Psycholegal Analysis of Nurses’ Decision-Making in Patient Treatment Refusal: A Human Rights Perspective in Indonesia

Regional human rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACtHPR) have become popular sites of mobilization for victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home. Besides being platforms for individual remedy, human rights courts increasingly shape social norms and state policy within countries, making them attractive avenues for rights advocates to develop new norms or to push domestic authorities to reform legislation. The judges of these courts can decide, for example, whether same-sex couples have a right to be married, if prisoners have the right to vote or receive HIV/AIDS treatment, or when a state can deport illegal immigrants to a country where they will likely be tortured. As these courts pass their judgments, they often find themselves in conflict with states that are violating human rights of marginalized groups on a large scale and are unwilling to implement international rulings. Although international human rights courts have become increasingly popular venues among victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home, we are only beginning to understand how activists play roles in shaping the development of regional human rights courts' case law—the body of judgments that shapes how judges will make their decisions in the future. We now have plenty of international relations and international legal research on the interactions between states and international courts: how judges in these courts wrestle between deferring to the interests of member state governments whose actions are on trial and sticking closely to the conventions' fundamental yet evolving principles (Alter et al., 2019; Helfer & Voeten, 2014). As some states begin to resist international courts' authority, scholars have begun to examine the dynamics of this backlash (Hillebrecht, 2022; Madsen et al., 2018; Sandholtz et al., 2018). Recent studies have also demonstrated that human rights advocates—whether NGOs or individual lawyers—have a significant impact on shaping the jurisprudence of international courts and the impact judgments have in concrete locations (Kahraman, 2018; Sundstrom, 2014; van der Vet, 2012; Kurban, 2020; Conant, 2018; Harms, 2021; Cichowski, 2016; Hodson, 2011; Haddad, 2018). Meanwhile, these advocates themselves have been subject to repression and stigmatization by governments as part of the backlash phenomenon. Without an adequate understanding of the factors shaping activists' engagement with international courts, we risk undervaluing their strategic impact on the expansion of case law, the human rights protection of marginalized groups who cannot find remedies at home, and the domestic implementation of these judgments in an age of state backlash. In this section, we summarize the three papers contained in this symposium and their original contributions to these themes. Over the last decade, dozens of countries have erected legal barriers or started vilifying campaigns to stymie the work of NGOs (Buyse, 2018; Chaudhry, 2022). One tactic in this toolkit is the enactment of burdensome regulation on NGOs that receive funds from foreign donors as they allegedly promote foreign agendas (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2021). States that frequently abuse human rights are especially prone to target NGOs that engage in strategic litigation (Hillebrecht, 2019). Most NGOs depend on foreign funding, and NGOs that litigate international cases fall disproportionately in this category, but do funders affect the selection of cases? In “Foreign Agents or Agents of Justice? Private Foundations, NGO Backlash, and International Human Rights Litigation,” Heidi Haddad and Lisa Sundstrom examine the extent to which Western donors, particularly private foundations, have encouraged NGOs in Europe to litigate at the ECtHR as a human rights advocacy strategy. They examine overall patterns of donor funding and NGO litigation records, and look in more detail at the case of Russian NGOs' foreign funding and litigation records. The analysis is extremely timely, as the Russian government's criminalization of independent civil society actors, especially in the human rights field, and their accusation that foreign funding turns NGOs into “foreign agents” have been crucial elements of the Russian regime's autocratization. This claim has also provided fuel for Russia's disenchantment with the ECtHR in recent years, contributing to the assessment of many observers that Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine was the last straw in an inevitable collision course leading to its exit from the Council of