Punishment and Regret

A significant body of empirical work attests to the negative consequences of psychological contract breach for employees and organizations. Two dominant explanations draw on social exchange theory and affective-events theory arguing that breach influences employees’ felt reciprocity and feelings of violation respectively, which in turn influences their contributions at work. However, breach has been found to produce stronger effect on attitudes versus behaviours (Conway & Briner, 2009), suggesting that there is insufficient knowledge about employees’ motivation after the experience of psychological contract breach. Herein lies the starting point of this thesis, which adopts a thwarted psychological need perspective to examine the motivational mechanism between psychological contract breach and employees’ behaviour. The focus on thwarted needs offers an alternative explanatory reason for why psychological contract breach matters, and extends the impact of breach from cognitions and emotions to psychological needs. With three empirical studies, this thesis aims to explore the role of thwarted need to control in understanding how employees’ respond to psychological contract breach. Study 1, a scenario-based experiment, supports the idea that breach can thwart employees’ state of need to control, which can in turn influence their intentions to engage in citizenship behaviours. Study 2 consists of a time-lagged survey with multi-source data of 163 Taiwanese employees in the service industry. The study findings reveal that thwarted need to control mediates the effect of breach on employees’ citizenship behaviours, and that employees’ implicit theories of employee-organization relationship moderates this mediating process. Study 3 consists of a three time-point survey of 124 EMBA Taiwanese employees over a six-month period. Study 3 replicates and extends the findings of study 2 by demonstrating that thwarted need to control provides a unique explanation (beyond established mechanisms such as felt obligation and feelings of violation) to explaining why employees withdraw their citizenship behaviour towards individuals, demonstrating its uniqueness in the aftermath of employees’ breach experience. This thesis expands existing knowledge of why psychological contract breach matters, and discusses the implications and directions for future research.

The problems are formulated as: 1) Has the minumum subsistance wage and the implementation of wage system protected the workers/laborer?, 2) Has the minimum subsistance wage contributed to the workers/laborers’ welfare? It is under the supervision of Yasin Nahar and Surahman. This is normative research using qualitative analysis method. The research aimed at finding out that the minumum subsistance wage and the waging system stipulated by the local goverment have provided protection for workers/laborers in terms of their welfare. Progressive law reviews the legal procedure within different period. Legal procedure refers to the integration of various factors as the elements such as mission of law, paradigm used, the knowledge on constitutional regulation law, the use of specific theories. It also includes attitudes and psychological matters such as intention, commitment, dare, determination, emphaty, as well as compassion. The provincial minumum subsistance wage in Tolitoli Regency has not been fully provided welfare for the workers/laborers and employees due to the fact that some employers interpreted the meaning of minimum subsistance wage that if the workers/laborers have been payed with the minimum subsistance, the employers feel that they already satisfy their obligation based on the statements on the regulations.

How should we explain the temporal asymmetries in our evaluations of past or future possibilities? One recent approach characterizes these asymmetries in terms of empirical generalizations governing human psychology, and finds an evolutionary basis for them in terms of past/future asymmetries found in the behavior of non-human animals. This chapter argues that human temporal reasoning, and particularly, our conceptions of past and future, depend on human language, and has no ready counterpart in animals. It proposes that human temporal reasoning is required by humans’ status, unique among animals, as free, and explains this freedom as fundamentally a matter of human psychology being full of singular causal connections not grounded in causal generalizations. This in turn suggests that the temporal asymmetries should be thought of in terms of our having a sheaf of tensed temporal emotions that we can feel in connection with particular, one-off psychological connections.

“They look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft, and therefore seldom fail to punish it with death,” Jonathan Swift famously wrote of the fictional island of Lilliput in Gulliver's Travels. Appearing as an epigraph of Edward Balleisen's Fraud: An American History from Barnum to Madoff, it invites comparison of Lilliput with the United States, not least because it is paired with a 2007 quotation from the former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who was rather more philosophical about fraud. As the world teetered on the edge of economic crisis, he wrote it off as a regrettable but inevitable part of “the way human nature functions,” suggesting that “what successful economies do is keep it to a minimum.” Looking backward, Balleisen finds greater ambivalence in the historical record, as a matter of both human psychology and American law. From the nation's founding, he observes, “the country's lionization of entrepreneurial freedom has given aid and comfort to the perpetrators of duplicitous schemes.” But this is not to say that they have been allowed to act with impunity. To the contrary, their creative deceptions have inspired a wide array of anti-fraud initiatives, operating “at the leading edge of regulatory innovation.” In chronicling these conflicting and conflicted pursuits of profit and justice over the course of two centuries of American history, Balleisen brilliantly elucidates an enduring dilemma of governance: how to promote ingenuity without undermining “‘the capital of confidence upon which all progress depends.’”

