Pure and impure risk: Integrating and adapting to landmine danger in Western Sahara’s pasturelands

Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continue to kill, injure and destroy lives and livelihoods. They cause an estimated 11 to 12 casualties daily and are not confined to a single part of the world. The six countries with the highest landmine and ERW casualties in 2011 – Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan and South Sudan – belonged to different regions.1 Twenty years after the establishment of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and 15 years after the monumental Mine Ban Treaty, the world has yet to overcome this scourge, which harms far more innocent civilians than military personnel.1 In a paper in this issue of the Bulletin, Durham et al. note that in Global Burden of Disease (GBD) studies, the true number of landmine and ERW casualties has historically been underreported.2 Their paper was written before the release in December 2012 of the GBD 2010 report, which fails to specifically discuss accidents caused by landmines and ERW and categorizes them under “collective violence”.3 In line with the Landmine Monitor’s reporting on landmine and ERW casualties, the disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) attributable to collective violence have declined.4 However, the problem of landmines and ERW persists and it would be a grave misjudgement to consider it solved. The health community has a major role to play in matters pertaining to landmines and ERW. The most apparent is ensuring an adequate health-care response, both immediate (e.g. acute trauma care and surgery) and long-term (e.g. rehabilitation), to the physical and psychological trauma of people injured by landmines and ERW casualties. Most of these people live in poverty, which tends to get worse after the accident. Furthermore, health services equipped to treat people with landmines and ERW injuries are often found in urban areas only, yet most accidents occur in rural and remote areas. Those who survive but with permanent disabilities, often face social and environmental barriers that can preclude their full and equal participation within their communities. With many health campaigns and calls to action to promote child health and survival, it is worth noting a substantial proportion of civilian landmine and ERW accidents occur in children – 42% on average, according to the Landmine monitor 2012.1 Landmine and ERW contamination can also undermine the health of a population indirectly by destroying food security as well as access to safe water and to vaccination and health facilities in general.5 These weapons can also prevent community-based health teams from carrying out their activities. As succinctly noted by Maddocks, “infectious diseases move freely … but health teams are restricted to safe areas”.6 The tragic deaths of two polio workers recently killed by a landmine blast in Pakistan drives this message home, especially now that the international health community has focused its attention on health worker safety.7 Today we understand that to improve the health of a population, we must address the social determinants of health. Landmine and ERW contamination is among these social determinants. The social detriment it causes is incompatible with sustainable development and with the three fundamental aspects of human well-being: economic development, environmental sustainability and social inclusion.8 The indirect impact of landmines and ERW on health are not reflected in GBD studies or captured by data gathered in accordance with the International Classification of Diseases. Durham et al. call for better integration of mine action and health reporting systems to better inform resource allocation and planning. Similarly, WHO Director-General Margaret Chan, in her commentary in the special edition of The Lancet on GBD 2010, warned that national health information is not fully integrated into global data collection: “…we need to agree on common standards for documentation and sharing of data … that maximises benefits to countries”.9 Assisting the victims of landmines and ERW by providing them with health care and ensuring their thorough integration into society is an obligation under two major disarmament treaties – the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and the 2010 Convention on Cluster Munitions – and is one of the five pillars of mine action. The other four are clearance of landmines and ERW, stockpile destruction, advocacy for a universal ban and mine risk education. Despite this, victims continue to face a dire situation in most countries contaminated by landmines and ERW.10 Moreover, direct international support for victim assistance has decreased sharply; it dropped by almost 30% from 2010 to 2011, the year when it reached its lowest level since funding for monitoring mine action was initiated.1 At a time when countries are seeking to address their health problems through integrated approaches, all sectors must focus their attention on the fight against landmines and ERW.

