Protestant Responses to Hollywood, Censorship, and Art Cinema

A Landmark Decision Rodney Hill Laura Wittern-Keller and Raymond J. Haberski, Jr. The Miracle Case: Film Censorship and the Supreme Court University Press of Kansas, 2008 233 pages; $35.00. Anyone familiar with the history of American film censorship is at least nominally aware of the “Miracle Case” of 1952, in which the U.S. Supreme Court finally extended free-speech protection to motion pictures. Prior to that time, the high court had not ruled on this particular issue since 1915, when it concluded in Mutual Film Company v. Ohio that the movies were “entertainment, pure and simple,” and as such did not fall within the purview of the First Amendment. The court’s decision in the “Miracle Case” (more properly known as Burstyn v. Wilson) ended decades of prior-restraint censorship and helped to usher in a period of greater freedom in American cinemas, in terms of the international films that could be shown here, as well as the kinds of subject matter that Hollywood studios and independents could broach in their films. What many of us might not know about the “Miracle Case” is the history of the man who brought it about. Joseph Burstyn (1901 – 1953) was a Polish immigrant who got into the film business in the 1930s as a distributor of European motion pictures. After World War Two, he and his partner, Arthur Mayer, introduced American audiences [End Page 101] to the Italian Art Cinema, with such acclaimed and successful titles as Rome: Open City (1945), Paisan (1946), and Bicycle Thieves (1948). Burstyn’s contributions to the way we have come to understand the international art cinema cannot be overstated. When he began his career in the 1930s, the total American market for international screenplays consisted of roughly 500,000 people. By the time of Burstyn’s death in 1953, the U.S. art-house audience had ballooned to over 7 million, thanks in large measure to his efforts. Burstyn’s greatest notoriety came with Roberto Rossellini’s Il Miracolo (The Miracle, 1948), which he combined with two other short photodramas—Jean Renoir’s A Day in the Country (1936) and Marcel Pagnol’s Jofroi (1933)—into an omnibus film which he titled, Ways of Love (released in 1950). The film opened at New York’s Paris Theatre, to critical acclaim and enthusiastic audiences. The City License Commissioner, however, found The Miracle to be “personally and officially blasphemous.” Subsequently, the New York State Board of Regents withdrew the film’s license, effectively banning it from New York screens. As Burstyn, together with the brilliant young attorney Ephraim S. London, fought the case all the way to the U. S. Supreme Court, he garnered the support of organizations such as the New York Film Critics, the ACLU, the American Jewish Congress, and the American Book Publishers Council. Burstyn and London’s victory in the case rocked the film industry and indeed shaped the future of American film history, as the Supreme Court declared, “expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Authors Wittern-Keller and Haberski are legal historians, offering a fresh angle on their subject that film scholars should welcome enthusiastically. One of the book’s greatest strengths is that it explains the legal intricacies and far-reaching ramifications of Burstyn’s case without getting bogged down the slightest bit in legalistic jargon. As such, it offers an account that is at once rigorous and highly readable. Furthermore, the book goes to great lengths to contextualize Burstyn’s individual legal struggle within the larger history of American film censorship—going back to the first local moving pictures censorship board, formed in Chicago in 1907, and looking forward to the era of Jack Valenti’s ratings system, self-imposed by the industry and still in effect today. Wittern-Keller and Haberski also do a commendable job of situating Burstyn v. Wilson within larger American cultural contexts, such as the changing attitudes towards freedom of expression in the 20th century, especially during the McCarthy era. However, the fact that the authors are not film scholars does present a few problems here...

