Promoting distributed photovoltaic adoption: An evolutionary game model approach for stakeholder coordination.

Abstract

Distributed photovoltaic (DPV) is a promising solution to climate change. However, the widespread adoption of DPV faces challenges, such as high upfront costs, regulatory barriers, and market uncertainty. Addressing these barriers requires coordinating the interests of stakeholders in the promotion of DPV. Therefore, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model in a social network with the government, investment companies and residents as the main subjects and examines the influence of different subjects' behavioral strategies on the promotion of DPV under the social learning mechanism. The results show that: (1) In the game equilibrium, both the government and residents hold a positive attitude towards the promotion of DPV; (2) Companies will obtain most of the subsidies through market power and information differences, resulting in the increase of government subsidies that do not always benefit residents; (3) The increase of energy consumption and pollution prevention costs can promote companies' investment in DPV; (4) The increase of environmental protection taxes to a certain extent helps companies to take responsibility for promoting DPV, reducing the pressure on the government to promote it and increasing residents' income. This study provides insights into the sustainable development of DPV.