Communities in war torn countries continue to face many life threatening situations long after the end of a war. These situations include the contamination of the environment by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). One of the main objectives of mine action is to address problems faced by communities owing to landmine contamination. Since the removal of all landmines worldwide is improbable, the humanitarian demining sector focusses on removing landmines from areas where communities are most affected. Due to the decrease in donor funding, there is continued pressure for more effective and efficient mine action through improved and appropriate data collection, analysis and the use of the latest technologies. Proper data management, sharing of data in the collaborative cloud and improved decision support systems to prioritize areas for demining, will result in more effective mine action. This chapter will discuss humanitarian demining as one of the components of mine action and will emphasize the importance of mapping an area for demining purposes. The importance of data management for decision support systems to prioritize areas for demining is covered with specific reference to data collection, manipulation, dissemination and data quality. The important role that the collaborative cloud plays in data dissemination and sharing is expanded upon. Use cases of the collaborative cloud and humanitarian mapping are noted and the role of data security is described. The latest decision support systems for humanitarian mapping are briefly discussed. The main shortcoming of these decision support systems is the lack of a spatial analysis component. The development of a decision support tool based on a Geographical Information System is illustrated by referring to case studies in Afghanistan and Western Sahara. The successful use of the GIS based decision support system has consequently lead to the development of a spatial multi-criteria analysis tool. The spatial multi-criteria analysis tool emphasizes the importance of sharing data in the collaborative cloud and the use of quality data. This tool contributed to humanitarian demining and mapping by assisting in better and faster decision making processes at a reduced cost.

Africa’s Last Colony

Background and significanceBlast injuries arising from high explosive weaponry is common in conflict areas. While blast injury characteristics are well recognised in the adults, there is a lack of consensus...

Millions of tonnes of dumped ammunition and explosive remnants of war remain in nature both on land and at sea. It is well known that the ordnance could represent a definite explosive risk if disturbed, and that some of the constituents in the ammunition could be harmful to humans and the environment. Nevertheless, a tacit assumption by decision makers is that, if left alone, the ammunition will slowly become harmless over time. Explosive remnants of war, however, represent not only an environmental risk but also a security and safety risk, as members of the public could come into contact with them, and fear is growing that ageing munitions could explode and/or be misused. In recent years, several concerns have been raised regarding the presence of dumped ammunition and explosive remnants of war, the potential dangers they represent, and the fact that the deterioration rate of the explosives could be significantly lower than previously assumed. In the present work, thermal and impact sensitivity studies of high explosives extracted from explosive remnants of war were performed, to determine whether or not the explosives have deteriorated to such a degree that a noteworthy decrease in performance and/or impact sensitivity can be recorded. The thermal behaviour of the explosives was studied using thermogravimetry analysis, and the impact sensitivity was determined using a fallhammer machine and the Bruceton test procedure. The thermal and impact sensitivity results obtained in the analysis indicated no deterioration of high explosives in the examined explosive remnants of war that would denote any significant reduction in performance and/or impact sensitivity.

The closing months of 2008 saw the end of a chapter and the opening of a new one in the Western Sahara conflict. Over the past three years, the peace process in Western Sahara, what the United Nations considers Africa’s last colony, was under the guidance of former Dutch diplomat Peter Van Walsum, who lost his position as UN Secretary General Personal Envoy at the end of August. Taking up where Van Walsum left off, the United States put forward the nomination of Ambassador Christopher Ross – one the US’s leading Middle East diplomats – to mediate the three decades old dispute between the occupying power, Morocco, and the Sahrawi pro-independence movement, the Polisario Front. The change of leadership in the Western Sahara peace process in autumn 2008 came shortly before the election of Barak Obama to the US presidency. Since 2001, theGeorgeW.Bush administration had taken a decidedly pro-Moroccan stance on the issue of Western Sahara, one that grew more explicit approaching the end of his second term. Though Obama won the election on a pledge to revise the Bush administration’s foreign policies, especially in the Middle East, it was still unclear – at the time ofwriting – whether the new administration in theWhiteHousewould also revise the US position on Western Sahara. As one of the most important Western powers with an interest in Western Sahara, next to France and Spain, yet with the power either to leverage or augment the stances of Paris and Rabat, the United States remains the linchpin to the (ir)resolution of the Western Sahara conflict.

BackgroundFollowing more than a decade of civil conflict, Nepal is among the countries affected by landmines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IED) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).ObjectivesTo assess the...

Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) pose significant
 humanitarian problems to the civilians as well as to the
 governments in post conflict situations. People continue
 to be at risk even after the war due to the presence of
 ERW. The issue of ERW has in fact shifted the focus of the
 international community from the immediate impacts of
 the weapons to their long term effects. In response to this,
 states concluded a landmark agreement, Protocol V to the
 UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in
 2003 (CCW). This Protocol aims at providing a proper
 mechanism to deal with ERW threat. Meanwhile, with the
 beginning of the new century and the emergence of newly
 sophisticated weapons the debate over the ERW got
 shifted to one of the most menacing category of weapons
 called cluster munitions. Again, responding to the
 problem, the state parties adopted the Convention of
 Cluster Munitions 2003 which bans the use and
 development of these deadly weapons. Both these
 instruments suffer from certain inherent limitations.
 Despite these limitations they still serve as the last resort
 for the civilians as well as for the governments of the war
 torn communities in dealing with the catastrophic effects
 of ERW.

This chapter focuses on the international legal side of explosive remnants of war (ERW): it focuses on the rights and duties which exist in general international law and on international humanitarian law in particular with special reference to the ERW situation in Eritrea and Ethiopia. It introduces the main legal terminology on landmines, booby traps and other explosive ordnance producing ERW. The chapter also introduces the magnitude of the problem of ERW in Eritrea and Ethiopia in general and in particular as a consequence of the Eritrean-Ethiopian armed conflict which raged between 1998 to 2000. The chapter provides a picture of the devastating effects of the war and the presence of ERW on these poor countries. It also focuses on the application of some of the 'cardinal' principles of international humanitarian law. The chapter discusses the ius in bello and ius post bellum . Keywords: Eritrea; Ethiopia; explosive remnants of war (ERW); international humanitarian law; ius in bello ; ius post bellum

Injuries place an enormous burden on individuals, households, and communities and they exacerbate poverty.1 A substantial but often under-recognized cause of injury in post-conflict environments is the presence of land mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), such as abandoned ordnance or weapons and cluster munitions, bombs, mortars or other devices that failed to detonate on impact but remain volatile and can explode if touched or moved. This under-recognition, which is partly the result of underestimates, has global implications because it affects to what extent the resources assigned to injury prevention and the rehabilitation of injured people are prioritized. This paper provides detailed case studies of three countries that are heavily contaminated with land mines and ERWs and where mine action pro- grammes – i.e. programmes for humanitarian, non-military purposes – have been in place for a long time: Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) and Viet Nam. The purpose is to illustrate the degree to which injuries caused by land mines and ERW are underreported. The paper highlights how little has been published in the health literature on the subject of land mines and ERW and the failure to include available national data on the injuries caused by these devices in global burden of disease (GBD) estimates. The GBD is a measure that combines the contribution of both mortality and impaired functionality resulting from a range of diseases and injuries to provide a national ranking for comparing disease burdens across countries and, by implication, for assessing the relative importance of a given health problem at the national and global levels. Hence, underreporting is of global relevance. Language: en

The Western Sahara region has been a source of complex political dispute between Morocco and other parties regarding its control. This issue arose subsequent to the decolonization era, and it is obvious that the process of decolonization has encountered various challenges throughout history. Despite the various approaches proposed by global leaders to address such issues and mitigate potential conflicts that could jeopardize regional security, certain methods such as mandates or the exercise of self-determination may be considered. The issue of Western Sahara has an extensive history of disputes and contentions among three primary parties: The Kingdom of Morocco, Mauritania, and the Polis Ario Front. Each of these parties has advanced claims over Western Sahara that align with their respective interests. On the other hand, the territorial dispute garnered the attention of various key players, including the United Nations and Spain, the former colonizer of the region, among others ("Western Sahara | Facts, History, Conflict, Map, & Population," 2023). This study will centre on the interplay between the defence and security policies of the United States and the United Nations in this multifaced issue.