Europe. Haddad and Sundstrom debunk the idea that foreign donors are pushing NGOs toward strategies of human rights litigation. Instead, they argue, there is more evidence that NGOs themselves promoted the mechanism of international litigation as a strategy that donors later adopted. This article is a poignant reminder of the advocacy tools that Russian human rights activists and citizens have lost as a result of their government's departure from the Council of Europe, including ECtHR jurisdiction. Yet it also provides insight into the likely roles of foreign donors in other country cases where NGOs are using international court litigation as a human rights advocacy strategy, which is often a target of the ire of national governments, as explored in the next article in the symposium. When states attack human rights NGOs within their borders and/or international human rights courts themselves, how does this affect the willingness of those NGOs to take cases to international courts, and the ways in which they do so? De Silva and Plagis ask this question in their article about state backlash against NGOs in the case of Tanzania and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A fascinating empirical question they pose is: does state backlash against NGOs increase NGO litigation at international courts (to contest state repression at those courts and use international mechanisms when domestic ones are not available), roughly in line with Keck and Sikkink's famous “boomerang pattern” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), or decrease it due to heightened fear and restricted NGO capabilities that state repression creates? Employing a process-tracing analysis of NGOs' involvement in three cases before the African Court at different stages of the Tanzanian government's backlash against the Court, De Silva and Plagis find that “two-level backlash” by states can result in both phenomena, either promoting or deterring NGO legal mobilization at international human rights courts, depending on certain conditions. The three selected cases concerning the death penalty, the rights of persons with albinism, and the rights of pregnant schoolgirls and mothers, which took place at different time periods, demonstrate a number of patterns of state backlash interacting with NGO strategies. The authors find that domestic-level state backlash deterred domestic NGOs from partnering with international NGOs in litigation, but that such backlash, when it repressed domestic political and legal mobilization opportunities, actually encouraged both Tanzanian and international NGOs to turn to the African Court more frequently to seek remedies. International-level backlash in turn only deterred NGOs from international litigation when such backlash consisted of state efforts to restrict NGOs' ability to engage in litigation, and not when the international backlash was in the form of routine noncompliance with African Court rulings. Importantly, the authors find that NGO responses to state backlash were significantly shaped by their degree of legal consciousness and expertise with the rules, proceedings, and workings of the African Court. Those NGOs with less knowledge and experience were more likely to back away from engaging with the Court under the pressure of state backlash. De Silva and Plagis conclude that “NGOs' persistent human rights advocacy in the face of state backlash is a double-edged sword,” in the sense that they may not be deterred by state backlash initially, but there is a danger that their continued determination to engage in international litigation could prompt governments to engage in even more severe forms of backlash, with critical impacts on international courts and already vulnerable human rights defenders. Rights advocates have a growing menu of institutions and courts available to them. How do activists choose at which institution to lodge their cases in a world where legal remedies have diversified, or as some have argued, fragmented (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002)? In “What Makes an International Institution Work for Labor Activists? Shaping International Law through Strategic Litigation,” Filiz Kahraman goes beyond the tendency of legal mobilization studies to only examine how activists interact with a single court or institution. Instead, Kahraman opens up how rights advocates imagine which institution is most receptive to their claims. Drawing on a comparative interview study of British and Turkish trade union activists and their legal mobilization campaigns at international courts and quasi-judicial institutions like the International Labor Organization (ILO), Kahraman examines how activists first probe and then