civil society. The author supplements the pioneering work of Hamad al-Jasir on genealogy with his own ample research on the topic.Madawi Al-Rasheed in chapter 14 begins her incisive discussion of contemporary changes in the role of Saudi women by outlining the masculine state's subordination and exclusion of women from the public sphere through rulings by the ulama, regulation of women's attire, revival of polygamy, channeling of women to certain limited occupations, and in many other ways. However, in the 2000s there took place especially for female elites an “increased visibility of women [as] a product of modernizing authoritarian rule, economic liberalization, and, finally, the war on terror” (302). The author's analysis is presented at greater length in her book, A Most Masculine State: Gender, Politics, and Religion in Saudi Arabia (Cambridge University Press, 2013).Amélie Le Renard discusses the importance of shopping malls in Riyadh for young Saudi women, who thereby gain access to urban public spaces despite strict gender segregation. The author discloses the negative practical consequences of religiously inspired social rigidity, while also pointing to recent changes in education and employment that have opened some new opportunities for middle-class women to interact with each other in a consumption-oriented milieu. Her analysis is more fully presented in her book, A Society of Young Women: Opportunities of Place, Power, and Reform in Saudi Arabia (Stanford University Press, 2014).This excellent collection of essays is highly informative and well worth reading. However, it does contain a few weaknesses. More contributions from Saudi scholars would have been beneficial. Some authors invoke theoretical frameworks in which they situate their work, but many do not. A dominant question among scholars who study Saudi Arabia is whether the kingdom is so exceptional that it cannot be usefully compared to other countries, though some researchers reject this exceptionalist narrative. In this book Gause, Jones, Lacroix, Le Renard, and the three editors in their introduction might be put in the anti-exceptionalist category. A more explicit discussion of this topic by the other contributors would have been welcome.One problem found in most of the chapters is that they end their coverage in the decade of the 2000s and thereby do not cover recent developments in Saudi Arabia, even though the book has a copyright date of 2015. This problem is somewhat alleviated by the introduction as well as a brief afterword written by Bernard Haykel, in which he discusses the Saudi ban on the Muslim Brotherhood enacted in 2014, the addition of women to the Majlis al-Shura, the spread of social media, and rising expectations among young people because of great wealth that accrued to the state when oil prices were high. The reader who wishes to pursue in greater depth the topics discussed in this book is encouraged to take a close look at the thorough bibliographical coverage presented in J. E. Peterson, “The Arabian Peninsula in Modern Times: A Historiographical Survey of Recent Publications,” Journal of Arabian Studies 4, no. 2 (December 2014): 244–74.

The Myth of Sustainable Development: Personal Reflections on Energy, its Relation to Neoclassical Economics, and Stanley Jevons