Since their discovery about three-quarters of a century ago, Echinocystis and Palœodiscus have been the themes of an intermittent stream of publications, and, although their Echinoid nature is now generally accepted, their significance and structure are still largely problematical. Jackson (1912, p. 250) concludes his account of the ‘Order’ Echinocystoida with the only confident statement in the paragraph, to the effect that ‘further knowledge is much to be desired’. Two sets of factors, one objective and the other partly subjective, are the causes of this uncertainty. The two forms have, as yet, been found in one locality only, so that most of the material is in one state of preservation. Friable casts of flexible tests that have been crushed and telescoped before and after decalcification are ill-adapted to reveal the structure of organisms that cannot be correlated with living types; and, in the case of fossils from Leintwardine, the rare specimens that are not decalcified are often less intelligible than the others. The new material that we have collected, including specimens which, in combination, show almost every aspect of the organisms, is sufficient warrant for this addition to the literature of the two genera for that reason alone. The second factor tending to confuse our outlook on these early Echinoidea is a matter of human history and psychology. The years between 1857 (when Salter described Palœodiscus ) and 1861 (when Wyville Thomson introduced Echinocystis ) saw the publication of the ‘Origin of Species’. By 1861 all palæontologists who did not reject the

A social psychology of non-human primates: A developing field

A mature discipline that cannot define its subject matter is like a sovereign country that has not defined its borders-although it has a sense of identity, the ambiguity at the edges invites hostile maneuvering. Mayer believes that personality psychology has an identity framework problem. Mayer is a serious scholar who has done a prodigious amount of reading; he proposes a well-thought-out model of the content of personality psychology, and he challenges others to provide a better one. In addition to registering general and enthusiastic approval of his project, I would make five further points. First, his article points up the significance of this journal. Mayer raises a very important issue, but his article probably would not be published in a so-called mainstream journal like Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. We should all be grateful for the existence of Psychological Inquiry and the good judgment of the editor. Second, personality psychology is not the only branch of psychology whose subject matter is poorly defined. What, for example, is the subject matter of social psychology? It seems to be an evaluation of how situations influence social behavior. But Hogan and Roberts (in press) noted that after 90 years, social psychology has yet to provide a taxonomy of situations; this suggests that (a) there is nothing in the world that actually corresponds to a situation, and (b) social psychology is defined operationally as that which social psychologists do. Third, Mayer's complex and apparently exhaustive framework for the field is tied to the content of existing personality theories; it is an organization of the status quo. This means that, should an original theory be proposed, it would lie outside the framework and be defined out of existence. But as a wise man once remarked, To put limits to speculation is treason to the future. Fourth, my sense is that Mayer is not entirely successful in his effort to maintain a distinction between framework and theory. His relational system of personality constructs (cf. Table 2) looks very much like a prescription for a theory. He suggests that a competent theory must include a discussion of enablers (working memory), establishments (self-concept), types (extraversion), and agencies (superego). I have no problem with these requirements; my point is that the distinction between a formal, content-free framework, and the substantive requirements of a theory become blurred here. Finally, I too have spent a good bit of time thinking about the definition and content of personality psychology. My views are rather different from Mayer's, but I can summarize them quickly, and this might be an appropriate occasion to do so (for more detail, see Hogan, 1976). Personality psychology concerns analyzing the nature of human nature. The topic is of huge practical, moral, and political significance-virtually all public policy is predicated on assumptions about human nature-and personality psychology is the only empirical discipline that takes human nature as its explicit subject matter-which is why it is so important. Studying human nature is not an ambiguous, formless, or open-ended pursuit. Rather, evolutionary theory defines the parameters of the discussion. It is a relatively straightforward task to analyze the design requirements of the species by asking what it is that we evolved to do. For some very interesting examples of this kind of analysis, I recommend Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989), Lykken (1995), and Simpson and Kenrick (1997). I adopted a history of ideas approach to defining the content of personality psychology. In brief, the approach involves a content analysis in which one tries to identify the essential themes underlying the subject. Although some judgment is required, the reliability of the classification scheme can be readily established by

The operative removal tumors of the parotid salivary gland.

Different approaches to the classification of a knowledge field include empiristic, rationalistic, historicist, and pragmatic methods. This paper demonstrates how these different methods have been applied to the classification of psychology. An etymological approach is insufficient to define the subject matter of psychology, because other terms can be used to describe the same domain. To define the subject matter of psychology from the point of view of its formal establishment as a science and academic discipline (in Leipzig, 1879) is also insufficient because this was done in specific historical circumstances, which narrowed the subject matter to physiologically-related issues. When defining the subject area of a scientific field it is necessary to consider how different ontological and epistemological views have made their influences. A subject area and the approaches by which this subject area has been studied cannot be separated from each other without tracing their mutual historical interactions. The classification of a subject field is theory-laden and thus cannot be neutral or ahistorical. If classification research can claim to have a method that is more general than the study of the concrete developments in the single knowledge fields the key is to be found in the general epistemological theories. It is shown how basic epistemological assumptions have formed the different approaches to psychology during the 20th century. The progress in the understanding of basic philosophical questions is decisive both for the development of a knowledge field and as the point of departure of classification. The theoretical principles developed in this paper are applied in a brief analysis of some concrete classification systems, including the one used by PsycINFO / Psychological Abstracts. The role of classification in modern information retrieval is also briefly discussed.