strategically identify which court or international institution is most susceptible to their primary goals of influencing structural reforms and setting new norms. Through this probing process—or dynamic signaling game between courts and litigants—activists push a court's jurisprudence and case law into new issue areas. For instance, at the ECtHR, Turkish trade unionists challenged domestic courts' ruling that public sector workers did not have the right to establish unions, even though the ECtHR had no established case law on labor rights in 1990s. They won the case, with the ECtHR finding that Turkey violated the right of public sector workers to unionize. These cases not only had an impact within Turkey, but over the next decades, similar cases brought by British unionists would spin off the early precedent set by the Turkish legal mobilization efforts. Kahraman argues that they ultimately pushed the ECtHR to recognize the basic trade union rights as fundamental human rights. Kahraman sheds light on the often hidden strategies behind international litigation. Activists litigate not just for the immediate impact on the current case they work on, but how they envision that all the cases they work on may shape norms and domestic structural reforms further in the future. Whether an institution is perceptive of claims lies in the eye of the beholder. Kahraman finds that besides targeting institutions with high compliance rates, they also take cases to institutions with low rates of compliance, especially “if these institutions have extensive judicial authority to create new international norms.” So, it is not the de jure protection set by an international courts, but rather how activists perceive the juridical responsiveness and judicial authority of courts—or, how judges adopt either an activist approach or restraint in response to incoming cases and how willing states are to implement cases of a court, respectively—that determines why activists select certain courts or quasi-judicial institutions (like the ILO). Kahraman gives us new tools to interpret how activists perceive authority and receptiveness and respond to opportunities. Rather than static external legal remedies, courts and quasi-judicial institutions are opportunity structures that are malleable to the strategic vision of the activist or litigant. The articles in this symposium together reveal a number of key overlapping insights. At the broadest level, they demonstrate that activists' behaviors and strategies influence international courts' jurisprudence, politics within states, and the human rights outcomes of everyday citizens—and these influences have often been hidden in our existing canon of research on international courts. In addition, all of these articles show that, while activists may face challenges in their efforts, often including significant backlash from their home state governments, they also continue to retain significant agency through their creative efforts to develop legal strategies and circumvent state repression. Activists perennially innovate: sparking the ideas that inspire donors who fund them; calculating how to continue their litigation work when government actors threaten them; and taking risks in litigation to push courts to expand how they define human rights. However, along with these uplifting conclusions, there are worrying patterns that demand future research. States are increasingly pushing back against the powers of international courts to bind them to costly measures, and as this symposium has shown, national governments often point to activists as contributors to this “problem” of invasive international human rights standards. A growing body of research has tracked how human rights defenders of all kinds globally are under threat from actors like governments and corporations who disagree with their contentious actions. We need more studies that gather comprehensive data and systematically track these threats, specifically with regard to activists who engage in international human rights litigation. We suspect that such activists are likely disproportionately targeted due to the international visibility of their complaints. We also desperately need research into possible innovative responses to these threats to activists—responses from activists, funders, governments of countries that support human rights, and international courts themselves. Freek van der Vet is a University Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki and the principal investigator of the Toxic Crimes Project. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. She is the director of the ActinCourts network at UBC and conducts research on legal mobilization by Russian activists.