FOCUS | INDIGENOUS PEOPLES & UNIONS 13 25/4 | International Union Rights | Since 2013, the EU Commission has been pushing to consolidate its trading arrangements with the Morocco into a ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area’ (DCFTA). For over a decade, the existing agreements with Morocco have in practice been knowingly applied to Western Sahara and its waters – a non-self governing territory over which Morocco has claimed sovereignty since Spanish withdrawal from the former colony in the 1970s. Already in 1966, following the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514), the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution (2229) calling for ‘the administering Power to determine at the earliest possible date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested Party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination’. That referendum is yet to happen, despite a 25-year UN mission designed to bring it about. As Morocco’s largest trading partner, the EU itself acknowledges that the four-decade long dispute over the occupation of Western Sahara has had devastating consequences, including creating 174,000 Sahrawi refugees – for whom the EU committed € 5 million to ‘supply basic food products’ and € 1.15 million to ‘ensure clean water’ in 20171. Lest one mistake such contributions to this humanitarian crisis as a heartfelt gesture, it is worth recalling that the EU also provides € 14 million (and growing) in annual support to the Moroccan fishing industry under its bilateral fisheries agreement – much of which is put into infrastructure in Western Sahara, where the unlawful plunder of resources continues unabated2. Following landmark rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the EU’s practice of applying its agreements with Morocco to the territory of the Saharawi is now clearly unlawful, but the EU appears determined to push on. Earlier this year, over one hundred organisations, including the Saharawi trade union, UGTSARIO (Unión General de Trabajadores de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro), were named by the EU Commission as having been ‘consulted’ on the matter of such application. In fact, the vast majority had expressly refused to participate in what they deemed to be a complete sham. EU Talks Trade, But Won’t Listen The Polisario Front proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in February 1976. In 1979, the UN recognised Polisario as the representative of the Saharawi people (General Assembly Resolution 34/37) and in 1984 the SADR became a member of the African Union (prompting Morocco to leave the organisation; since its own readmission in 2017, Morocco has been campaigning to reverse SADR membership). Polisario has launched multiple challenges before the EU’s courts against the application to Western Sahara of both planned and existing EU-Moroccan agreements - on liberalisation, fisheries, agriculture and aviation - arguing that no agreement with Morocco can be applied to the territory without the consent of the Saharawi people3. The CJEU has – to an extent – validated Polisario’s complaint, albeit in a manner which has allowed it to take comfort in legal fiction, rather than address a concrete reality. As a matter of textual interpretation, the Court rejected the view that these agreements apply to the territory of Western Sahara; nor can they so apply without the consent of the people of Western Sahara, as this would constitute a clear breach of international law. In finding that the agreements do not apply to Western Sahara, the Court however ruled that the Polisario Front therefore doesn’t have any standing before the Court in respect of the agreements, on the basis that Western Sahara is not legally affected by such agreements. That legal fiction is unravelling quickly. The EU is satisfied that its gaining access to the resources and markets of Western Sahara is without qualification beneficial to the economic development of the territory. It has committed to making the practice lawful, rather than ending the unlawful practice, and is undertaking to make the necessary amendments to...

The war between Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rfo de Oro, better known as the Polisario Front, is raging in one of the most remote and least known corners of the globe. Who are the people of Western Sahara, the Saharawis? What kind of relations did they have historically with their Moroccan neighbours to the north, and with the Mauritanian tribes to their south? How did such an apparently barren territory as Western Sahara come to be colonised by Spain, and what was Spanish rule there like? The territory's phosphate deposits are well known; but are there any other resources? How and why did Morocco and Mauritania lay claim to Western Sahara from the late 1950s? What indigenous political parties and liberation movements took shape within the Spanish colony, and what have the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had to say about the controversy surrounding its future? These are some of the questions that this file will address, in the hope of shedding some light on a contemporary decolonisation problem which seems as intractable as it is obscure. It will also examine how Western Sahara was ceded to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975-6, the consequent refugee movements to Algeria and the creation of Polisario's Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, the Moroccan-Mauritanian partition treaty of April 1976, the evolution of the war since 1975, Mauritania's withdrawal from Western Sahara in 1979, the role of the world powers and the prospects for peace.