In the United States, First Amendment protections for free speech are deeply associated with democracy. The dominant view in the Supreme Court and among commentators is that the primary (albeit not necessarily the only) reason we protect free speech is because of its essential role in advancing democratic self-governance. What are the implications of the democratic self-governance theory for free-speech protections outside the United States, in particular in nondemocratic countries? If we assume that the role of free speech is to advance democratic politics, then presumably non-democratic countries would have no reason to protect or tolerate speech. After all, if one rejects western-style liberal democracy, presumably one also rejects the subsidiary rules that undergird that system of government. The truth, however, is more complex. First of all, the vast majority of constitutions in the world grant at least some level of written protection for free speech, even though many of these constitutions are in countries which do not even purport to be free, multiparty democracies. Of course, many of these constitutional protections are shams; but it is simply not the case that no autocratic regimes permit free speech. The purpose of this paper is to explore how and why that might be so, and to consider whether the answers to these questions might have implications for domestic law.I begin by surveying the scope of global protections for free speech in written constitutions, and then examining in some detail three case studies of autocratic countries which have provided a degree of room for free speech: modern Communist China, the Soviet Union during the Glasnost era under Mikhail Gorbachev, and modern Qatar. In each case, I demonstrate that the regime provides meaningful protections for free speech, albeit with clear limits. I also argue that in each of these cases, the leadership has absolutely no interest in advancing democracy or surrendering their monopoly on power. Yet even without democracy, they perceive that permitting some degree of free speech advances their interests and the interests of their citizens and nations.Based on my case studies, I identify three distinct reasons why autocratic leaders might have an interest in permitting some freedom of speech by citizens. The first, and most significant, is internal control. In any large, bureaucratic system, central leadership often faces great difficulty in getting local officials to advance central policies and follow central leadership. Citizens can play an important role in identifying, and publicizing, corruption and lawlessness, as well as violations of central policy, at the local level. Second, free speech can act as a safety valve. Permitting some degree of free speech can, therefore, alleviate pressures for political change. Third, free speech as a form of citizen participation in government can lend legitimacy to a government, even without the legitimacy conferred by popular consent through elections. I also explore the countervailing factors – notably the desire for rulers to maintain their power – which result in clear limits on what sorts of speech will be tolerated in autocracies.I close by considering whether these alternative justifications for protecting free speech have any implications for speech within the United States. I argue they do, for this reason: even though our system of government is at its base democratic, actual citizen interactions with the government often are not experienced this way. This means that in addition to protecting democratic government, free speech also plays some of the same roles in the U.S. as in autocracies: permitting oversight over the bureaucracy, providing a safety valve, and granting legitimacy to high officials. I close by considering some doctrinal implications of this insight.

‘Transportation theory’ deals with phenomena which have been noted, valued and worried about since the days of Aristotle (catharsis) and Plato (mimesis and diegesis): we are often moved, and may sometimes be changed, by being caught up in a well-told story. In academic psychology, which tends to start from assumptions that humans set their path by cognitive rationality and learning, transportation theory brings back the potential importance of emotions and the recognition that a parable is often more powerful than an exposition. Green & Clark's paper 1, considering the application of transportation theory to the potential effects of movies in encouraging tobacco smoking, can be related to a long tradition. Worries that movies may have especially powerful effects, potentially leading young viewers away from desired norms or rational behaviour, arose early in the history of movies. The worries motivated a series of linked studies of ‘motion pictures and youth’ carried out in 1929–32. Among them was a study of Movies and Conduct by the sociologist Herbert Blumer, then at the start of his career, which collected and analysed ‘motion picture autobiographies’ from more than 1000 young Americans 2. A major element in Blumer's analysis is an equivalent of ‘transportation theory’, which he termed ‘emotional possession’: a ‘type of experience … in the course of which, through having his emotions roused, the individual loses self-control … Impulses which are ordinarily restrained are strongly stimulated … This emotional condition may get such a strong grip on the individual that even his efforts to rid himself of it by reasoning with himself may prove of little avail’ [2, p. 74]. Blumer notes that emotional possession is usually short-lived but then, as now, there was a strong hypothesis that such a powerful experience may have lasting effects, as expressed by one of Blumer's informants in this comment's title [2, p. 102]. While ‘emotional possession’, like ‘transportation theory’, could propel the audience member into approved as well as disapproved behaviour patterns the emphasis then, as now, tended to be on the problem side. Another study in the series, The Content of Motion Pictures, ranged quite widely in its content analysis of, among other samples, 115 US movies from 1928 to 1930 3. Included in the analyses were counts of pictures ‘containing liquor situations’ (78%) and with someone using tobacco (88%)—far higher than drinking and smoking rates then in the US population. Presentations of both behaviours were tilted towards the favourable; heroes were much more likely than villains to be shown drinking (43 versus 13%) and using tobacco (65 versus 23%) [3, pp. 167–172]. The problem, then and now, is in establishing the predictive power of possession or transportation in changing beliefs and behaviour, particularly concerning behaviours such as smoking or drinking which are often peripheral to the plotline. Those making the movies are often seeking to tap into cultural trends; the individual might have changed anyway, due to cultural change or simply to maturation, without the experience of possession or transportation. At a minimum, with respect to both alcohol and tobacco in the 1920s and 1930s, the American movies of the era can be described as ‘amplifiers of cultural change’ 4—but the changes in drinking and smoking were also being driven by many other factors. Even if the predictive power is established, there is the question of what to do about it. The 20th century saw much movie censorship, in the United States and elsewhere, but effective censorship operates within limits in an open society, and voluntary cooperation has also proved to have its limits. Besides, the censor's task is complicated by the finding that what the audience draws from a movie may diverge from the movie's overt moral framework—as, for instance, Charles Winick found in a study of audience response to a film, The Man with the Golden Arm (1955), which aimed to present drug addiction negatively; teenagers instead responded positively to a heroin addict portrayed by a famous actor 5. From my perspective, it would be helpful if work on transportation theory took more into account traditions of work which have used other terminology, such as absorption, engagement, flow or peak experience, for the same or closely related experiences 6. Thus, according to Slater & Rouner, ‘engagement, absorption, and transportation are three terms used by different researchers to describe the same phenomenon’ 7. That said, increased attention by psychologists to audience effects of media is welcome, and the idea that becoming caught up in the storyline of a film can have lasting effects is a useful counterpoint to approaches which focus solely upon persuasion by argument and through cognition. Consideration of such effects with respect to tobacco, alcohol and drugs is a potentially fruitful revival of the phenomena and concerns that Herbert Blumer and his colleagues first analysed. None.

