Protection Politics: The Effect of Government's Counterterrorism Policy on Terrorists' Choice of Targets

Abstract

Does political affiliation with the government in power lead to better protection from terrorism and to a lower probability of exposure to attacks? How do government's protective measures affect terrorists' decision of whom to attack? In this paper, I analyze these questions using a formal model that is based on the general framework proposed by Powell (2007). There are three main differences between this model and Powell's framework. First, in this model, government's decision on counterterrorism allocation occurs in the context of a broader conflict with terrorists, in which the latter demand concessions. Second, counterterrorism resources in this model are not abstract, but government allocates soldiers who can also become targets of attacks. Third, in an extension to this model, I explore how terrorists' uncertainty about government's sensitivity to military casualties affects government's allocation of soldiers, and terrorists' choice of targets. My analysis yields the following results: (1) populations that are government's key supporters become more attractive targets for terrorists; (2) as a result, governments protect their supporters more than others, and they become less likely to be attacked; (3) there are conditions under which terrorists attack soldiers and conditions under which they attack other populations that are less important to government; and (4) if terrorists are uncertain about government's sensitivity to military casualties, governments may over-allocate soldiers to reduce terrorists' demands.