248 SAIS REVIEW demonstrated, often against great odds, a remarkable capacity for improvising their own organizations and arranging their lives so as to steer round and even passively resist the oppressive regime which rules them. ... It gives some grounds for hope." The United States and Saudi Arabia: Ambivalent Allies. By David E. Long. Boulder, CoL: Westview Press, 1985. pp. 161. The American House ofSaud. By Stephen Emerson. New York: Franklin Watts, 1985. pp. 450. Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. By Nadav Safran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. pp. 524. Reviewed by Steven Simon, a State Departmentforeign affairs offcer. That the three books under review concern Saudi Arabia is about all they have in common. The United States and SaudiArabia: AmbivalentAllies by David Long is, despite its title, an upbeat assessment of the "special relationship." Steven Emerson's The American House of Saud is an overwritten, underargued exposé of Saudi influence in the United States. In his Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Questfor Security, Nadav Safran systematically covers Saudi foreign and security policy from the third realm (1902-32) to the close of Khaled's reign in 1982. The thesis of Long's book is straightforward: The United States and Saudi Arabia have long enjoyed a good relationship, in which "each country has benefited greatly from the other's friendship." Nevertheless, the two states have allowed economic, commercial, military, and political interests to overlap in times ofcrisis. The "Arab-Israeli problem" is often the cause of this confusion of interests, which breeds disappointment and resentment in both Washington and Riyadh. Long maintains that if the United States and Saudi Arabia could preserve the independence of these factors, relations between the two would assume a more productive and stable character. In practical terms this means that the United States would end its attempts to compel the Saudis to directly and publicly support the peace process by linking the sale of arms to the kingdom's cooperation. At the same time, the Saudis would have to foreswear the use of the oil weapon as a way of forcing the United States to adopt a more "evenhanded" approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author cautions that such mutual pressure ignores constraints on the maneuverability ofboth parties. The results desired are therefore bound to remain out of reach. Long's conclusion may be reasonable, but his argument is flawed. He overestimates the economic, diplomatic, and military benefits to the United States of the relationship, the importance of our ties to Israel in setting the limits to U.S.-Saudi cooperation, the extent to which Riyadh takes U.S. interests into account in developing policy, and the significance of ideology in Saudi decisionmaking. Consider the putative benefits of the "special relationship." The United States has tried over the past fifteen years to enlist Saudi cooperation in three areas: oil supply and pricing, the peace process, and strategic cooperation. Riyadh has consistently resisted these efforts. According to Long, Saudi Arabia's pricing policy has "reflected its interest in maintaining market stability" and has responded rationally to economic determinants. Most analysts agree. Yet the Saudi decision to maintain the price of oil set in Tehran in December 1973 could be viewed as the result of an array of noneconomic, tactical considerations: BOOK REVIEWS 249 Iranian pressure, anticipated difficulties with Iraq at the upcoming Rabat summit, a perception that the market would bear the new price, a diminished fear of the consequences of rapid modernization, and the continued American emphasis on the special relationship despite the embargo. The decision did not, however, take into account the depressing effect such a large price increase would have on the U.S. economy. The Saudis noted the likelihood of a contraction and saw that its consequences, including reduced demand, would in the end damage their own interests. But market realities and long-term U.S. (and Saudi) interests were not, evidently, the decisive factors in the episode. In 1979 the Saudis followed the same calculus in permitting the second major oil price hike, with equally disastrous consequences for the U.S. economy. It is interesting that in his dosing discussion of the economic basis of Saudi pricing policy, Long does...

The United States (US) industrial product index (IPI) and West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices during 1986 to 2008 are analyzed to reexamine the relationship between oil prices and the US economy. A key feature of this study is an analysis of changing distribution of the US IPI growth rates over time by the quantile regression model and a meaningful comparison analysis with the results of the ordinary least squares estimates is examined. The following conclusions are drawn from our empirical results. First, while oil prices have a significant negative impact on the US economy over expansive conditions, the relationship between them is positive when the US economy is experiencing recession regimes. Second, the asymmetric relationship between oil prices and the US IPI growth rates identified by this study could satisfactorily explain the existing puzzle regarding the link between oil prices and the US economy among prior empirical studies.

First Confirmed Cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) Infection in the United States, Updated Information on the Epidemiology of MERS-CoV Infection, and Guidance for the Public, Clinicians, and Public Health Authorities—May 2014

This paper uses the global vector autoregressive (GVAR) modelling approach to study (1) the effects of negative output shocks on Bangladesh's following trading partners on Bangladesh's economy: the United States, China, Eurozone, India and Saudi Arabia (2) positive global oil price shocks. To represent Bangladesh's macroeconomics, the GVAR model contains four key macroeconomic variables as endogenous variables. They are (1) real gross domestic product (GDP), (2) real exchange rate, (3) short-term interest rates, and (4) inflation. The specified GVAR model is estimated using quarterly data from 32 countries/regions from 1993Q4 to 2016Q4. The findings of this paper are consistent with theoretical predictions that external shocks can and will be transmitted to an open economy operating under a fixed or managed floating exchange rate system. For example, quantitatively, if the real output of Bangladesh's trading partners' falls by 1%, its output will fall by 0.39%, while the inflation rate of Bangladesh's trading partners' rises by 1%, and Bangladesh's inflation rate will increase by 1.38%. Although the negative output shock of the US economy will not significantly affect the Bangladeshi economy, the negative output shock of the Chinese economy will have a negative and significant effect on the Bangladeshi economy. The negative output shock on the US economy has caused the real exchange rate of Bangladesh's currency to appreciate and raised its short-term interest rate, although it is not statistically significant. Contrarily, a negative output shock to China or other economies devalues the real exchange rate of the Bangladeshi currency, although it is not statistically significant. However, Bangladesh's interest rates have not responded to negative output shocks from its trading partners (except the United States and Saudi Arabia), and they are not statistically significant. One policy implication of Bangladesh's inflation being overly sensitive to external inflation shocks is that Bangladesh can and should make its currency exchange rate more flexible to protect its economy from external price shocks. Unexpectedly, the external oil price shock did not seem to have a significant impact on the Bangladeshi economy. One explanation is that the impact of foreign inflation on Bangladesh's economy may have reflected the impact of oil prices.