This book examines religious minority rights in Islam in Indonesia from the international and local human rights perspectives. Its main contribution lies in the effort to find Indonesia's uniqueness in managing minority rights in religion. This study leads the author to a rich discussion of how international human rights through its activists spread the need for freedom of every citizen and how advocates of religious orthodoxy ​​respond to it. In contrast to analysts who use the dichotomous view of the acceptance or rejection of international human rights values, the author sees complexity in the process of spreading these values. It can be said that there is a process of modifying the values ​​of secularism in human rights and localization to make these values ​​an integral part of society. In this line of view, the author calls the Indonesian state a quasi-theistic secular state which means that Indonesia is a secular country but friendly and tries to guarantee freedom of religion and worship. In the case of minority rights in Islam, the state prioritizes harmony in society and supports the orthodox views of the majority. The minority view must be assimilated with the orthodox teachings of Islam to get a place to live. The quasi-theistic secular state continues to experience contestation and has undergone a long construction process based on the narration of the peaceful entry of Islam and the relatively moderate character of Indonesian Islam. At a certain level, this state concept has developed to be an identity and norms that become a reference for how to treat religious minorities. The author thus succeeded in showing that Indonesia is an example of a country that can develop its own identity and norms of religious life that are different from that of the Western secular state system.

Objective: This article analyzes the Islamic Law Compilation (KHI) as a manifestation of state engagement with Islamic law, utilizing a state typology framework for analysis. Methods: Employing both doctrinal and socio-legal methodologies, the research elucidates how the political-religious dynamics in Indonesia influence the codification and reform of Islamic family law. Results: The study illustrates that Indonesia occupies a unique position among Muslim-majority nations, embodying a synthesis of secular regulation and religious accommodation. Three key findings emerge from this analysis: (1) the KHI occupies an ambiguous status within Indonesia's legal hierarchy, which constrains its enforcement capabilities; (2) recent rulings from the Constitutional Court have redirected the trajectory of Islamic family law reform, frequently circumventing formal legislative procedures; and (3) a more adaptive approach to reforming Islamic family law necessitates a methodological transition from a textual-normative interpretation to a contextual-substantive interpretation. Conclusion: The article concludes that future reforms in Islamic family law in Indonesia must strike a balance among religious values, constitutional principles, international human rights standards, and local wisdom to ensure sociological legitimacy while striving for legal certainty and justice.

Bullying has transformed from a mere school behavior problem into a serious human rights violation with complex legal implications. This study aims to analyze the phenomenon of bullying through three normative lenses: Indonesian positive law, Islamic law, and international human rights instruments, with a particular focus on the case study of Timothy. The research method used is a normative juridical approach with a case study. The results show that Indonesian law, through the Child Protection Law, has provided criminal sanctions, but its implementation is still hampered by diversion for child perpetrators. From an Islamic legal perspective, bullying is considered an act of injustice that violates the principles of hifdz al-nafs (protection of life) and hifdz al-'ird (protection of honor). Meanwhile, a human rights perspective views bullying as a violation of the right to security and human dignity. Timothy's case underscores the need to synchronize preventive and repressive policies that are more humane yet still deter. This study recommends strengthening religion-based character education and strict supervision of children's social environments.

As is well known, different countries may have a different attitude toward the formal rank of international human rights law in domestic legal order. In those countries that qualify the ratified international human rights law merely as statute, the formal rank of international human rights law is often used as an argument against the binding force of international human rights law on domestic constitutional law. Through a comparative analysis between Germany and Taiwan, though, this paper shows that, despite similar determinations on the formal rank of international (human rights) law, the German and the Taiwanese Constitutional Courts have developed quite different views on the normative significance of international human rights law to their domestic constitutional orders. The different constitutional practices in Germany and Taiwan thus not only reflect Taiwan’s unique international status, but also indicate that the formal rank of international human rights law does not have much to do with its normative binding force on domestic constitutional law. Those who use formal rank as an argument against the binding force of international human rights law on constitutional law presuppose the absolute dichotomy of international and domestic law and thereby overlook the potential compatibility between international human rights law and constitutional law. From a human rights perspective, I argue that international human rights law should not be regarded as an “external” law, but rather as a framework order which delegates domestic constitutional orders to concretize international human rights law according to their own needs or interests so as to fulfill their international task of human rights protection on national level. Viewed this way, the determination on the formal rank of international human rights law in domestic legal order matters only because it has to do with the determination of a certain constitutional order on the way in which it concretizes international human rights law.

This study aims to analyze the practice of Piti Rambang in the perspective of Islamic civil law, as well as how the revitalization of Islamic values can be applied to harmonize customs with the principles of justice and protection of women's rights. This study uses an analytical descriptive method with a normative-empirical approach. The normative approach is carried out through the study of Islamic law, the Marriage Law, and human rights law in Indonesia. Meanwhile, an empirical approach is carried out through secondary data analysis related to Piti Rambang's practices, interviews with traditional leaders, academics, and women activists in Sumba. The results of the study show that the practice of Piti Rambang is contrary to the basic principles of marriage in Islam, which emphasizes the willingness of both parties (ridha) and gender justice. In national law, this practice violates the provisions of Article 6 of Law Number 1 of 1974 concerning Marriage, which requires the consent of both prospective brides. In addition, Piti Rambang can also be categorized as a violation of human rights and kidnapping based on Articles 328 and 333 of the Criminal Code. As an effort to revitalize Islamic values in marriage customs, it is necessary to carry out a reconstruction of customary law that is more oriented towards the values of sakinah, mawaddah, wa rahmah, as well as education to the public about women's rights in marriage. Local governments, religious leaders, and women's protection institutions must play an active role in conducting socialization and advocacy to ensure that Islamic customs and laws can run in harmony without harming certain parties, especially women.