Psychology has been in the past and now is a fragmented science. One reason of the fragmentation is a disagreement about the subject matter of psychology. This paper attempts to review in detail the state of the subject matter disagreement. Analogy from conceptual integration in natural sciences can be used to integrate psychology. The author proposes that psychology should focus on human psychology only. Animal ar nonhuman organisms should not be a domain of psychological study but a domain of other sciences such as biology, zoology, entomology, wild life and animal sciences.

ABSTRACTWhy do international peace- and state-building interventions regularly fail to transform conflict-ridden countries into liberal states? This paper argues that interventionists’ practices and dependency on local intermediaries help explain the disappointing outcomes of intervention. Based on a relational theoretical approach and original empirical material, the paper compares two of the largest peace- and state-building interventions in recent years. For practical and normative reasons, peacebuilders need to find local partners who help them instil change. However, as partners of peace- and state-building interventions, local elites may appropriate international resources and use them to strengthen their own positions. Interventionists abstain from sanctioning such appropriation as long as their own short-term and purpose-oriented goals are not undermined. Contrary to assumptions in much of the literature, interventionists do not eagerly defend their alleged liberal agendas. Instead, their pragmatism strengthens existing neo-patrimonial figurations rather than fostering fundamental transformation. The paper argues that research should focus on peacebuilders’ actual practices rather than normative statements. Such an approach allows for a better understanding of evolving political orders in conflict societies.

Conflict provides the context for the manifestation of some of the most horrendous instances of violence in Nigeria. This paper discusses the salient aspects of an eight – year experience in the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja – Nigeria, where the author attempted to apply psychological principles in the conduct and supervision of research, advocacy and direct conflict management in some parts of Nigeria. Some of the significant observations are that; (a) within the Institute, among the members of the social science family, psychology is the least associated with the multidisciplinary “theatre” of conflict management arising from ignorance among fellow social scientists about the subject matter of psychology and rivalry emanating from subtle competition among sub disciplines of the social science for hegemonic role in conflict management, (b) many of the social scientists working in the Institute have limited skills in research, advocacy and practical conflict management, (c) in most cases, these other social scientists are oblivious of ethical issues in conflict research and management processes. For psychologists to make any appreciable impact in conflict management and contribute to the prevention of violence in Nigeria, they need to understand and communicate in a language that is mutually comprehensible to other social scientists. Psychologists operating in multidisciplinary settings need to cure themselves of their obsession with theoretical and methodological purity and sophistication in order to engage in meaningful and productive communication as well as foster better relationships with “more socially- minded” social scientists.

O emprego de sanções é corriqueiro e geralmente associado a uma expectativa de se aumentar a força normativa das regras. Alguns experimentos confirmam essa intuição e indicam que punições fazem com que as pessoas cooperem mais. Filósofos, no entanto, debatem, sem consenso, sobre quais devem ser os propósitos das punições. A despeito da discussão normativa, estudos psicológicos apontam para uma tendência punitiva retributivista no julgamento das pessoas comuns. Além disso, a psicologia tem apontado para algumas assimetrias no comportamento punitivo, como a diferença de preferências na escolha das pessoas na projeção das normas e no seu julgamento; a influência dos juízos morais na atribuição de intencionalidade para os julgamentos punitivos; e certas perplexidades envolvendo punição de acidentes. O filósofo do direito deveria fazer um esforço para integrar as diferentes informações sobre as punições para fornecer uma explicação mais adequada do fenômeno jurídico e para construir teorias normativas mais factíveis.

Chapter 7 addresses a concern about narratives that is often voiced: whether narratives about our lives are capable of truth and objectivity. Care needs to be taken as to what we mean by these terms: truth is not simply a matter of the constituent propositions in the narrative satisfying some minimal truth schema; and achieving objectivity is not simply a matter of providing or thinking through a narrative whose content expresses a perspective that can be shared by all reasonable people. Nonetheless, narratives are capable of truth and objectivity properly understood, and this in spite of the fact that, as a matter of human psychology, we tend to bestow our lives with a degree of narrativity that is often more appropriate to traditional fiction than it is to real life.

Utilitarianism has frequently been criticized for lacking psychological realism, but what this means and why it is thought to matter varies. This article distinguishes and examines three main relevant kinds of appeals to psychological realism: (a) A minimalist, self-avowedly metaethically neutral and empirically based ‘ought implies can’ approach, exemplified by Owen Flanagan. (b) Arguments from psychological costs and flourishing, exemplified by Michael Stocker and Bernard Williams. (c) ‘Thick’ psychological realism, exemplified by Elizabeth Anscombe, where a conception of human nature does not simply provide constraints on value theory, but forms the substantive basis on which it builds. The main challenge raised for utilitarianism turns out to be metaethical, not a matter of empirical psychology. The question is not so much whether utilitarianism can accommodate (putative) descriptive facts of human psychology as such, but what normative weight these facts should be given and why.