The 21st century has seen several infectious disease outbreaks that have turned into epidemics and pandemics including Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) which began in Asia in 2003 (Poon, Guan, Nicholls, Yuen, & Peiris, 2004), followed by H1N1 that emerged in Mexico and the United States in 2009 (Belongia et al., 2010). Next came the lesser known Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) originating in Saudi Arabia in 2012 (Assiri et al., 2013), after which the Ebola outbreak in West Africa took place from 2014 to 2016, with a more recent occurrence in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2018 to 2019 (Malvy, McElroy, de Clerck, Günther, & van Griensven, 2019). To date, the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak that started in Wuhan, in the Hubei province of China, in late December 2019 seems to be eclipsing all of these previous infectious diseases in terms of its global reach and impact (Wang, Horby, Hayden, & Gao, 2020). After being declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) as a public health emergency on 30 January 2020 (World Health Organization, 2020c), it was elevated to a pandemic status on 11 March 2020 (World Health Organization, 2020d). As of 28 April 2020, there are more than 2.9 million cases and 202,597 deaths reported worldwide (World Health Organization, 2020b).

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Saudi Arabia is a country that is quite rich in oil production. But within a few years of peaking at the top, world oil prices have declined, which has seen Saudi Arabia drop below the United States. The government of Saudi Arabia then responded to the decline in the economy caused by fluctuating oil prices by compiling the Arab Vision 2030. The goal of the Arab Vision 2030 is to diversify the economy or want to release Saudi Arabia's economic dependence on oil production. This study seeks to analyze the efforts made by Saudi Arabia in implementing the Arab Vision 2030. This issue is more focused on the efforts that have been planned and will be carried out. This study uses the concept of national interest to analyze Saudi Arabia's efforts to implement Saudi Vision 2030. This research was conducted using a qualitative method with a literature study and case study approach. The data was collected through primary and secondary data in the form of articles, journals, and news in the mass media. This study concludes that several efforts made by Saudi Arabia began with new, more liberal policies and the creation of several infrastructures that support Saudi Arabia's economic diversification. Saudi Arabia is trying to increase its economy through the non-oil and gas sectors. Muhammad bin Salman, the Crown Prince, has a very important role in making policies related to economic diversification in Saudi Arabia. The efforts can still be seen from various aspects, such as increasing Saudi Arabia's investment in several countries and changing patterns of economic development in the non-oil and gas sector

Global Oil Trends and their Effect on the Middle East

Despite the growing recognition of insomnia among students, research specifically targeting respiratory therapy (RT) students remains limited. Therefore, this study aimed to assess the prevalence of insomnia symptoms and their association with academic performance among RT students in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United States of America (USA). The Insomnia Severity Index (ISI) survey was electronically distributed to students via email in coordination with RT program directors. Data analysis included descriptive statistics (frequencies and percentages), with insomnia prevalence reported as proportions with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). One-way ANOVA was employed to identify significant differences in ISI scores across categorical groups. A total of 403 responses were received from participants in both countries. The majority were from KSA (79.9%), and (20.1%) were from the USA. The prevalence of insomnia among RT students was 32% in KSA and 21% in the USA. Higher ISI scores were significantly associated with being female (p = 0.003), in the second academic year (p = 0.003), current smoking status (p < 0.001), single marital status (p < 0.001), and lower GPA (p < 0.001) in KSA. In the USA, elevated ISI scores were significantly associated only with current smoking status (p < 0.001). Insomnia was commonly reported among RT students in both KSA and the USA and was significantly associated with several demographic and academic variables, including GPA. These findings reflect correlational not causal relationships and suggest the need for targeted interventions to support healthy sleep habits and academic well-being among RT students.

