Proliferation Security Initiative: Origins and Evolution

Abstract

Abstract : On December 9, 2002, the United States and Spanish navies cooperated to interdict a North Korean vessel, the So San, in the Arabian Sea. The operation initially appeared to be an unqualified success, a textbook example of interdiction to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), related materials, or delivery systems. According to press reports, the United States began tracking the vessel when it first left North Korea, believing that it was carrying a cargo related to Scud ballistic missiles. The So San flew no flag, making it a stateless vessel under international law, subject to interception and boarding by warships on the high seas. The United States asked the Spanish navy to stop and search the So San when the ship reached the patrol area of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, then under Spanish command. The mission of CTF 150 was to promote maritime security in order to counter terrorist acts and related illegal activities in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean. Thus, the United States proposed and Spain agreed to use a tool developed to combat global terrorism in a counterproliferation mission. After the Spanish naval ship Navarra intercepted the So San, the vessel's captain refused to halt, and Spanish naval personnel forcibly boarded it by helicopter. U.S. naval personnel joined the Spanish on board quickly thereafter. The So San's manifest claimed that it was carrying a cargo of cement. That statement, while true, was incomplete. Hidden in the ship's hold under many bags of cement was a proliferation cargo comprised of 15 complete Scud missiles, 15 conventional warheads, 23 containers of nitric acid missile fuel, and 85 barrels of initially unidentified chemicals, later described as oxidizer for the missile fuel. At Spain's request, the U.S. Navy took control of the vessel and its cargo.