Previous articleNext article No AccessEducational WritingsYouth and the Movies The Content of Motion Pictures, Children's Attendance at Motion Pictures. Edgar Dale Harold H. PunkeHarold H. Punke Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Volume 43, Number 10Dec., 1935 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/439873 Views: 1Total views on this site Journal History This article was published in The School Review (1893-1979), which is continued by the American Journal of Education (1979-present). PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

This chapter details Wyler's involvement in political activities that were organized to protest HUAC's influence over the content of motion pictures and its blacklisting of film artists accused of being subversive. Along with three others, he co-founded The Committee for the First Amendment, which sent a delegation to Washington, D.C. There is also a detailed accounting of government activity against Wyler and of his attempts to clear his reputation with Paramount. The chapter also provides production histories of three films made by Wyler that deal, directly or indirectly, with that political situation: Detective Story, based on a play by Sidney Kingsley, which deals with a fascistic police officer; The Desperate Hours, based on a best-selling novel, which stars Humphrey Bogart and Frederic March; and Wyler's remake of The Children's Hour, which centers on the persecution of two teachers fueled by the accusations of a child. Also touched on is Roman Holiday, which was written by blacklisted writer Dalton Trumbo (whose name was removed from the film but restored after his death).

Movie Censorship and American Culture Francis G. Couvares, Editor. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006. The second edition of this edited book is virtually unchanged from the original published by the Smithsonian Institution Press in 1996 except for a new preface by the editor. The work consists of the editor's introduction and eleven chapters. Most of the authors see connections between the historic cultural struggles in the United States as a result of ethnic and religious differences, immigration, and the commercialization of mass culture, and movie censorship. Attempts to censor or regulate motion picture content were particularly widespread in the 1920s and 1930s, although they extend to the present day. The early censorship efforts were led by reform groups such as the Women's Christian Temperance League and the General Federation of Women's Clubs or religious coalitions such as the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the National Council of Churches. As the authors point out, activists campaigned for federal, state and local censorship and consumer boycotts of the movies arguing that youth, women, and rural citizens were particularly vulnerable to the corrupting influences of the cinema. In arguing their points, many of the authors rely on recent books on movies and mass media, documents of the National Film Board of Review in the New York Public Library, archives of the Hollywood Production Code Administration and records of state and local censorship boards and reform groups. Daniel Czitrom's chapter on early theater licensing and the beginnings of movie censorship in New York City is particularly insightful and helpful. He notes that the Motion Picture Exhibitors Association began self-censorship as early as 1909 when the center of the industry was in New York City. When Hollywood became the heart of the industry the motion picture producers formed another voluntary censorship body, the National Board of Review. This organization formed the foundation for the later establishment of codes of censorship by the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association (MPPDA) under the leadership of William Hays, former Republican official and US Postmaster. Mothering the Movies a chapter by Alison M. Parker is a fascinating study of the role of the WCTU in attempts to censor the movies. The WCTU's efforts were aided by the US Supreme Court ruling in 1915 which argued that movie censorship and particularly prior restraint, did not violate the constitutional protections under the first and fourteen amendments of the US Constitution. Richard Maltby in his chapter focuses on the role of the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors in its censorship or alteration of plays, novels, and scripts to meet the demands of the Hays office. Editor Francis G. Couvares's study of the role of Protestant and Catholic interest groups in the censorship battles is particularly useful for scholars. …

Chinese films are subject to excessively rigorous standards in their production processes and are required to follow certain principles as part of efforts to safeguard films, the film industry, and the public. However, this could limit the freedom of film making and artistic expression. Considering the rigid film censorship system, filmmakers have long been calling for the implementation of a rating system. Similar to academic circles in the West, there has been a significant growth in research on the Chinese film industry. There have also been academic discourses about Chinese films and film festivals (Berry and Robinson 2017) and the development of the film industry (Kokas 2017; Su 2016). Simultaneously, Chinese films have entered a golden period of development and have also become a cultural card for China to establish its image globally. However, Chinese films remain unrated, and film censorship continues to be stringent. What are the factors that make the rating of Chinese films so difficult? This study reveals the main reasons such as the outdated Chinese film censorship system and the restrictions placed on film art. In particular, the release of many world-class films in China has been facing several hurdles, while some outstanding Chinese art films have also been banned in the domestic market. Therefore, to popularize Chinese films, it is imperative to examine the censorship system of Chinese films. Accordingly, this study analyzes the necessity and feasibility of establishing a film rating system by considering many popular films that cannot be shown in China or have been excessively censored and discusses the necessity and feasibility of establishing a film.