Objective: The objective of this study was to compare the regulations and clinical requirements of the endodontic board certifications and master's degrees in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United States of America (USA). Materials and Methods: This study was performed in the year 2012. Documents from the American Board of Endodontics (ABE) and the Saudi Specialty Certificate in Endodontics (SSC-Dent [Endo]) were collected from their official websites. Fifty-two American and 3 Saudi endodontics programme directors were requested to submit their institutional requirements for obtaining board certification. Results: The response rates of directors from the KSA and USA were 100% ( n = 3) and 32.7% ( n = 17), respectively. In KSA, dentists with a bachelor's degree in dental surgery are eligible to join the 4-year SSC-Dent (Endo) programme or a 3-year master's degree programme. In the USA, dentists who graduate from a specialty accredited by the American postgraduate programme in endodontics are qualified to become board-certified through the ABE voluntary examination process. Both the SSC-Dent (Endo) and the ABE offer a variety of modules that equip the candidate with greater knowledge regarding endodontics. The two programmes consist of written and oral examinations and vary in terms of the number of clinical procedures involved. The didactics and clinical requirements of master's degree programmes in the KSA and USA are comparable. Conclusion: The regulations and clinical requirements of master's degree programmes in the KSA and USA are comparable, and both the SSC-Dent (Endo) and ABE have a variety of modules that can be completed.

We develop a quarterly macro-econometric model for the Saudi economy over the period 1981Q2-2018Q2 and integrate it within a compact model of the world economy (including the global oil market). This framework enables us to disentangle the size and speed of the transmission of growth shocks originating from the United States, China, and the world economy to Saudi Arabia, as well as study the implications of stress in global financial markets, low oil prices, and domestic fiscal adjustment on the Saudi economy. Results show that Saudi Arabia's economy is becoming more sensitive to developments in China than to shocks in the United States – in line with the direction of evolving trade patterns and China's growing role in the global oil market. A global growth slowdown (e.g. from trade tensions or geopolitical developments) could have significant implications for Saudi Arabia (with a growth elasticity of about 2½ after one year) and the oil market (reducing prices by about 5% for 0.5 percentage point reduction in global growth). We also illustrate that a 10% lower oil prices and stress in global financial markets could both have a negative effect on the Saudi economy, but given the prevailing social contract in Saudi Arabia, their impact is countered by fiscal easing. Finally, we observe that a domestic fiscal adjustment in Saudi Arabia does not show a negative impact on economic growth in the data. The impact on growth would depend upon the quality of fiscal adjustment and whether it is complemented with structural reforms.

The effects of oil and gold prices on oil-exporting countries

The OPEC Oil Embargo (1973) was precipitated by the Yom Kippur War. The United States was the first country to be sanctioned by Saudi Arabia, Libya, and other Arab countries on October 19, 1973 for its political and military support for Israel (particularly through the delivery of military equipment and arms, which played a key role in Israel's wars against neighboring countries). The 1973 Oil Embargo put a strain on a United States economy that had become increasingly reliant on foreign oil. The research is conducting to analyse the The Opec Oil Price Shock Crisis (1973) and Impact to United States of America. The objectivof this study is to examine the OPEC Oil Price Shock Crisis impact to United States of America. The concept of national interest is used to support the action of United States of America in solving the the crisis. The study is being carried out using a qualitative approach, including data gathered from secondary sources. The secondary data in this study also consists of printed and digital material gathered from articles and books. Findings of the study are several impacts that have a significant impact on the United States where it has already had an impact on the economy, politics and also the United States relationship with the OPEC organization. One of the obvious impacts is from an economic point of view. The U.S. economy undeniably experienced a downward trend during the oil crisis. It left no lasting impression, even more than a year on the United States. Not to forget the impact on U.S. politics. U.S. politics is seen as less stable and volatile after the oil crisis. But the United States Government is still able to work together to overcome this problem. Not to forget the impact on US relations and the OPEC Organization. The relationship between the two was seen to erode when the crisis began and in 1974 to 1975 witness their recovery phase but this crisis has taught the United States not to be too dependent on oil resources from foreign countries.