Proximity and Nervous Shock

Abstract

This article examines the detail of the proximity requirements in ‘nervous shock’ cases and argues that, even though it may be desirable that Parliament legislates to remedy the current anomalous situation in relation to secondary victims, it can be remedied by a proper application of the common law. The origin of the present requirements is identified in the case of Hambrook v Stokes [1925] 1 KB 141 which, almost incidentally, raised the secondary victim requirement of spatio/temporal proximity. This, it is argued, arose because the judgments concentrated on the position of a road user. The article goes on to suggest that there is nothing in the law of negligence which requires that the secondary victim have a close tie of love and affection with the primary victim and that there be spatio/temporal closeness to the injurious event. This restrictive approach is contrasted with a more flexible approach in the pure economic loss case of White v Jones [1995] 1 All ER 691. Finally, the article considers different approaches to proximity in nervous shock cases.