Proper Names and the Referential-Attributive Distinction

1. Preliminaries In 'Reference and definite descriptions' (1966), Keith Donnellan argued that there were two different uses of definite descriptions: referential and attributive. He went on to suggest that Russell's (1905) Theory of Descriptions was incomplete at best, as it failed to accommodate the referential use. In 'Speaker's reference and semantic reference' (1977), Saul Kripke countered that Donnellan was mistaken in supposing that Russell's Theory was threatened by the referential use. Although definite descriptions could indeed be used referentially, this was (Kripke claimed) a pragmatic, not a semantic fact, and was therefore irrelevant to Russell's (semantic) Theory. In arguing on behalf of this view, Kripke proposed a particular test, the application of which was supposed to show that the referential use of definite descriptions did not disprove, or in any way threaten, Russell's Theory. Kripke thereby attempted to substantiate his claim that Donnellan's Distinction was not a semantically significant one. Kripke's argument against the alleged semantic significance of Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction has considerable intuitive appeal and has, consequently, been endorsed by a number of Russellians.1 Indeed, I agree with Kripke that the mere fact that definite descriptions are used referentially does not undermine Russell's Theory. However, I also believe that the fact that the referential use of definite descriptions is a standard (i.e., statistically common) use of such expressions, does pose a problem for Russell's Theory. When Kripke's Test is applied to the relevant phenomenon - the frequency of the referential use - the results lend credence to Donnellan's claims concerning the inadequacy of Russell's Theory. Although the mere frequency of the referential use does not, by itself, establish that such use is semantically significant, when coupled with various other considerations (to be discussed below), such frequency does indeed support Donnellan's claims about the semantic significance of his distinction. Or so I intend to argue. First, however, I will argue briefly for an alternative (non-Russellian, non-Donnellian) account of the semantics of referentially used definite descriptions. Once I have done this, it will not be difficult to motivate Donnellan's claim that the referential use (given its frequency) does indeed pose a problem for Russell's Theory.

A generally accepted view regarding proper names is that they have reference, but no lexical meaning (Lyons, 1977). This idea is the basis for the Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008) view of proper names as primitives of the Interpersonal Level and the lexical head of Subacts of Reference. At the Representational Level, the entity is designated by an absent head, which captures the fact that proper names do not have a meaning. Although this approach accounts for the most prototypical use of proper names, it fails to explain a range of other uses. In addition to the referential use of non-modified proper names, this paper analyses other uses of proper names in Portuguese: modified proper names, metaphorical proper names, and proper names in naming constructions. The proposal presented here explains cases of restrictive modification and metaphorical uses of proper names as instances of reflexive language and coercion, respectively. As for proper names in naming constructions, they are considered to have a third, different, function, in addition to the vocative and referential use.@font-face{font-family:"Cambria Math";panose-1:2 4 5 3 5 4 6 3 2 4;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:roman;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1107305727 0 0 415 0;}@font-face{font-family:Times;panose-1:0 0 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 0;mso-font-charset:0;mso-generic-font-family:auto;mso-font-pitch:variable;mso-font-signature:-536870145 1342185562 0 0 415 0;}p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal{mso-style-unhide:no;mso-style-qformat:yes;mso-style-parent:"";margin:0in;mso-pagination:none;text-autospace:none;font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman",serif;mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;}.MsoChpDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-default-props:yes;font-size:11.0pt;mso-ansi-font-size:11.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-fareast-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin;mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman";mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;mso-ansi-language:EN-US;mso-fareast-language:EN-US;}.MsoPapDefault{mso-style-type:export-only;mso-pagination:none;text-autospace:none;}div.WordSection1{page:WordSection1;}

Referential use of definite descriptions in Donnellan’s sense can be accounted for in semantic and pragmatic terms. One of the semantic accounts was outlined by Kaplan and elaborated in detail by Marti. According to their theory, when a definite description is used referentially, (1) it is used as a throw-away proper name, and (2) its attributive semantic content loses any semantic relevance. (In this theory, proper names are treated as directly referring devices.) The paper presents a criticism of this view. I argue that in typical cases of referential use, the attributive semantic content of a definite description is pragmatically relevant, and because of this, only subsequent use can show its semantical irrelevance. But the subsequent use is possible only for stable names, not for throwaway names. Thus, (2) can only be grounded by evidence that (1) excludes, which undermines the empirical basis of the theory in question. I conclude that this theory has no advantage over the pragmatic account of referential use, and that the pragmatic account is preferable for reasons of parsimony.