The Content of Motion Pictures. Children's Attendance at Motion Pictures.

The Content of Motion Pictures. [Combined with] Children's Attendance at Motion Pictures

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Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsThe Content of Motion Pictures and Children's Attendance at Motion Pictures. Edgar Dale Kimball YoungKimball Young Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by American Journal of Sociology Volume 41, Number 5Mar., 1936 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/217282 Views: 1Total views on this site PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

The American Psychological Association's (APA's) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct (American Psychological Association, 2017b; hereinafter referred to as the Ethics Code) does not contain an enforceable standard regarding psychologists' role in either honoring or protecting the free speech of others, or ensuring that their own free speech is protected, including an important corollary of free speech, the protection of academic freedom. Illiberal acts illegitimately restrict civil liberties. We argue that the ethics of illiberal acts have not been adequately scrutinized in the Ethics Code. Psychologists require free speech to properly enact their roles as scientists as well as professionals who wish to advocate for their clients and students to enhance social justice. This article delineates criteria for what ought to be included in the Ethics Code, argues that ethical issues regarding the protection of free speech rights meet these criteria, and proposes language to be added to the Ethics Code. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

How Constitutional Rights Matter explores whether constitutionalizing rights improves respect for those rights in practice. Drawing on global statistical analyses, case studies in Colombia, Myanmar, Poland, Russia, and Tunisia, and survey experiments in Turkey and the United States, this book advances three claims. First, enshrining rights in constitutions does not automatically ensure that those rights will be respected in practice. For rights to matter, rights violations need to be politically costly, which can happen when citizens mobilize against governments that encroach upon their rights. Successfully resisting the government, however, is no small feat for unconnected groups of citizens, and governments can often get away with constitutional rights violations. Second, some rights are more likely to be enforced than others. The reason is that some rights come with natural constituencies that are able to mobilize for their enforcement. This is the case for rights that are practiced by and within organizations, or “organizational rights,” such as the rights to religious freedom, unionize, and form political parties. Because religious groups, trade unions, and political parties are highly organized, they are well equipped to use the constitution to resist rights violations. Indeed, we find that these organizational rights are systematically associated with better practices. By contrast, rights that are practiced on an individual basis, such as free speech or the prohibition of torture, usually lack constituencies to enforce them, which makes it easier for governments to violate them. Third, even highly organized groups armed with the constitution face an uphill battle. Although such groups may be able to successfully resist repressive practices, they often can only delay governments that are truly dedicated to rights repression.

This chapter will provide a succinct introduction to the Indian state’s film censorship laws, policies, and practices, and thenmove on to a chronological overview of evolutions in film censorship in post-colonial India by focusing on two crucial historical periods of the 1970s and 1990s that were marked by a series of censorship controversies and protracted legal wrangles.1 Although mainly restricted to manifest censorship of popular Hindi cinema produced by the Bombay film industry, I shall also make occasional references to regional cinemas and new wave, art, and documentary films.

The rise of the Internet and the emergence of social media platforms have raised several questions concerning the exercise of the right to free speech as well as its judicial protection which fall under the constitutional umbrella.1 In particular, the phenomenon of social media influencers has questioned the traditional boundaries between commercial speech and other forms of expression. Indeed, from a constitutional law perspective, it is not simple to draft a clear line between different forms of expression, especially since, in some cases, the protection of free speech is broad including sometimes even those statements closer to hate and violence. In other words, the constitutional perspective reveals that the influencers’ phenomenon is more complicated than the debate about disclosure. This chapter will primarily analyze what is currently understood as the right of publicity by tracing its justifications and the evolving case-law that has developed in the United States (US). This chapter will then proceed to discuss the constitutional protection afforded to commercial speech in light of the case-law of the US and European courts. This comparative approach may appear to fall outside the scope of this research on the regulation of speech on digital platforms, in light of the transboundary element characterizing the online world. However, an analysis of the US Supreme Court’s case law offers useful insights into the constitutional framing of commercial communications. 4 Moreover, the research will focus on how the world of the Internet has affected the exercise and judicial protection of free speech. Finally, in light of the information described above, this chapter will attempt to assess how the current advertising practices by influencers on online social media (OSM) can be inserted in this picture and what rules they are currently subject to. In particular, the last part will focus on the Italian jurisdiction as a relevant example of how the topic of influencers can be contextualized in the topic of this chapter.