This book explores whether or not international human rights and Islamic law are compatible. It asks whether Muslim States can comply with international human rights law whilst adhering to Islamic law. The traditional arguments on this subject are examined and responded to from both international human rights and Islamic legal perspectives. The volume engages international human rights law in theoretical dialogue with Islamic law, facilitating an evaluation of the human rights policy of modern Muslim States. It formulates a synthesis between these two extremes, and argues that although there are differences of scope and application, there is no fundamental incompatibility between these two bodies of law. The author argues that their differences could be better addressed if the concept of human rights were positively established from within the themes of Islamic law, rather than by imposing it upon Islamic law as an alien concept. Each article of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as relevant articles of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, are analysed in the light of Islamic law. The book concludes that it is possible to harmonise the differences between international human rights law and Islamic law through the adoption of the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine by international human rights treaty bodies and the utilization of the Islamic law doctrines of ‘maqâsid al-shari'ah’ (the overall objective of Shari'ah) and ‘maslahah’ (welfare) by Muslim States in their interpretation and application of Islamic law, respectively.

Objective: Ratifying Human Rights conventions are expected to strengthen the guarantee of Human Rights protection in Indonesia. Human Rights and Act Number 26 of 2000 concerning Human Rights Courts, Indonesia has shown increased involvement in participating as a party to various international agreements in the field of Human Rights. However, the dynamics of human rights law in Indonesia have not progressed since the 1988 reform marked by various existing human rights violations. This research refers to this tendency which slowly erodes the democratic quality of fundamental freedoms. Initially based on the principle of "freedom from fear," human rights have changed to "fear of freedom." So there needs to be continuity between law and politics toward human rights. Methode: The research method used is a normative legal approach with qualitative analysis. The data obtained includes first-level legal, tributary, and third-level legal sources. Result: The implementation of human rights law protection in Indonesia after the formation of Law Number 39 of 1999 concerning Human Rights has experienced ups and downs, which cannot be separated from law enforcement caused by several factors. Human Rights require judicial independence and the rule of law. The problem of upholding human rights and the rule of law in Indonesia involves a degraded legal system and other systems that have significant influence, such as the political, economic, and social systems. Suggestions: It is necessary to reexamine the Government's legal and political policies regarding upholding Human Rights in Indonesia, with a focus on studying the legal and political aspects of Human Rights to Act Number 39 of 1999 concerning Human Rights.

Although the application of Islamic criminal law still raises pros and cons due to the assumption that the sanctions tend to be sadistic. It does not mean Islamic criminal law is impossible to apply in Indonesia. Positive law in Indonesia results from thinking based on three components that substantially influence European, customary, and Islamic law. The problem related to the formation of positive law in Indonesia is the position of Islamic law, especially those still vague and unfamiliar to the public. So that the formulation of the problem in this study is: how are the dynamics of existence and the urgency of applying Islamic criminal law in Indonesia? This research used normative juridical methods or legal research. The study results show that the dynamics of Islamic criminal law in Indonesia began in the colonial period as a subsystem of customary law. As for the legalization process of Islamic law or criminal law in Indonesian law, it cannot be carried out easily due to the tendency of the influence of Western state law, which previously colonized Indonesia. Nowadys, Islamic criminal law has been applied to one of Indonesia’s regions, namely Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Another dynamic that Indonesia has to face in implementing Islamic criminal law is the existence of a stigma that punishment in Islamic criminal law seems sadistic and inhumane or violates human rights. The urgency of implementing Islamic criminal law in Indonesia is that Islamic criminal law contains more than all the goals commonly known in the world of criminal law, namely retribution, deterrence, and reformation.

This article re-visits the debate about whether or not Islamic law and international human rights are compatible. It examines and responds to the traditional arguments on the subject from both an international human rights and Islamic legal perspective. It formulates a synthesis between two extremes and argues that although there are some differences, that does not create a general state of dissonance between Islamic law and international human rights. The author argues that the differences would be easier to address if the concept of human rights is first positively established from within the themes of Islamic law rather than imposing it as a concept alien to Islamic law. He thus researches into the sources, jurisprudence and general principles of Islamic law to establish the concept of human rights in common perspective with the concept under international human rights law. The article concludes that through this establishment of common grounds Islamic law could serve as an important vehicle for the realisation of international human rights in the Muslim world.

