Abstract

During the Cold War, a non-nuclear U.S. ally, Japan, relied on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence for its security. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, Japan’s alignment with the United States was a focal point of political confrontation between the conservative and progressive camps while the public opinion was divided over the issue. Moreover, the public sentiment against nuclear weapons was so strong that the conservative camp had to compete with the progressive camp to better represent the public sentiment. As a result, the conservative government and the governing party were in the politically awkward position of having to carefully avoid making statements and taking actions that might have stimulated the public’ anti-nuclear sentiment and, further, might have been interpreted as distrust of the U.S.–Japan alignment and the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This article illustrates the combined effects of public opinion and party politics on Japan’s reliance on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, specifically the government’s public explanation of it, the establishment of it as a declared government policy and U.S.–Japan relationships regarding it in the late 1960s. To this end, it examines the government-level policy-deliberation and diplomacy as well as policy discussions on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in the national legislature.

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