Definite descriptions, A reader, edited by Gary Ostertag, Bradford books, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1998, xii + 411 pp. - Gary Ostertag, Introduction, Pp. 1–34. - Bertrand Russell, On denoting, A reprint of 1119. Pp. 35–49. - A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, From Principia mathematica, A reprint of pp. 30–32, 66–71, 173–175 of 1941. Pp. 51–65. - Bertrand Russell, Descriptions, A reprint of pp. 167–180 of 11126. Pp. 67–77. - Stephen Neale, Grammatical form, logical form, and incomplete symbols. A reprint of LXI 1391. Pp. 79–121. - Rudolf Carnap, From Meaning and necessity, A reprint of pp. 32–42 of XIV 237. Pp. 123–133. - P. F. Strawson, On referring, A reprint of XVIII 87, Pp. 135–160. - Karel Lambert, A theory of definite descriptions, A revised reprint of XXXII 252(1, 3) with altered title, Pp. 161–171. (Reprinted from Philosophical applications of free logic, edited by Karel Lambert, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 1991, pp. 17–27). - Keith Donnellan, Reference and definite descriptions, A reprint of XL 276(12), Pp. 173–193. - H. P. Grice, From “Vacuous names,” A reprint of pp. 138–144 of XL 479(7), Pp. 195–200. - Christopher Peacocke, Proper names, reference, and rigid designation, Pp. 201–224. (Reprinted from Meaning, reference and necessity, New studies in semantics, edited by Simon Blackburn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge etc. 1975, pp. 109–132.) - Saul Kripke, Speaker's reference and semantic reference, Pp. 225–256. (Reprinted from Contemporary perspectives in the philosophy of language, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1979, pp. 6–27; also in Studies in the philosophy of language, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 2, The University of Minnesota, Morris 1977, pp. 255–276.) - Howard Wettstein, Demonstrative reference and definite descriptions, Pp. 257–273. (Reprinted from Philosophical studies, vol. 40 (1981), pp. 241–257.) - Scott Soames, Incomplete definite descriptions, Pp. 275–308. (Reprinted from Notre Dame journal of formal logic, vol. 27 (1986), pp. 349–375.) - Stephen Neale, Context and communication, Pp. 309–368. (Reprinted from Stephen Neale, Descriptions, Bradford books, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1990, pp. 62–117.) - Stephen Schiffer, Descriptions, indexicals, and belief reports: some dilemmas (but not the ones you expect). Pp. 369–395. (Reprinted from Mind, n.s. vol. 104 (1995), pp. 107–131.) - Volume 64 Issue 3

Journal Article On the Use of Proper Names and Definite Descriptions Get access Richard T. Garner Richard T. Garner The Ohio State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 19, Issue 76, July 1969, Pages 231–238, https://doi.org/10.2307/2218109 Published: 01 July 1969

Do Apparently Empty Names Help <scp>M</scp>illianism Prevail Against Widescopism? A Note

DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv2.05 In this paper I argue that the notions of speaker’s reference and semantic reference—used by Kripke in order to counter the contentious consequences of Donnellan’s distinction between the referential use and the attributive use of definite descriptions—do not have any application in the interpretive interaction between speaker and hearer. Hearers are always concerned with speaker’s reference. Either, in cases of cooperation, as presented as such by the speaker or, in cases of conflict, as perceived as such by the hearer. Any claim as to semantic reference is irrelevant for the purposes of communication and conversation. To the extent that the purpose of semantic theory is to account for linguistic communication, there is no reason to take definite descriptions to have semantic reference.

The use of official proper names is regulated by laws that contribute to the social codification and standardization of propria registration. The paper deals with minority language laws concerning the use of proper names of national minorities in Slovakia. The author gives an overview of the laws, or more precisely paragraphs dealing with the use of official anthroponyms, toponyms and names of institutions. In Slovakia, the largest national minority is Hungarian, so the paper gives examples of using the proper names of Hungarians living in Slovakia, that is, from Slovak-Hungarian bilingual municipalities. In an ethnically mixed environment, the variability of the forms of propria increases, since in the official (and non-official) sphere, proper names can be used not only in the state language, but also in the minority language. In bilingual municipalities, bilingual toponyms and names of institutions appear in both languages. Members of national minorities have the option of entering a personal name in the Register Offices in their mother tongue. Minority proper names fulfil an ethno-identification function, they are a source of individual and collective identity.