The power of the Indonesian Constitutional Court to review laws is a constitutional adjudication process. It is a forum to resolve constitutional issues where a citizen can challenge Law that has injured his rights. The Court's reasoning provides audiences with the debates for its deliberation. Audiences may find reference to the international human rights law. It is an interesting practice. However, there is no studies yet about the information on the statistic of the Court made reference to international human rights law. As such, this study aims to identify reference to international human rights law in the Court's decision on judicial review cases from 2003 to 2016. Additionally, this study also aims to answer the question of what underlies the Court to made reference to international human rights law. As many studies show, the objective of Constitutional Court's references to the international human rights law is to strengthen constitutional rights protection. Nonetheless, the Court did not pay any interests to the global agenda of transnational constitutionalism or a convergence of rights and legal pluralism. The article is divided into 5 (five) sections, commencing with the introduction. The second part discusses the status of international human rights law in Indonesia. As the third presents information on Court's decision which cited international human rights law. Then, the fourth presents typical function of the decision that made reference to international human rights law. It concluded that the practice of referring to international law demonstrates the open attitude of Indonesian constitutional justices to the universal nature of fundamental rights.

Law was born to provide protection, justice and certainty in every dimension of social and state life, both individuals and groups. In this context, the law provides guarantees and principles of recognition and protection of human rights. This noble goal of the law will be easily realized when the politics of the law is clear. But in reality, the occurrence of human rights violations cannot be denied even though since the beginning the Indonesian state has adhered to the principles of the rule of law and democracy. Cases of human rights violations in the past are debts that must be resolved. Therefore, one of the problems today is how to resolve cases of human rights violations that occurred in the past and how to prepare more responsive legal instruments so that in the future human rights violations, especially those committed by the state, can be avoided. Furthermore, the resolution of past human rights violations is the key to upholding human rights in Indonesia in the future. This is where the political meaning of human rights law in Indonesia is to design more responsive legal regulations. Therefore, to create a more responsive politics of human rights law in Indonesia, we must first examine the journey of human rights in Indonesia through historical research. This is because historical research can reveal how the concept of human rights has been made in the past and how the concept of human rights should be made to build a better future. For this reason, a high commitment is needed from the government to develop the politics of human rights law in Indonesia.

Capital punishment remains a contentious issue at the intersection of Islamic law and human rights law. This paper undertakes a comprehensive examination of the discourse surrounding capital punishment within these two legal frameworks. Islamic law, rooted in the Quran and Sunnah, provides guidance on criminal justice, including provisions for the death penalty in certain cases. Human rights law, on the other hand, emphasizes the protection of individuals' inherent dignity and right to life, often challenging the legitimacy of capital punishment. Through a comparative analysis, this paper explores the philosophical, theological, and legal underpinnings of capital punishment in Islamic law and human rights law. It delves into the historical evolution of capital punishment in Islamic jurisprudence and examines contemporary interpretations and applications of hudud punishments. Additionally, it scrutinizes international human rights instruments and jurisprudence, evaluating the compatibility of capital punishment with principles of human dignity and the right to life. Furthermore, this paper examines the practical implications of capital punishment within Islamic legal systems and its interaction with human rights norms. It considers case studies and legal precedents from various jurisdictions to illustrate the complexities and challenges inherent in reconciling Islamic legal principles with international human rights standards regarding capital punishment. By engaging in this discourse, the paper aims to foster a nuanced understanding of the tensions and harmonies between Islamic law and human rights law concerning capital punishment. It contributes to scholarly dialogue on the intersection of religion, law, and human rights.