FOCUS | INDIGENOUS PEOPLES & UNIONS 13 25/4 | International Union Rights | Since 2013, the EU Commission has been pushing to consolidate its trading arrangements with the Morocco into a ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area’ (DCFTA). For over a decade, the existing agreements with Morocco have in practice been knowingly applied to Western Sahara and its waters – a non-self governing territory over which Morocco has claimed sovereignty since Spanish withdrawal from the former colony in the 1970s. Already in 1966, following the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514), the UN General Assembly adopted a Resolution (2229) calling for ‘the administering Power to determine at the earliest possible date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested Party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination’. That referendum is yet to happen, despite a 25-year UN mission designed to bring it about. As Morocco’s largest trading partner, the EU itself acknowledges that the four-decade long dispute over the occupation of Western Sahara has had devastating consequences, including creating 174,000 Sahrawi refugees – for whom the EU committed € 5 million to ‘supply basic food products’ and € 1.15 million to ‘ensure clean water’ in 20171. Lest one mistake such contributions to this humanitarian crisis as a heartfelt gesture, it is worth recalling that the EU also provides € 14 million (and growing) in annual support to the Moroccan fishing industry under its bilateral fisheries agreement – much of which is put into infrastructure in Western Sahara, where the unlawful plunder of resources continues unabated2. Following landmark rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the EU’s practice of applying its agreements with Morocco to the territory of the Saharawi is now clearly unlawful, but the EU appears determined to push on. Earlier this year, over one hundred organisations, including the Saharawi trade union, UGTSARIO (Unión General de Trabajadores de Saguia el Hamra y Río de Oro), were named by the EU Commission as having been ‘consulted’ on the matter of such application. In fact, the vast majority had expressly refused to participate in what they deemed to be a complete sham. EU Talks Trade, But Won’t Listen The Polisario Front proclaimed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in February 1976. In 1979, the UN recognised Polisario as the representative of the Saharawi people (General Assembly Resolution 34/37) and in 1984 the SADR became a member of the African Union (prompting Morocco to leave the organisation; since its own readmission in 2017, Morocco has been campaigning to reverse SADR membership). Polisario has launched multiple challenges before the EU’s courts against the application to Western Sahara of both planned and existing EU-Moroccan agreements - on liberalisation, fisheries, agriculture and aviation - arguing that no agreement with Morocco can be applied to the territory without the consent of the Saharawi people3. The CJEU has – to an extent – validated Polisario’s complaint, albeit in a manner which has allowed it to take comfort in legal fiction, rather than address a concrete reality. As a matter of textual interpretation, the Court rejected the view that these agreements apply to the territory of Western Sahara; nor can they so apply without the consent of the people of Western Sahara, as this would constitute a clear breach of international law. In finding that the agreements do not apply to Western Sahara, the Court however ruled that the Polisario Front therefore doesn’t have any standing before the Court in respect of the agreements, on the basis that Western Sahara is not legally affected by such agreements. That legal fiction is unravelling quickly. The EU is satisfied that its gaining access to the resources and markets of Western Sahara is without qualification beneficial to the economic development of the territory. It has committed to making the practice lawful, rather than ending the unlawful practice, and is undertaking to make the necessary amendments to...

Subject Progress on the Western Saharan conflict Significance The UN Security Council (UNSC) voted on April 28 to extend for another year the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). The force observes a ceasefire (since 1991) between Morocco and the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara (the organisation recognised by the UN as representing Sahrawis). African Union (AU) demands to upgrade MINURSO's mandate to include human rights monitoring in the contested territory were rejected. Instead the watered down resolution calls on Morocco and the Polisario Front to "enter a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations" in order to reach a political solution. Impacts Sahrawi activists backed by Algeria will wage a legal battle against international companies cooperating with Morocco in Western Sahara. Diplomatic tension and competition between Morocco and Algeria will intensify and complicate regional conflict resolution efforts. However, a direct military confrontation between Morocco and Algeria is unlikely. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCR) may become more active in monitoring human rights in Western Sahara. This could create tension between OHCR and Rabat, and raise scrutiny on firms seeking to invest in Western Sahara or import goods.