In this chapter, we summarize the observations about the difference between definite expressions and indefinite ones. Furthermore, we discuss which properties distinguish definite descriptions (expressions with the articlethe) from the other types of definite expressions like proper names, possessives, demonstratives, and pronouns. The basic insight is that definite descriptions may be used at least in some cases where the other definite expressions are also used, and some of the uses of definite descriptions, in fact, share characteristics with indefinites. It even seems difficult to argue that there is one use of definite descriptions that no other definite expression may have and that does not share properties with indefinites. The conclusion is that definiteness is a vague notion. But definite descriptions have a prototypical use. Definite expressions constitute a family resemblance. The object language mainly considered is English.

This chapter discusses definite descriptions, arguing that they have two possible functions and that failure to deal with this duality of function obscures the genuine referring use of definite descriptions. The first function is the referential use of definite description, in which the speaker uses it to refer to something. The second is the attributive use, in which the speaker asserts something about whatever or whoever fits the description. The chapter then examines the theories of Bertrand Russell and Peter Strawson regarding definite descriptions, saying that there is something wrong with their theories.

This paper revisits a study by Machery et al. (2004), suggesting that, in experimental versions of Kripke’s (1980) fictional cases on the use of proper names, Westerners are more likely than East Asian participants to show intuitions compatible with Kripke’s causal-historical (CH) theory of reference. We conducted two experiments, recruting participants from Norway and Bangladesh, either in English (experiment 1; N = 75) or in the participants’ native languages (experiment 2; N = 60), using modified cases and a new approach to data analysis. We replicated the results of Machery et al. (2004), but we show that the residual finding—i.e., that participants who are not aligned with CH produce responses consistent with a definite descriptions (DD) theory of reference—does not hold. Most participants in our experiments, and nearly all those who do not provide CH answers, respond as predicted by a theory that accommodates speaker’s reference in reasoning about uses of proper names, not according to DD. We suggest that cross-cultural variation in this task is real. However, explanations of variation within or across cultures need not invoke competing theories of reference (CH vs DD), and can be unified within a single, broadly Kripkean analysis that honors the basic distinction between semantic reference and speaker’s reference.

Only very recently have philosophers of religion begun to apply and adapt contemporary theories of meaning and reference to god-talk. Of particular interest here is the Causal Theory of Reference initially developed by Saul Kripke. 1 This theory is also known as the Historical Explanation View. 2 This theory offers a sharp contrast with traditional "descriptivist" theories of reference and poses some interesting and thorny problems when it is applied to god-talk. I will briefly sketch the essential differences between the two kinds of theories and then show the consequences of opting for a causal theory within religious language. Finally, I will argue that recent attempts to incorporate the causal theory within religious language have ignored a very significant consequent of the causal theory which makes the causal theory unacceptable for the religious person. I will conclude that some minimalist descriptivist theory is preferable within a religious context. Descriptivist theories of reference maintain that referring expressions such as definite descriptions and proper names are able to refer to some unique individual only because of some "content" or description or characteristic which truly applies to the individual thing named or described which is the referent. Let us focus here only upon singular, definite reference involving the use of proper names or definite descriptions of the form, 'the so-and-so.' According to the descriptivist accounts of reference, singular definite reference is successful only because the name or description "contains" some description of a property which is actually possessed by the individual. For reference to be completely successul there must be some unique reference which fits only the individual which is the reference of the referring expression under consideration. In other words given the old Principle of the Identity of Indescemibles, any individual must possess some unique property in order for us to

This paper deals with Donnellan's notion of the referential use of definite descriptions. First, I point out that Donnellan's examples in "Reference and Definite Descriptions" are almost exclusively those in which the speaker uses the description demonstratively. Secondly, however, I shall show that his notion need not be so restricted, and that referential use per se comprises the case of what I call "trace-based reference" -a kind of reference a speaker effects by calling the hearers' attention to the traces made by the intended referent. The rest of the paper will be devoted to the discussion of how one can explain and develop this notion.

In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive

The distinction between speaker’s and semantic reference arose in connection with Donnellan’s distinction between the referential use and the attributive use of definite descriptions. The central issue concerning the referential/attributive distinction is whether it is semantic or pragmatic. Kripke favours the pragmatic interpretation and developed the terminology of speaker’s and semantic reference in his explanation. The notion of speaker’s reference can apply also to uses of proper names, demonstratives, indefinite descriptions and quantifier expressions. The main danger for the speaker’s reference/semantic reference distinction lies in controversy over the semantics/pragmatics interface. Both Relevance Theory and neo‐Gricean theory acknowledge the phenomenon of pragmatic intrusion into semantics. If the pragmatic intrusion involves objective context rather than speaker’s intentions this may permit a distinction between speaker’s and semantic reference.