The nature of the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law remains a vexed one. In recent years, human rights lawyers and activists have sought to apply human rights norms to military conduct in international and internal conflicts, and during belligerent occupations. With varying degrees of success, complainants have brought their cases before international tribunals, and to national courts able to apply international human rights standards. This development has occurred largely because forums exist to hear human rights claims, whereas they do not for persons claiming individual redress for violations of international humanitarian law. However, human rights norms have also been seen as more restrictive: as placing greater constraints on States' freedom to conduct hostilities, preventively detain, and administer occupied territories. It is for this reason that some States have resisted attempts to extend the reach of international human rights law into areas traditionally seen as governed by international humanitarian law. This chapter argues that principles have now developed to govern the relationship between the two bodies of law. However, their application to different situations remains a work-in-progress and controversies remain. In particular, despite valient efforts, it remains unclear what what happens in situations where the two bodies of law cannot be read together? There are only few rules of norm-conflict resolution in international law, all of which have limited application in the context of the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law. Most inconsistencies between the rules of the two bodies of law are not true conflicts at all, as they do not require States to conduct themselves in different ways. It is simply that international humanitarian law is the more permissive system. In such situations, to argue that the two bodies of law are ‘complementary and mutually reinforcing’ is to do little more than issue a policy prescription. In reality, in such cases States have to make a choice as regards which rules they wish to comply (a choice which is likely to be a political one) and take the consequences. There are fundamental incompatibilities between international humanitarian law and human rights law, not only as regards discrete rules but in their theoretical bases. Attempts can be made to reconcile them, to avoid conflicts, but they can only be provisional and on a case-by-case basis. The legal tools available cannot always provide an answer. Absent legislation, conflicts will remain. And in a world of States with differing interests and values, the adoption of new rules governing armed conflict and belligerent occupation will be difficult, if not impossible. One difference between the two bodies of rules, in particular, remains fundamental. Despite developments over past decades which are said to indicate a ‘humanization of humanitarian law’, international humanitarian law, in contrast to human rights law, is not based on an individual rights paradigm. It is this difference, even excluding the differences in the substantive protections accorded individuals under the two bodies of law, which will ensure that individuals continue to bring complaints regarding their treatment in situations of armed conflict before human rights bodies. And even if human rights bodies take the view that States’ human rights obligations in situations of armed conflict are to be interpreted using the yardstick of international humanitarian law, their interpretations of humanitarian law are likely to differ from lawyers advising States’ defence ministries and armed forces, who are likely to continue to be unhappy with such trespasses into what they see as their chasse gardee.

The article carries out a systematic and critical analysis of doctrinal sources of existing systems of human rights protection in international and national Islamic (Muslim) law. The scientific approaches of Ukrainian and foreign international lawyers, researchers of comparative jurisprudence regarding the nature and essential characteristics of Muslim law, Islamic law, relevant legal systems and legal families of the modern world are singled out. Although there is considerable scientific interest in the issues of human rights protection in international law, national legislation of Ukraine and law enforcement practice, not enough attention is paid to the systems, mechanisms, subjects of human rights protection in Islamic (Muslim) law. In the existing studies, the emphasis is mainly on the general theoretical, historical and comparative legal features of the development of Islamic law, the Muslim legal family, but there are practically no scientific studies on the specifics of the protection of human rights and freedoms in certain areas, the implementation of international universal and regional standards on human rights in national legislation of Islamic (Muslim) states, guarantees and mechanisms for the protection of human rights and freedoms, judicial practice. The effects of such processes as globalization and regionalization, integration, as well as the interaction of existing legal systems at different levels turned out to be regular. The influence of European legal traditions, the experience of reforming national and supranational scales in the field of human rights protection in the European region, which was reflected in both the international legal doctrine and the legal doctrine of the studied states, the modernization of political and legal views, in particular regarding the revision of the elements modern and traditional, effective and dogmatic in the direction of protecting the rights of women and children, expanding the forms of international human rights cooperation etc. It is important to draw attention to the regional systems of human rights protection in international and national Islamic (Muslim) law, to consider the issue of their identity and effectiveness, their relationship with other international regional and universal, supranational systems.